THE PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY OF CHARLES HARTSHORNE:
AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF THE CATEGORIES OF DIPOLAR THEISM

BY

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INTRODUCTION

Charles Hartshorne is a philosopher of remarkable creative ability, whose synoptic turn of mind has produced one of the most significant contributions in the history of constructive thought.

Unfortunately, however, the power and originality of his extensive writing[1] has not been given the serious attention and critical reflection that it eminently deserves. This is no doubt largely due to the fact that his interests have been tangential to, and at times altogether dissociated from, a philosophical main stream that has rejected the legitimacy of metaphysics and questioned the possibility of constructing philosophical systems.

However, Hartshorne's rising stature on the American philosophical scene makes it imperative that a systematic, interpretive analysis of his work be made available. Aside from a few brief treatments of his thought[2] and a handful of book reviews, there is an obvious dearth of secondary material dealing with his philosophy. This dissertation is intended as an initial effort in what promises to be a sustained encounter with Hartshorne on the part of the writer.

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[1] Hartshorne to date has written some 160 articles and seven books (one of these, Philosophers Speak of God, being in joint authorship with William L. Reese). Two of his books, however, represent a republication of earlier articles--Reality as Social Process and The Logic of Perfection (though the latter work contains a highly original section on the ontological argument that had not been published previously).

Apart from a brief (and somewhat negative) confrontation with Hartshorne's thought during my junior year in seminary, my interest in his philosophy was kindled following a semester of exposure to Whitehead's Process and Reality in a graduate seminar. I was at once impressed by the originality, remarkable subtlety and the incisiveness of Whitehead's speculative metaphysics, but I was also somewhat overwhelmed by the difficulty of grasping categories and a technical vocabulary that at a first reading seemed to be rather abstruse. Nevertheless, a slow and patient rereading of the material a number of times overcame my initial difficulties and provided the impetus and enthusiasm that was later to be carried over to my study of Hartshorne.

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[2] Edward Farley, The Transcendence of God: A Study in Contemporary Philosophical Theology (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1960), Chapter V; Andrew Reck, "The Philosophy of Charles Hartshorne," in Studies in Whitehead's Philosophy, Vol. X, Tulane Studies in Philosophy (New Orleans: Tulane University Press, 1961), pp. 89-108; John B. Cobb, Jr., "'Perfection Exists': A Critique of Charles Hartshorne," Religion in Life, Vol. XXXII, No. 2 (Spring, 1963), pp. 294-304. (This is primarily a critical review of The Logic of Perfection, but there is an excellent summary of Hartshorne's doctrine of God in the third section of the article.) More specialized treatments of particular problems in Hartshorne's doctrine of God will be found in John Wilcox, "A Question from Physics for Certain Theists," The Journal of Religion, Vol. XLI, No. 4 (October, 1961), pp. 293-300; and in William A. Christian, An Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), pp. 330-334, 403-409.

My chief concern with Whitehead was the theological implications of his metaphysics. However, I found that his doctrine of God, while offering rich possibilities for a new, constructive conception of deity, had not been fully developed. I was soon to discover that Charles Hartshorne had devoted some forty years of his career to the systematic elaboration of a doctrine of God, the basic insights of which had been derived in no small measure from Whitehead. To be sure, Hartshorne has been influenced by many other philosophers, including Berkeley, Peirce, Royce, Fechner and Leibniz, to name but a few; but the most significant influence on his thought is probably that of Whitehead.

One of the difficulties in writing an interpretive analysis of Hartshorne's thought lies in the frustration of knowing where to begin. Because Hartshorne's philosophy forms an organic, self-returning system of mutually dependent ideas, there is a certain degree of arbitrariness in choosing a starting point. He has himself observed that "it is the very nature of metaphysical questions that they all interlock in such fashion that any one of them is the metaphysical question from a certain angle."[3] For example, panpsychism could well serve as the interpretive key to his thought;[4] or process as the all-inclusive category might become the central idea;[5] or the category of "asymmetrical organicity" (which is more or less a synthesis of panpsychism and process) could also do the honors; but equally plausible as the organizing category, and one which Hartshorne has recently identified as his own intuitive starting point, is the idea of God itself.[6]

Since ultimate conceptions, however, are invariably interconnected with one another in such a manner as to be mutually clarifying, whatever starting point is taken in approaching Hartshorne's philosophy, one is bound to end up with his idea of God. And by the same token, to undertake a thorough study of his idea of God is eventually to encounter the other major categories of his thinking.

This is precisely what I discovered in doing the research for this dissertation. As more and more of Hartshorne's articles and books were read, it became obvious that one could not begin to do justice to his doctrine of God without giving some attention to other major categories of his thought. For this reason, the first three chapters deal with such generic notions as Hartshorne's understanding of the method and structure of metaphysics and his conception of reality as social process.

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[3] Saint Anselm, Basic Writings: Proslogium, Monologium, Gaunilon's On Behalf of the Fool, Cur Deus Homo, trans. by S. W. Deane, with an intro. by Charles Hartshorne, 2nd ed. (La Salle: Open Court Publishing Company, 1962), p. 2.

[4] Beyond Humanism: Essay in the New Philosophy of Nature (Chicago: Willett, Clark & Company, 1937), p. 199.

[5] "Process as Inclusive Category: A Reply," The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LII, No. 4 (February 17, 1955), pp. 94-102.

[6] "Whitehead's Novel Intuition," in George L. Kline, ed., Alfred North Whitehead: Essays on His Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 21.

Chapters IV through VIII represent a systematic analysis of Hartshorne's doctrine of God. Chapter IV sets forth his logical analysis of the various ways in which the superiority of God may be differentiated from other individuals. We shall consider Hartshorne's vigorous polemic against various types of theological absolutism, all of which, he maintains, are infected in varying degrees with the "monopolar" bias of predicating of God only one side of certain ultimate contrasts. For example, traditional theology could affirm being and not becoming of God, eternity but not temporality, necessity and not contingency, self-sufficiency rather than dependence, immutability rather than mutability, impassibility rather than passibility, and so forth. We shall show how much monopolar prejudice is the principal source of what Hartshorne considers to be objectionable contradictions that arise out of the relationship between God and the world.

Chapter V deals with Hartshorne's theory of dipolarity, which represents his attempt to overcome the antinomies in traditional theism (such as the notion that God knows and loves the constituents of the world and yet has no element of contingency in his being) by positing two aspects in God--a wholly necessary, abstract essence, and a contingent, concrete actuality. In his essential aspect God is independent of, and wholly distinct from, the particular multiplicity of things which exist, but in his accidental aspect God includes the totality of the world within the concrete actuality of his experience. Hartshorne is thus able to construct a theological position that retains the positive values affirmed by both a transcendent theism and an immanental pantheism, without committing the monopolar fallacy that renders either of these doctrines one-sided when taken alone.

Chapter VI discusses Hartshorne's doctrine of the divine essence and his theory of relations, which is the logical core of the philosophy of panentheism. The reason why the problem of relations is central to Hartshorne's thought is that since he has predicated two aspects or natures of God, the inevitable question arises as to the relation between them. By making use of external relations, Hartshorne shows how it is possible to bring the absolute essence of God, which by definition implies the absence of relation, into relation with God's concrete, all-relative actuality, without forfeiting the categorical independence which constitutes the very meaning of absoluteness. The essence of God is an externally related, abstract term in the all-inclusive relativity of the divine actuality. In this manner Hartshorne is able to avoid the difficulties in two traditional positions: the difficulty, on the one hand, that arises from equating the whole of reality with the absolute, with the attendant problems generated by exclusively external relations; and the difficulty, on the other hand, of affirming sheer absoluteness of God, while trying to get him genuinely related to a contingent world.

Chapter VII is a presentation of Hartshorne's use of philosophical argumentation for the existence of God, with particular attention being given to his neoclassical reformulation of the ontological argument. Hartshorne concurs in the judgment of virtually all contemporary philosophers and theologians outside the Roman Catholic tradition that the classical arguments are invalid. However, Hartshorne's rejection of the traditional proofs is not because he regards the task of argumentation for the existence of God to be an illegitimate enterprise; rather it is because he rejects the confusions and absurdities arising from the conception of a wholly absolute deity--a conception that the traditional arguments were intended to support. He feels that new arguments may be formulated in such a way as to eliminate those weaknesses which vitiated the earlier formulations. For example, Hartshorne feels that in light of both traditional and more recent criticisms of the ontological argument, the only defensible form which it can take is in terms of a dipolar theism, where an allowable distinction of logical levels is made between the abstract existence (essence) and the concrete actuality of God. Apart from such a distinction, the Anselmian form of the argument not only cannot yield a valid inference, but it actually constitutes a cogent disproof of the idea of God. That is, it attempts to derive the concrete actuality of God from an abstract definition of his perfection--a procedure that is plainly contradictory.

In chapter VIII, we shall analyze Hartshorne's doctrine of the divine actuality, by which is meant the all-inclusive unity of the world as comprising a cosmic superlife. It is at this point that the idealistic implications of Hartshorne's theory of knowledge are clearly seen. For he contends that the world can only be constituted as a single organic reality by virtue of its being the content of God's unitary intuition in a unique, simultaneous, present moment.

Moreover, since a cosmic simultaneity is possible only where contemporary events are causally related to one another, Hartshorne has consistently elaborated his doctrine of panentheism in terms of a theory of the interdependence of contemporary events. Expressed otherwise, Hartshorne was obliged to reject one of the basic principles of relativity physics that there is a mutual independence between contemporary happenings.

Recently, however, Hartshorne has definitely broken with his earlier point of view regarding contemporary relations--a shift in position, we shall contend, that has important ramifications for his doctrine of God. The argument to be put forth in the concluding chapter of the dissertation is that this seemingly inconsequential concession to Whitehead and present-day physics actually introduces a basic inconsistency in his doctrine of God that implicates his theism in precisely the kind of incoherency that he has so vigorously attacked in traditional theisms. Specifically, our thesis is that by relinquishing his earlier view regarding the mutual immanence of contemporary events, and by subsequently adopting the position that contemporaries are causally unrelated to one another, Hartshorne has undermined that axiomatic assumption in terms of which his understanding of the relation between God and the world was articulated: namely, the principle that to be is to be known by God, and that God's knowledge is not only the measure of reality but that it literally includes all reality. This may be demonstrated propositionally as follows: (1) Hartshorne's recent endorsement of causal independence among contemporary events entails the rejection of an absolute cosmic simultaneity (though not necessarily the denial of a divine present moment). (2) If there is no cosmic simultaneity, no instantaneous cross section of the world in a given moment of time, then the principle of panentheism that God literally includes all of reality in a single, unitary synthesis must be amended in favor of a view which allows more autonomy to the world. (3) If God does not literally include the world which is contemporary with him, then there is some reality--the presently becoming world--which is independent of God's knowledge of it. (4) If there is an aspect of the real world that is external to God's knowledge, then it is not unqualifiedly true that omniscience is the measure of reality, that to be is to be known by God.

Now if this above line of reasoning can be sustained, then it seems that several aspects of Hartshorne's doctrine of God, which were originally formulated within the context of a cosmic contemporaneity, are no longer defensible: (1) Hartshorne's description of the divine essence as the utterly abstract, all-pervasive factor immanent within the whole of reality becomes inconsistent with the affirmation of a contemporary world which is in unison of becoming with the divine actuality. (2) Insofar as Hartshorne's formulation of the ontological argument is dependent upon the acceptance of the divine essence as coextensive with all reality, it too becomes forfeit to an unacceptable inconsistency. (3) To the extent that the panentheistic principle of the inclusiveness of the divine actuality rests on Hartshorne's view of the omniscience of God, this also must be amended to allow for a more clear-cut distinction between God and the world.

CHAPTER I

THE METHOD AND SUBJECT MATTER OF METAPHYSICS

There is a widespread consensus among contemporary philosophers that classical metaphysics, say from Aristotle and Plotinus to Hegel, Schopenhauer, Bradley, and Royce, has been something less than a success.[1] However, the failure of traditional metaphysics is no worse, for example, than the fate that has overtaken the applicability of Newtonian mechanics to very small and very large magnitudes in nature. Indeed there is a similarity in the historical demise of these two disciplines but with one significant difference: Whereas Newtonian principles are still largely valid in reference to the macroscopic magnitudes that dominate our everyday existence, there are many who would declare total bankruptcy for the metaphysical enterprise.

Hartshorne feels there are two possible ways of interpreting this decline of classical metaphysics. Either it failed because it was an intrinsically impossible enterprise in the first place, or perhaps its decline may be traced to certain handicaps which are not inherently a part of its task.

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[1] "Present Prospects for Metaphysics," Monist, Vol. XLVII, No. 2 (Winter, 1963), pp. 188-210.

In the first case, metaphysics failed because it attempted to study the wholly transcendent or the supersensible--a task which Hartshorne readily dismisses as impossible or absurd because (1) answers are being sought to unanswerable questions, or non-factual answers are given to factual questions (or vice versa); or (2) an attempt is being made to describe the ineffable or to translate linguistic propositions into statements about existence.[2]

> Let us grant that metaphysicians have at times discussed questions too ill-defined to have definite answers, or dealt with empirical questions in unempirical ways; also that they have at times strained language to the breaking point and beyond, or have confused linguistic proposals with existential affirmations or negations; and finally, that some of them have presented foolishly one-sided or extreme doctrines--still, do these vagaries constitute all that metaphysics can be, if it is not to dissolve into the sciences, or into the study of language?[3]

In the second place, metaphysics may have failed because of certain fundamental liabilities that very early became a part of the classical tradition. This is clearly seen in the traditional bias whereby one pole of certain ultimate contraries was affirmed at the expense of the other pole--a prejudice which has generated serious contradictions in the classical doctrine of God. For example, being was favored at the expense of becoming, identity at the expense of difference, the absolute at the expense of the relative, the infinite at the expense of the finite, origins or causes at the expense of outcomes or effects.[4]

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[2] Ibid.; "Metaphysics for Positivists," Philosophy of Science, Vol. II, No. 3 (July, 1935), p. 287.

[3] "Present Prospects for Metaphysics," op. cit., p. 189. Hereafter all second entry footnotes will be followed by a number in brackets which will facilitate locating the full publication data in the numbered bibliography at the end of the dissertation. [145]

Against such one-sided or unbalanced metaphysics, Hartshorne seeks the truth of the "golden mean," a higher synthesis in which ultimate contraries are embraced in unity.[5] Hartshorne proposes a neoclassical metaphysics of becoming or creativity as the modern philosophical task, a "neglected alternative" to both the older speculative theology and metaphysics, and the outright rejection of metaphysics and theology.[6] Here is "an alternative as significantly new as relativity physics and quantum mechanics, yet attractive not simply in that it is new, but because it renders substantial justice to both parties in many an old battle."[7]

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[4] Ibid.

[5] Discussion: "The Structure of Metaphysics: A Criticism of Lazerowitz's Theory," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. XIX, No. 2 (December, 1958), p. 227; cf. "The Parallel Development of Method in Physics and Psychology," Philosophy of Science, Vol. I, No. 4 (October, 1934), pp. 456.; Reality as Social Process: Studies in Metaphysics and Religion (Glencoe: The Free Press and Boston: The Beacon Press, 1953), p. 17. (The implications of this for Hartshorne's doctrine of God will be discussed in the theory of polarity in chapter V.)

[6] "Present Prospects for Metaphysics," op. cit., p. 191.

It should be pointed out that Hartshorne by no means considers himself completely outside the classical tradition in metaphysics. He indicated early that in contrast to "the more violent and crude of modernistic reactions to classical philosophy," the new metaphysics has close affinities with the traditional metaphysics. "It is not a question of tradition or no tradition, but of a really 'catholic' range, and a sensible use, of tradition."[8] Although Hartshorne's own philosophy is in a large measure the product of his own creative activity, he considers himself to be part of a convergent trend in metaphysics, which since about 1850 has exhibited "a certain rough agreement" between such philosophers as Bergson, Peirce, James, Fechner, Alexander, Whitehead, Varisco, Scheler, Ward, Boutroux, Montague, Parker, Garnett, Hocking, Boodin, and others.[9]

Hartshorne characterizes his general philosophical outlook as that of rationalism,[10] but a rationalism that is heavily indebted to modern empiricism and modern logic.[11] This blending of the rationalist and empiricist traditions into a novel synthesis was given cogent expression in one of Hartshorne's early articles delineating his methodological procedure.[12] He speaks of "the empirical principle" and "the rational principle" as two fundamental cornerstones of an adequate philosophical method. Regarding the first of these he says: "The meaning of fundamental concepts is to be held capable of elucidation without residuum in terms of direct and concrete experience."[13] Of the rational principle he writes: "Experience is, without residuum, illustrative of rational, i.e., logical structure, and there is nothing whatsoever that must be left as mere isolated, brute fact, mere ineffable quality, wholly inexplicable datum."[14]

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[7] Reality as Social Process, p. 18.

[8] "The New Metaphysics and Current Problems (I): Medievalism, Humanism, and Beyond," The New Frontier, Vol. I, No. 1 (September, 1934), p. 31; cf. pp. 26ff.; also "The New Metaphysics and Current Problems (II)," The New Frontier, Vol. I, No. 5 (November-December, 1934), p. 14.

[9] Reality as Social Process, p. 131.

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[10] In one place he refers to himself as "a resolute rationalist," (Discussion: "Absolute Objects and Relative Subjects: A Reply," *The Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. XV, No. 1 (September, 1961), p. 176); and in another he speaks of sharing (with some qualifications) the convictions of the great rationalists of the past. ("The Divine Relativity and Absoluteness: A Reply," *The Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. IV, No. 1 (September, 1950), p. 31.)

[11] *The Logic of Perfection and Other Essays in Neoclassical Metaphysics* (La Salle: Open Court Publishing Company, 1962), p. viii.

[12] "Four Principles of Method--with Applications," *The Monist*, Vol. XLIII, No. 1 (January, 1933), pp. 40-72.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 41. We shall have occasion to note the fundamental importance of this principle for Hartshorne's panpsychic ontology in chapter II.

In a rare autobiographical reference Hartshorne describes his early commitment to rationalism:

> About the age of seventeen, after reading Emerson's Essays, I made up my mind (doubtless with a somewhat hazy notion of what I was doing) to trust reason to the end. In pursuit of this ideal, I have tried to make my thinking about metaphysical and religious questions good thinking, good by the proper criteria of thinking, rather than of persuading, edifying, or expressing emotion.[15]

If all of Hartshorne's thought is vigorously logical, it is because he has given careful attention to the development of a method that is unequivocally logical to its core. Rather than relying on rhetorical devices to drive home a point in philosophical debate, Hartshorne's polemic has more often made use of "the impersonal lucidity of the formal logicians."[16] One of the basic convictions that permeates all of Hartshorne's writing is that the ultimate concepts with which metaphysics deals have a rational or logical structure that is at once lucid and intellectually beautiful.[17] "When I meet an opponent of metaphysics or theology who shows an awareness of this logic," Hartshorne tells us, "then indeed I shall wonder why we disagree."[18] In the spirit of the older rationalists Hartshorne feels that to believe in a true idea is somehow to understand it as true. Hence those who do not believe do not understand, for if they did understand then they would surely believe.[19] This attitude no doubt helps to explain Hartshorne's persistent and often dogmatic[20] presentation of his views, not merely in defense of his own position or in rebuttal of his opponent's attacks, but just as often with a kind of resolute obstinacy that is sustained by the conviction that the future of philosophy is to be cast in the direction of his neoclassical metaphysics.

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[14] Ibid., p. 43. Hartshorne also includes what he designates the "biological" and "value" principles, but these are not especially relevant in our particular context.

[15] The Logic of Perfection, pp. viiif.

[16] Ibid., p. 9.

[17] Ibid., p. ix. In another place he speaks of metaphysical truth as disclosing "a realm of beauty unsullied by any hint of ugliness." (Ibid., p. 288.)

While the word "logic" only appears in the titles of two of his books--Man's Vision of God and the Logic of Theism, and The Logic of Perfection and Other Essays in Neoclassical Metaphysics--and in two of his articles--"The Logical Structure of Givenness" and "The Logic of the

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[18] Ibid., p. ix.

[19] "The Divine Relativity and Absoluteness: A Reply," op. cit., p. 31. [69]

[20] Note, for example, his dogmatic insistence on the validity of panpsychism (Reality as Social Process, p. 84; The Logic of Perfection, p. 212.) and its corollary, the mind-body relation (Reality as Social Process, p. 103.) The same is true of his dismissal of all theistic possibilities but one. (See chapter IV.)

Ontological Argument"--virtually all of his writing has sought to demonstrate the relevance of modern exact logic to metaphysical issues.[21] This is nowhere more apparent than in his brilliant recasting of the ontological argument in the language of modal logic.[22] Wherever one begins studying Hartshorne's thought, particularly his doctrine of God, which is the principal theme of his philosophy and around which the other concerns serve as a kind of Begleitmelodie, one is impressed by a lucid and cogent reasoning that has led one theologian to call him quite appropriately the "most logically disciplined and rigorous of contemporary religious philosophers."[23]

In attempting to construct "a truly logical metaphysics," Hartshorne has made considerable use of the methodological instruments of logical positivism and linguistic analysis--not, however, with the result of banishing all metaphysical ideas but of correcting their erroneous aspects.[24] "We cannot know adequately what metaphysics is," Hartshorne affirms, "until we know with the utmost clearness what it means to attempt to get along without it. Those neo-Humians who are known as 'logical positivists' may in the end do more for the science of metaphysics than the neo-Hegelians or neo-Thomists."[25] In another place he remarks: "I am told that a member of the Viennese Circle once said teasingly, to another member, 'All you are doing is to prepare the language of the metaphysics of the future.' May this jest prove prophecy."[26]

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[21] The Logic of Perfection, p. 10.

[22] See chapter II in The Logic of Perfection and chapter VII below.

[23] John Hick, Review of The Logic of Perfection in Theology Today, Vol. XX, No. 2 (July, 1963), p. 295.

[24] "Metaphysics for Positivists," op. cit., pp. 287f. [14]; cf. also "The Rationalistic Criterion in Metaphysics," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. VIII, No. 3 (March, 1948), p. 438. Hartshorne has suggested that the reason why some logicians (such as Peirce) find a place in their logical doctrine for the method of metaphysics, while other equally competent logicians reject metaphysical issues

Our task will now be to outline the main features of

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altogether (such as Russell), is that there is a fundamental difference in interest. The anti-metaphysical logicians happen not to be interested in metaphysical problems and hence seek to justify their indifference. Equally as probable, however, is that the type of metaphysics with which they have been concerned was infected with absurdity. ("Charles Sanders Peirce's Metaphysics of Evolution," The New England Quarterly, Vol. XIV, No. 1 (March, 1941), pp. 49ff.)

[25] "Anthropomorphic Tendencies in Positivism," Philosophy of Science, Vol. VIII, No. 2 (April, 1941), p. 184, footnote 1. As we shall have occasion to note in later chapters, Hartshorne's dipolar theism agrees roughly with the positivistic critique of theism as it has been traditionally conceived. However, he denies that this critique is relevant to his neoclassical revisions in the doctrine of God, which, in part, seek to remove the defects alleged by the positivists.

[26] "The Rationalistic Criterion in Metaphysics," op. cit., p. 447, footnote 5 [58], cf. Reality as Social Process, p. 169. In an early article which sought to clarify some prevalent misunderstandings of Whitehead's philosophy, Hartshorne speaks of the important task confronting his own philosophical program as follows: "To purify and strengthen Whitehead's synoptic insights by the methodological instruments explicit or implicit in the really 'positive' aspects of positivism." ("On Some Criticisms of Whitehead's Philosophy," op. cit., p. 344, footnote 21. [15])

Hartshorne's metaphysical method.

We may, first of all, distinguish the method of metaphysics from that of mathematics or the special sciences by virtue of a logical difference in type of its subject matter. Hartshorne proposes as an axiom that every logical difference in subject matter implies a methodological difference.[27] One must avoid what Hartshorne calls "a flat monism of intellectual method."[28] The correct principle, he maintains, is that "all things that are of one basic logical class should be investigated by one method."[29] Now concrete things and mathematical patterns are not of the same logical type; hence we have the inductive method of the one and the deductive method of the other.

Metaphysical doctrines, however, seem to be of a different logical type from all others. Whereas mathematics deals with various possible worlds or possible logical structures, and the natural and social sciences deal with the actual world, metaphysics deals with what is common and necessary to all possible states of affairs, that is, all possible truth.[30]

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[27] "God's Existence: A Conceptual Problem," No. 26 in Religious Experience and Truth: A Symposium, ed. by Sidney Hook (New York: New York University Press, 1961), p. 212.

[28] "Metaphysics and the Modality of Existential Judgments," in Ivor Leclerc, ed., The Relevance of Whitehead: Philosophical Essays in Commemoration of the Centenary of the Birth of Alfred North Whitehead (London: Allen and Unwin, 1961), p. 108.

[29] Reality as Social Process, p. 174.

Thus we have a third logical class of entities: the universal categories of all actual and conceivable worlds, those utterly basic features of experience and thought that are presupposed by any world whatever.[31] Expressed otherwise, metaphysics is the study of those necessary and completely general aspects of reality,[32] aspects for which there can be no alternatives.[33] It seeks to know those ideas which are unqualifiedly universal and not special cases of more general ideas.[34] It looks for meaning postulates which describe the necessarily non-empty universe--meanings which are so general that we are in effect using them even when we think we are not.[35] In short, metaphysical knowledge is concerned with the all-pervasive features of existence which are to be found throughout the whole of space and time.[36]

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[30] The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of God (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), p. xiii. (A second edition 1964, is now available in paperback, with identical pagination.) Cf. also "The Structure of Metaphysics: A Criticism of Lazerowitz's Theory," op. cit., pp. 228, 230 [116]; "Metaphysics for Positivists," op. cit., p. 288 [14]; "Metaphysical Statements as Nonrestrictive and Existential," The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. XII, No. 1 (September, 1958), pp. 36f.

[31] Reality as Social Process, p. 74; cf. also "Theological Values in Current Metaphysics," The Journal of Religion, Vol. XXVI, No. 3 (July, 1946), p. 157.

[32] "Whitehead's Metaphysics," in Whitehead and the Modern World: Science, Metaphysics, and Civilization, Three Essays on the Thought of Alfred North Whitehead, by Victor Lowe, Charles Hartshorne, and A. H. Johnson (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1950), p. 25, cf. also "Metaphysics and the Modality of Existential Judgments," in Leclerc, ed., op. cit., p. 107 [126].

[33] "Causal Necessities: An Alternative to Hume," The Philosophical Review, Vol. LXIII, No. 4 (October, 1954), p. 479; cf. also Man's Vision of God, p. 69; "Theological Values in Current Metaphysics," op. cit., p. 157 [52]; "Hume's Metaphysics and Its Present-Day Influence," The New Scholasticism, Vol. XXXV, No. 2 (April, 1961), p. 166; "Causal Necessities: An Alternative to Hume," op. cit., p. 479 [90].

In contrast with the empirical sciences which deal with things that, for example, become and are relative, metaphysics is concerned with the more ultimate questions as to the nature of becoming and relativity as such.[37] It seeks to know the essential nature of becoming that does not itself become and cannot pass away, or the universal nature of relativity whose principle is absolute.[38]

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[34] "Whitehead's Philosophy of Reality as Socially-Structured Process," Chicago Review, Vol. VIII, No. 2 (Spring-Summer, 1954), p. 62; cf. also "The Logical Structure of Givenness," The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. VIII, No. 33 (October, 1958), p. 307; Reality as Social Process, p. 29.

[35] "Present Prospects for Metaphysics," op. cit., p. 208 [145].

[36] "Charles Sanders Peirce's Metaphysics of Evolution," op. cit., p. 49 [28]; "Metaphysics for Positivists," op. cit., p. 288 [14].

[37] "Present Prospects for Metaphysics," op. cit., p. 192 [145]. Also Beyond Humanism: Essays in the New Philosophy of Nature.(Chicago: Willett, Clark & Company, 1937), pp. 268f.; Philosophers Speak of God, with William L. Reese (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 8.

[38] "Present Prospects for Metaphysics," op. cit., p. 192 [145].

> Not facts, but the idea of fact, not values but the idea of value, not truths but the idea of truth, is what theism tries to elucidate. . . . To suppose that natural science can substitute for Philosophy in this task is logical confusion; it is pseudoscience, not science.[39]

Metaphysical truth thus deals with the logical structure of concepts. It is essentially concerned with the meaning of words. It is not a search for factual knowledge.[40]

Metaphysics combines the procedures of both deductive and inductive reasoning into a functional method that Hartshorne calls "mathematical empiricism."[41] However, each of these principles appears somewhat differently than in traditional rationalism or empiricism. Deduction, for example, does not proceed from dogmatically proclaimed axioms or mere arbitrary postulates or hypotheses. This was one of the great historical errors in traditional metaphysics, namely, the assumption that certain propositions had only to be announced to be seen as true. To be sure, in metaphysics deduction from defined premises must play a role, but it is not that of expanding the implications of initial axioms.[42]

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[39] "The Modern World and a Modern View of God," The Crane Review, Vol. IV, No. 2 (Winter, 1962), p. 77; cf. Reality as Social Process, p. 30.

[40] The Logic of Perfection, p. 11; "The Logical Structure of Givenness," op. cit., p. 307 [114]; Philosophers Speak of God, p. 8.

[41] "Four Principles of Method--with Applications," op. cit., p. 50 [6]. Also "The Parallel Development of Method in Physics and Psychology," op. cit., p. 456 [12].

> The true role of deduction in metaphysics is not to bring out the content of the initially certain, but to bring out the meaning of tentative descriptions of the metaphysically ultimate in experience so that we shall be better able to judge if they do genuinely describe this ultimate.[43]

In another place Hartshorne speaks of deduction as a way of "magnifying the testability of assumptions" rather than merely elaborating their importance and meaning once they are announced. "We should never put all the burden of the evidence upon axioms, but distribute it over the whole chain of consequences."[44] Instead of axioms being accepted as the self-evident starting points of deduction,they should rather be understood as questions whose full meaning is disclosed only in the process of experimentation. If at any point in this process our ideas give rise to the following dilemma: either no clear meaning, or inconsistency, then we should seek out alternative premises.[45] In this way the premises are justified by the descriptive adequacy of the conclusions.[46] One must "experiment with diverse definitions and alternative axioms or postulates, in search of a set--if we are so lucky as to find it--which can be given definite and consistent meaning."[47] Another way of stating the synthetic temper of Hartshorne's method is to say that metaphysical judgments are both analytic and synthetic, though in different senses.[48] They are analytic or *a priori* in the sense that they apply to all possible states of affairs in any given cosmic epoch. It is this which makes them necessary rather than contingent. But metaphysical judgments are also synthetic in the sense that it is always only a probability that we have approximated to a correct understanding of necessary truth. At best the results lack the definiteness of purely mathematical ideas.[49] This is perhaps the reason why Peirce spoke of metaphysics as the "science of unclear thought." If it cannot be wholly consistent, it can at least partake of degrees of consistency. "If we cannot reach perfection of definiteness except in mathematics (and not in every sense there), is this any reason for failing to do the best we can elsewhere?"[50]

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[42] Reality as Social Process, pp. 174f.

[43] Ibid.; cf. "The Rationalistic Criterion in Metaphysics," op. cit., p. 438 [58].

[44] Man's Vision of God, p. 69.

[45] "The Rationalistic Criterion in Metaphysics," op. cit., pp. 438f. [58].

[46] Reality as Social Process, p. 175.

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[47] "The Rationalistic Criterion in Metaphysics," *op. cit.*, p. 438, italics his [58]. See also *Beyond Humanism,* p. 271. Since Hartshorne believes that *any* coherent set of philosophical ideas *must* be true, it is therefore unnecessary and even foolish to *begin* with self-evident ideas. "No matter how we start, if we iron out these inconsistencies, and substitute meanings for the meaningless, we are bound to reach the truth eventually." ("The Rationalistic Criterion in Metaphysics," *op. cit.,* p. 439; cf. "Metaphysics for Positivists," *op. cit.*, p. 290 [14].)

[48] *Beyond Humanism,* pp. 271ff.

[49] "Metaphysics for Positivists," *op. cit.*, p. 293 [14]. This is similar to Peirce's notion of *Fallibilism*. See *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, edited by Charles

Much of what has been said thus far about Hartshorne's metaphysics reveals close similarities to the procedure of the inductive sciences. But as a metaphysician, Hartshorne does not limit his observations to the phenomenological descriptions of pure empiricism. Indeed, to do so would commit the fallacy of begging the answer to one of the principle questions which philosophy seeks to answer, namely, are there necessary, as well as contingent factors in existence?[51] Rather he seeks to recognize those elements in experience that have metaphysical generality in the sense that they are applicable to all experience and all objects.[52] By virtue of their generality, metaphysical ideas are always embodied in experience, including the experience of the metaphysician at every moment of his thinking.[53]

Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931-35), Vol. I, pars. 135-149, 170, and 171-175.

[50] Beyond Humanism, p. 273.

[51] Man's Vision of God, p. 61.

[52] Ibid., p. 53, footnote 5.

[53] There is a certain similarity between the verification principle in logical positivism and Hartshorne's philosophical method to this extent: Whatever is unverifiable in the broadest sense by experience is meaningless. The object of knowledge must be humanly knowable. ("Anthropomorphic Tendencies in Positivism," op. cit., pp. 185, 198 [29].)

Yet it is precisely at this point that metaphysics is most often rejected. How can that which is universal or a priori in nature possibly convey anything new, consisting as it does of entirely tautologous sentences? Hartshorne's response is that of course metaphysics conveys nothing new. That is, it can only make us more conscious of what we already know. "How could it be otherwise, since it is self-evident (tautological) that universal categories express what could never fail to be presented in experience . . ."[54] The fallacy of "pure empir~~ic~~ism" is that in its denial of anything common among all possible facts (hence something necessary), it inadvertently affirms the modal status of the following negative judgment: If there is nothing that is common and necessary, then this negative truth is not a mere fact but is itself necessary, since it applies to all possibility.[55]

In order to arrive at strictly universal meanings, it is not necessary to have all possible experiences, but only experiences of some or any kind, plus the capacity to abstract and to create symbols. In short, one must be able to generalize explicitly from the details of experience.[56] The difficulty is not in forming the most general ideas; indeed, we cannot help but form them, for they are more accessible to the human mind than factual particularities, which could only be known in their fullness by an omniscient mind.[57] A blind man, for example, may be ignorant of not only this or that color sensation but of all color sensations; yet he is not ignorant of sensation as such. The scientist, also, knows and accepts certain fundamental generalities which are arrived at by the abstractive and projective faculties of thought and not by detailed observation--such as the generality that the future may be expected (with certain reservations) to resemble the past, indeed that it will resemble the past, for no scientist goes around regarding this proposition as uncertain.[58] Hartshorne remarks:

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[54] Beyond Humanism, p. 274; italics his. Also cf. "Metaphysics for Positivists," op. cit., p. 274 [14]; Man's Vision of God, p. 61; The Logic of Perfection, p. 285.

[55] "The Rationalistic Criterion in Metaphysics," op. cit., p. 436 [58]. Hartshorne gives an excellent analysis of the modal status (hence metaphysical character) of some of Hume's basic notions in "Hume's Metaphysics and Its Present-Day Influence," op. cit., pp. 152-171 [127]. See also "Metaphysics and the Modality of Existential Judgments," in Leclerc, ed., op. cit., p. 107 [126].

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[56] "Metaphysics for Positivists," op. cit., p. 291 [14]; Man's Vision of God, p. 346.

[57] "Anthropomorphic Tendencies in Positivism," op. cit., p. 185 [29]. It is for this reason that a naturalistic theism such as Hartshorne's must make use of both metaphysics, which discovers the a priori and necessary dimension of reality (e.g., God's essence), and the special sciences, which study the factual, contingent, non-necessary aspects of existence (the full actuality of the divine life). Cf. Man's Vision of God, p. 72.

[58] "Anthropomorphic Tendencies in Positivism," op. cit., p. 188 [29].

> Here is a generality lying behind observation, giving it all the significance it can have, and this generality is certainly not merely a matter of language; and if it is known to have truth, then this knowledge must come in some sense just by taking thought.[59]

Hartshorne adds that it makes no difference whether we "know" or "believe" such general principles. "For metaphysics can about as well be described as the rational systematization of what we ultimately believe as of what we ultimately know . . ."[60]

We turn now to another significant facet of Hartshorne's method. Its importance is seen in the need for having some way in which the generic and necessary ideas of metaphysics may be distinguished from the more specific and factual ones with which they are entangled.[61] This is to be done by systematically confronting every idea with the attempt to conceive its alternative.[62]

Karl Popper has said that the mark of a metaphysical statement is its inability to be falsified experientially.[63] Such statements express ideas which are so general that no conceivable facts, no conceivable observations, could possibly fail to illustrate them.[64]

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[59] Ibid.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Ibid., p. 272; "Metaphysics for Positivists," op. cit., p. 291 [14].

[62] "Metaphysics for Positivists," op. cit., p. 291 [14].

[63] "Present Prospects for Metaphysics," op. cit., pp. 206f. [145]; The Logic of Perfection, p. 87.

Now in this regard it is informative to contrast metaphysical ideas with the postulates of the empirical sciences. In the latter, a hypothesis is regarded as scientific if it can be observationally falsified--not, it should be emphasized, if it can be verified. A crucial experiment is not one which has a chance of proving some theory (since no experiment can wholly establish a positive theory), but rather is one which has a chance of disproving it. For example, if one instance should be observed which is not in accordance with a supposed law, such a law is refuted. But, on the other hand, many instances in conformity with the law still do not suffice to prove it.[65] Thus, to confirm a view by scientific evidence is to conceive ways of falsifying it, and then to find that the falsifying observations fail to result under the proper experimental conditions.[66]

To reiterate, then, a metaphysical statement is one for which there is no conceivably knowable or experienceable alternative.[67] The criterion here is the inconceivability of the opposite.[68]

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[64] "Present Prospects for Metaphysics," op. cit., pp. 206f. [145].

[65] "The Modern World and a Modern View of God," op. cit., p. 76 [138].

[66] Ibid., p. 77.

Now when the principle of falsification is combined with the three modal forms of existential statement, Hartshorne's method takes on unusually incisive precision.

There are three modal forms of existential statement: (1) those which contradict some positive existential assertions but agree with others; (2) those which contradict every positive existential assertion; (3) and those which contradict no positive existential assertions.[69] The first mode is partially restrictive of existential possibilities. It is the realm of ordinary factual statements, which, when they are affirmative, also implicitly deny something; and conversely, when the are negative also implicity affirm something.[70] Take the proposition, "There are men in the room." This statement implicitly denies that the room is filled solid from floor to ceiling with boxes or furniture. The negative of the statement, "There are no men in the room," affirms that there is something in the room other than men, even if only air or a "vacuum." Thus this kind of a statement affirms that there are some conceivable situations which would make the proposition false and others which would not. The sentence in either situation would therefore be contingent.[71]

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[67] "Hume's Metaphysics and Its Present-Day Influence," op. cit., p. 166 [127].

[68] "Anthropomorphic Tendencies in Positivism," op. cit., p. 200 [29]. This principle is crucial, as we shall see, in Hartshorne's defense of a neo-classical form of the ontological argument (chapter VII).

[69] "Metaphysics and the Modality of Existential Judgments," in Leclerc, ed., op. cit., p. 111 [126]. Hartshorne acknowledges indebtedness to Karl Popper's similar classification of existential statements as impossible, empirical, or metaphysical. (The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York: Basic Books, 1959), p. 633.) Hartshorne notes: "Since I read some parts of Popper's great book years ago in the earlier, German edition, it seems just possible that in the recesses of memory I owe my idea of this matter to him." (p. 112, footnote 1.)

The second modal form of existential statement is completely restrictive of existential possibilities.[72] It denies that any existential possibility is actually realized. For example, the statement, "Nothing exists," excludes anything and everything from existing. Such a statement could not conceivably be verified, since the verifying experience itself would have to exist. But it is impossible to experience a bare "nothing." Some contact with existence is the sine qua non of experience. To experience literally and absolutely nothing is the same as not to experience--period.

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[70] "Metaphysical Statements as Nonrestrictive and Existential," op. cit., p. 35 [113].

[71] "Metaphysics and the Modality of Existential Judgments," in Leclerc, ed., op. cit., p. 110 [126].

[72] "Metaphysical Statements as Nonrestrictive and Existential," op. cit., p. 35 [113].

However, if it cannot be verified, the statement can indeed be falsified, for we do so every moment. It is simply not true that nothing exists. Every conceivable situation makes the statement false and hence impossible.[73]

The third modal status of existential judgments is completely nonrestrictive.[74] Such is the statement, "Something exists." We have found the contradictory and wholly restrictive form of this ("Nothing exists") to be impossible. Now if we grant that the contradictory form of an impossible statement is necessary,[75] then we can expect the statement, "Something exists," to be necessarily true, one that is valid a priori. It excludes nothing from existence but bars "nothing," which is no existence at all. Furthermore, the statement, "Something exists," cannot be falsified under any conceivable circumstances, since the falsifying experience would have to exist (and such a state of affairs would only confirm the judgment).[76] But if the statement is unfalsifiable, it is verified every moment. Hartshorne asks:

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[73] "Metaphysics and the Modality of Existential Judgments," in Leclerc, ed., op. cit., p. 112 [126]. In The Logic of Perfection, p. 293, Hartshorne uses a similar argument: "The allegedly possible contradictory fact, 'There are no particulars,' would be entirely nonparticular, and being thus unrestrictive or unselective, it could only be a necessary or essential truth. But this is absurd, since it would make existence impossible!"

[74] "Metaphysical Statements as Nonrestrictive and Existential," op. cit., pp. 35f. [113].

[75] Ibid., p. 36. This assumption is based on what is known in modal logic as "Becker's Postulate." See The Logic of Perfection, pp. 39f; and "Hume's Metaphysics and Its Present-Day Influence," op. cit., pp. 152, 165, [127], as well as discussion in chapter VII below.

> Could the verifiable but in any conceivable world absolutely unfalsifiable be false? I hold that the necessarily true must be knowable as true and only as true, and that, conversely, whatever is in principle verifiable though not falsifiable is thereby shown to be necessarily true.[77]

Here, then, we have the criterion of a necessary statement: It excludes no positive existential assertion whatever,[78] or, what is the same thing, it is neutral to all existential alternatives, being implied by any and every proposition.[79]

Finally, we turn to another fundamental conception in Hartshorne's thought which has direct bearing upon his interpretation of metaphysics--the principle of continuity. This principle has had a long philosophical history. It was to some degree anticipated by Parmenides in his notion that being is a continuum, a sphere without breaks; by Heraclitus, with his doctrine of the unity of opposites; by Kant, with his principle of infinity; by Hegel, who held that truth is the union of opposites and that ideas pass into one another; and by Peirce, who summarized his philosophical position by the word "synechism," which means "making continuous" or "holding together."[80] Peirce spoke of continuity as that "without which no physical science could have come into being . . ."[81] It is that "than which no conception yet discovered is higher."[82]

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[76] "Hume's Metaphysics and Its Present-Day Influence," op. cit., p. 166 [127].

[77] "Metaphysical Statements as Nonrestrictive and Existential," op. cit., p. 36 [113]. The exception to this in terms of the existence of God will be discussed in chapter VII.

[78] "Metaphysics and the Modality of Existential Judgments," in Leclerc, ed., op. cit., p. 112 [126].

[79] "Metaphysical Statements as Nonrestrictive and Existential," op. cit., p. 36 [113].

Hartshorne has continually acknowledged a profound indebtedness to Peirce, which is nowhere more clearly seen than in his own estimate of the importance of the principle of continuity. However important this concept may have been in the history of thought "its unusually explicit and fully generalized character as presented by Peirce . . . was one of the signal achievements of the human mind. It represented the fulfillment of the ancient Platonic dream of a genuine welding of mathematics and philosophy."[83] In another place Hartshorne speaks of the Law of Continuity as "the most scientific result which metaphysics has yet attained."[84] There are no philosophical problems, he holds, which do not demand clear formulation in the language of continuity.[85]

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[80] See the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. by Hartshorne and Weiss, especially Vol. 6, pars. 102-213.

[81] As quoted in Charles Hartshorne, "Continuity, the Form of Forms, in Charles Peirce," The Monist, Vol. XXXIX, No. 4 (October, 1929), p. 522.

[82] "Continuity, the Form of Forms, in Charles Peirce," op. cit., p. 522 [2].

The Law of Continuity asserts that geometry is the key to all relations of likeness and difference, a notion which is implicit in the physical conception of space-time as a unity embracing within itself all the diversity of existence.[86] All differences (except the polar one of positive-negative) can be radically quantitized, yielding a continuum not of wholly determinate parts or inexhaustible subdivisions, but rather, as Aristotle said, of inexhaustible subdivisibility. Continuity is thus the absence of gaps, "the totality of possibilities in a certain direction."[87] Continuity admits of any multitude. It is an endless source of variety. Yet it is also a unity which transcends all discrete multiplicity.[88]

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[83] "The Parallel Development of Method in Physics and Psychology," op. cit., p. 449 [12]. Cf. also "Continuity, the Form of Forms, in Charles Peirce," op. cit., p. 524 [2]. Hartshorne has referred to the mathematical method as the technical key of philosophy. (The Logic of Perfection, p. 11.)

[84] "Continuity, the Form of Forms, in Charles Peirce," op. cit., p. 532 [2].

[85] Ibid.

[86] "The Parallel Development of Method in Physics and Psychology," op. cit., p. 449 [12].

A number of examples of Hartshorne's application of the notion of continuity to his philosophic method and to various dimensions of his thought will help to show the central importance of this concept, as well as partly anticipate more full discussion in later sections of the dissertation.

In the first place the principle of continuity plays an important role in Hartshorne's methodology. We have said that strictly universal meanings can be entertained through the process of generalization from some particular experiences. Now if ultimate, generic truth is continuous, that is, if the universal aspects of existence are not discrete but form a continuum, then to know such truth is to know its dimensions, which can be discerned without experiencing every point on the continuum. Thus from a few points extrapolation and intrapolation will yield conceptions of the dimensional contrasts.[89] It also follows, however, that if general truths are part of an inexhaustible continuum, then there can be no one final system of metaphysics but only an endless variety of ways of "carving up" the ultimate continuum. Hence no metaphysical analysis will ever be the absolutely satisfactory and final one, but will be relative to a particular culture that produced it.[90]

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[87] "Santayana's Doctrine of Essence," in Paul Arthur Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of George Santayana, The Library of Living Philosophers, Vol. II (Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1940), p. 165.

[88] "Continuity, the Form of Forms, in Charles Peirce," op. cit., p. 527 [2].

In the second place, the principle of continuity provides the logical structure of his aesthetics and ontology. In his first book, The Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation, Hartshorne's theory of the affective continuum is elaborated. According to this hypothesis, the immediate data of consciousness comprise an everchanging field of interpenetrating qualities which are differentiated against a background of feelings socially involved with the feelings of others. This continuum is generated from contrasts of joy and sorrow, liking and disliking, etc., all of which are characteristics of feeling. It is termed an affective continuum because discrimination of contents within the continuum depends upon comparison with recognizable forms of affectivity.[91] The variables of affectivity, such as colors vs. sounds, qualities vs. affective tones, awareness vs. its contents, etc., are all distinctions which can be proved by the mathematically necessary consequences of observed facts to be relative only. That is, the differences merge into potentially continuous dimensions.[92] As Hartshorne puts it: "The type of relation existing between colors, whereby one is connected with or shades into another through intermediaries, can be generalized so as to connect qualities from different senses (e.g., a color and a sound) or from different elementary classes (e.g., secondary and tertiary qualities)."[93]

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[89] "Metaphysics for Positivists," op. cit., p. 293 [14].

[90] Ibid., p. 291. One sometimes gets the impression that Hartshorne does not always apply this principle to the cultural and historical relativity of his own philosophical endeavor.

Just as in Whitehead's notion of extensive abstraction, where the realm of actual space is composed not of indivisible parts but of slices potentially as small as you like; and just as the similar Whiteheadian criticism of the fallacy of simple location is based on the conception in physics that the ultimate analysis of elements are wave-packets into which the entire universe comes to a focus; so sensations are discriminable aspects of a continuum of experienced quality. Thus, for example, the color scale "is not an aggregate of colors, but a qualitative unity . . ."[94] "Colors are thus aspects of the one fact which is 'color'."[95] And what is true for color is equally true of all sensations and their respective sense organs. Drawing upon empirical data which Berkeley had long ago perceived, Hartshorne notes: "Heat passes into practically pure pain as orange into red . . . Thus, qualities from two senses, one of them by all natural conviction akin to the 'tertiary' or affective factor of sense experience, have observably the same continuity of nature as qualities from one sense."[96]

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[91] The Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1934), pp. 9-10.

[92] "Metaphysics for Positivists," *op. cit.*, pp. 301f. [14].

[93] The Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation, p. 6.

A most important corollary of this aesthetic theory of continuity and derivative from it is Hartshorne's doctrine of essences or universals. Because of his rather sharp departure from Whitehead at this point and the resulting important distinctions in their respective ideas of the primordial or essential nature of God, we shall discuss this doctrine at length later in the dissertation.[97] Suffice it to say at this point that for Hartshorne there is no such thing as a universal with a wholly determinate character. For example, redness we may know, but it is nevertheless a somewhat indefinite range of qualities, not just one quality.

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[94] Ibid., p. 42.

[95] Ibid., p. 43.

[96] Ibid., p. 50.

[97] See chapter VI.

Thus there is an infinity of possible reds between the very obviously purple and the very obviously orange of the color spectrum.[98] Continuity and the infinity of essences amount to the same thing. Given any two actualized qualities, there is an inexhaustible possibility of intermediaries between them. It is for this reason that Hartshorne rejects any notion of a set or multitude of eternal objects.

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[98] "Santayana's Doctrine of Essence," op. cit., pp. 156, 166 [25].

CHAPTER II

THE SOCIAL NATURE OF REALITY

In the last chapter we have noted the basic methodological principles that underlie Hartshorne's thought. We have seen that he begins with what is given in experience and by the process of generalization he seeks to abstract those aspects which may be said to have universal or nonrestrictive relevance to the whole of reality.

In this and the following chapter our purpose is to show how the application of these principles results in Hartshorne's conception of reality as social process. The concern of this chapter will be to discuss Hartshorne's epistemology and ontology, while in the next chapter attention will be given to the nature of process and related topics.

By way of biographical introduction, Hartshorne tells us that at the age of twenty, before reading any of the technical philosophers who held a social view of reality, he tried to persuade himself of the adequacy of a non-social view, expressed in part by a self-interest theory of motivation and in part by the notion of perception as involving things not themselves constituted by experience. "So far from succeeding in this attempt," Hartshorne affirms,

> I began to find reasons for regarding both motivation and perception as manifestations of a single principle, that of the overlapping or inter-individual unity of minds, not simply of human minds, but of mind on various levels of nature, including inorganic nature. This overlapping I thought I found in experience itself, and not merely through speculation or postulation.[1]

That Hartshorne should begin with reflection on direct experience is what we might expect when we consider those who have had the most influence on his development. In the radical empiricism of James, in Peirce's formal doctrine of phenomenology (or what he called "phaneroscopy"), and in both Whitehead and Bergson, with their appeal to immediate intuition, Hartshorne found a common concern for the immediate data of experience. He received first-hand acquaintance with the phenomenological method through study with both Husserl and Heidegger. He is closer to the latter than the former, however, for he finds in Heidegger's thought an irreducible social expression (Sorge), which is part of the very structure of consciousness itself.[2] Husserl, on the other hand, had denied the social nature of consciousness.[3]

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[1] "The Social Structure of Experience," Philosophy, Vol. XXXVI, No. 137 (April and July, 1961), p. 97.

[2] "Husserl and the Social Structure of Immediacy," in Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940), p. 228.

Hartshorne holds that reflection upon the given in experience discloses at least five essential structures: (1) the subject-object structure, (2) the modal structure of logical dependence and independence, (3) the causal structure, (4) the spatio-temporal structure, and (5) the social structure. All of these can be reduced to one complex structure, viewed from different aspects: "Experience is essentially _of_ objects, its relations to these objects involve a certain mixture of logical and causal dependence and independence, they constitute the structure of space-time, and are always social . . ."[4] Our primary concern in this chapter will be with the first two and the last of these structures, reserving the others for extended treatment in the next chapter.

The first structure affirms the intentional character of all experience. Experience is always _of_ something. It intends a given datum, something that is enjoyed, suffered, felt, sensed, etc., which can be distinguished from the experience itself.[5] It is meaningless to speak of an experience which is not "of" something--something which becomes the object of the experience. Present experience, therefore, does not have itself for an object, for we do not in the present instant perceive simultaneously our present act of perceiving.[6] This would be as ridiculous as a proposition which affirmed itself, or a class which is a member of itself.[7] It is true that when an object is included in an experience, it is thereby made a constituent of the experience, but this fact is itself only given to a subsequent experience. What we experience in the present has an independent status, which thus makes it possible to be an object in the experiencing situation.

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[3] See "Review of _Sein und Zeit_ by Martin Heidegger," in _The Philosophical Review_, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 4 (May, 1929), pp. 284-293, and "Husserl and the Social Structure of Immediacy," _op. cit._, pp. 219-230 [24]. For a discussion of Hartshorne's indebtedness to particular philosophers see "Whitehead and Contemporary Philosophy," in Leclerc, ed., _op. cit._, pp. 21f. [125], and _Reality as Social Process_, pp. 17-26.

[4] "The Structure of Givenness," _The Philosophical Forum_, Vol. XVIII (1960-61), p. 23, italics his.

A more formal way of expressing the intentional character of the given in experience is in terms of the modal status of subject and object. The subject or the experient occasion is a reality whose occurrence logically depends upon the prior reality of the object, while the particular object which is experienced is not logically necessary to the given subject. In other words, it is necessary that a given subject should experience certain objects, but it is not necessary that a given set of objects become data for a particular experience.[8] The relation between an experience and the things experienced is internal to the experience and external to the things. The experience depends upon and contains entities which do not depend upon or contain it. Hence both internal and external relations are required for experience, the former for the experience with respect to its objects, the latter for the objects with respect to experience.[9] Relatedness is neither universally internal nor external. What is universal, however, is an asymmetrical relatedness that is internal from the perspective of the subject and external from the perspective of the object.[10]

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[5] "The Logical Structure of Givenness," The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. VIII, No. 33 (October, 1958), pp. 308, 313, and "Whitehead and Contemporary Philosophy," in Leclerc, ed., op. cit., p. 34 [125].

[6] "The Logical Structure of Givenness," op. cit., p. 315 [114] and The Logic of Perfection, p. 227.

[7] "The Structure of Givenness," op. cit., pp. 23f. [129]. See also G. E. Moore, "The Refutation of Idealism," in Philosophical Studies (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1922).

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[8] "The Structure of Givenness," op. cit., p. 25 [129].

[9] "The Logical Structure of Givenness," op. cit., p. 308 [114], and Reality as Social Process, pp. 70-75.

[10] "The Structure of Givenness," op. cit., p. 25 [129], and "The Logical Structure of Givenness," op. cit., p. 311 [114]. As we shall see below, these realistic considerations are quite compatible with an idealistic ontology. Because Hartshorne's position is really a synthesis of aspects in both realism and idealism, he rejects the usual contrast between these supposedly contradictory doctrines. He refers to his position as "realistic idealism" or "realistic subjectivism." (Reality as Social Process, p. 73; cf. also Beyond Humanism, pp. 176ff.)

Now it is obvious that the foregoing considerations are enough to yield a realistic position in epistemology. There is a distinct givenness in experience that is not constituted by that experience. When we ask what it is that is given, Hartshorne replies that the immediate datum of our awareness is a configuration of quality inhering in the human body itself.[11]

This epistemological position, which we may call direct presentational realism,[12] is to be distinguished from the "sense-datum" theory, which seems to make experience constitute its own datum; from Husserl's identity theory, which asserts that sensation is the neural process itself; and from so-called naive realism, which holds that the extra-bodily datum is directly given.[13]

Hartshorne's position is that the external objects that are known through sense data are not the reality with which we are in most immediate contact. The extra-bodily object which we "see" or "hear" or "touch" is not immediately given;

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[11] "The Structure of Givenness," op. cit., p. 27 [129]; The Logic of Perfection, p. 230; "The Compound Individual," in Philosophical Essays for Alfred North Whitehead (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1936), p. 200.

[12] Hartshorne's position here is essentially that of Whitehead's. See Beyond Humanism, pp. 199ff.

[13] "Whitehead and Contemporary Philosophy," in Leclerç, ed., op. cit., p. 30 [125]. For a discussion of Hartshorne's differences with the realism of G. E. Moore and H. H. Price, see Beyond Humanism, pp. 202ff.

it is rather a certain state of the body itself which mediates or echoes the extra-bodily environment. To be sure, there is something which is given in perception that is perceived to be outside the body, but it does not follow that the perceived body itself is immediately given. Rather, what is thus given is something well within the body, particularly the prehended activity of the brain cells.[14] To be sure, in an experience such as vision what is "seen" is not the inner-bodily datum, rather than the light-reflecting object. To "see" something is to gain information about it, to adjust to it, all this being possible by means of the light which it transmits to our eyes. Nevertheless, what Hartshorne is affirming is that the information thus received is largely an instinctive and automatic evaluation, a lightning-quick interpretation, of something still more immediately possessed within the body.[15] Sense-perception thus gives us an ever-changing map of our environment, where the map-states are actual processes within the body which serve as signs

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[14] "Husserl and the Social Structure of Immediacy," op. cit., p. 228 [24]; "Ethics and the Assumption of Purely Private Pleasures," The International Journal of Ethics, Vol. XL, No. 4 (July, 1930), p. 505; and "Santayana's Defiant Eclecticism," The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LVI, No. 1 (January 2, 1964), pp. 37f.

[15] "Whitehead and Contemporary Philosophy," in Leclerc, ed., op. cit., p. 32 [125].

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pointing to processes outside the body which are not given.[16] "If the vision of extra-bodily objects is normally, and within limits, trustworthy," Hartshorne concludes,

> it is not because visual objects are givens, but because those states of the nervous system which genuinely are given and guaranteed by visual phenomena are normally produced only when the external objects really are at hand, and this again is due to the biological adaptation of organism and environment, not to the direct relation of givenness to its given.[17]

For instance, when we perceive an object as being situated midway between two others, this betweenness is intuited as a relation reproduced in the optical nerve system. The spatial configuration of objects is more or less duplicated in the retinal image and then sent in patterns of excitation to the brain, this final pattern being the one we directly intuit.[18]

Whitehead has shown that we are most vividly aware of the primacy of the body in experience in situations of emotional disturbance. In a case of delirium, for example, one may experience green snakes as visually given when there are no such snakes to be found; but the snakes could never be

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[16] "The Logical Structure of Givenness," op. cit., p. 314 [114].

[17] "The Compound Individual," op. cit., pp. 200f. [16]; cf. also "The Structure of Givenness," op. cit., p. 27 [129].

[18] "The Compound Individual," op. cit., p. 201 [16].

"given" if certain processes of the nervous system were not at hand. Again, in moments of deep emotional distress, we are more or less aware of compulsive feelings, which can be located in the viscera.[19]

One of the most compelling arguments supporting the theory that the locus of the given is within the body is the sensation we have of an after-image when our eyes have been intensely stimulated and are then confronted with complete darkness. For many seconds afterward bright light and color are directly experienced. But there is clearly nothing which is being presented outside the body. Hartshorne agrees with Whitehead that the only proper explanation of this phenomenon is that the highly stimulated neural process is what is experienced. In the same vein, it would be strange to suppose that the neural process would suddenly cease to be given once the light was turned on again.[20] Hence if visual images in darkness seem to confirm the theory that neural processes are directly given, then why not apply the latter notion to a general theory of sense experience?[21]

This is exactly what Hartshorne does in the case of secondary qualities, which also reveal the primacy of the body in experience. Take the redness I perceive in a particular rose. Where does this redness come from? There is no scientific evidence that it is coming directly from the rose, for I may have on rose-colored glasses and be looking at a pale yellow rose.[22] It seems then that color must come to us directly from the brain or nerve cells.[23] The supposition of naive realism that the "seen rose" is itself red in quality rests on no cogent factual argument and is even opposed by many factual considerations.[24] On the other hand, Hartshorne contends, "nothing disproves or even strongly weakens the supposition that the neural process does possess the . . . quality. Physiological evidence does not directly bear upon quality as such at all, but only shows that the most immediate causal condition of . . . quality is neural and not extra-bodily."[25]

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[19] Ibid., p. 200.

[20] "Whitehead and Contemporary Philosophy," in Leclerc, ed., op. cit., p. 33 [125].

[21] Ibid., p. 34.

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[22] Beyond Humanism, p. 178.

[23] The Logic of Perfection, p. 228.

[24] "The Structure of Givenness," op. cit., p. 27 [129]. This is not to assert that secondary qualities are confined to human perception, for Whitehead's famous rejection of the "bifurcation of nature" is a protest against the conception of a world consisting exclusively of primary qualities. Secondary qualities are really in nature because the constitutive parts of nature are for Hartshorne sentient individuals. And, of course, secondary qualities are qualities of sentience. The main point at issue here, however, is that the feeling of redness when we look at a "red" rose is not necessarily anything belonging to the rose as an independent object. The feeling that it has may be quite different and may have to be reached by inference. (See "The Interpretation of Whitehead (Reply to John W. Blyth)," The Philosophical Review, Vol. XLVIII, No. 4 (July, 1935), pp. 324ff.; and The Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation, pp. 263ff.)

Now if qualities, such as colors, enter my experience by way of certain bodily cells, then in order for me to experience a certain quality within the immediate content of my consciousness, it would seem that the cells themselves must possess this quality and have imparted it to my awareness.[26] If I have a red sensation, it is because there is an object or objects with red feeling in my bodily processes. I feel redly because the constituent objects that produce my present emotional state themselves feel redly. The objects, or the bodily cells, infuse my subjective immediacy with their own subjective quality. Direct qualitative knowledge is thus direct sympathy with the bodily cells.[27] The body is, so to speak, the environment of the mind.[28]

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[25] "The Structure of Givenness," op. cit., p. 27 [129]. In the same manner, an odor would tell us more directly what is going on in the bodily cells than what the chemical is like in its individual parts. ("Husserl and the Social Structure of Immediacy," op. cit., p. 227 [24].)

[26] The Logic of Perfection, p. 228; Beyond Humanism, p. 200.

[27] "The Relativity of Nonrelativity: Some Reflections on Firstness," in Phillip P. Wiener and Frederic H. Young, ed., Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 218; "The Structure of Givenness," op. cit., p. 30 [129]; and Man's Vision of God, pp. 151f. Hartshorne speaks of his view as "organic sympathy" or "social organicism." (Beyond Humanism, p. 200.)

This is particularly evident in the case of pain. We have already seen that Hartshorne rejects the view that the object of experience can be just the experience itself. A state of awareness does not have itself as the sole datum. "Now a man in pain," Hartshorne writes, "is not tormenting himself--nor is he being tormented merely by this own torment. Rather the torment is there and he is forced to share in it."[29]

When I have a toothache, for example, I suffer; but the pain is not just my feeling of suffering. It is a direct, though often indistinct, awareness of certain aching bodily cells, in whose suffering I am irresistibly forced to participate.[30] The pain I feel is felt by me as another's.[31] I feel the painful feelings of certain cells as something other than merely my own feeling.[32] There is a sense of double location of ownership, brought about by a mutual overlapping between the injured cells and my awareness of pain.[33] To be sure, I do not experience the injured cells as such. Their distinct individualities are not directly given, but are prehended en masse.[34]

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[28] "Leibniz's Greatest Discovery," Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. VII, No. 4 (October, 1946), p. 416.

[29] "The Social Structure of Experience," op. cit., pp. 107f. [128].

[30] "Husserl and the Social Structure of Immediacy," op. cit., p. 224 [24]; The Logic of Perfection, p. 229.

[31] "The Social Structure of Experience," op. cit., p. 106 [128].

[32] Ibid., p. 108; Beyond Humanism, p. 198.

Our discussion thus far has been largely concerned with Hartshorne's epistemological realism. We have seen that what is given in experience is primarily some phase of the bodily process. We have briefly touched on the ontological question when we considered the bodily cells as sentient individuals, in whose feelings my unitary experience has direct (though temporally subsequent) participation.

Now if feeling is the immediate (and only) datum of experience,[35] then, since thought can only expand, generalize and abstract, it follows that mind can attain to no world other than a world of feelings.[36] This does not necessarily remove us, however, from the "ego-centric predicament" or from the confines of the body. Is it possible, we may ask, to generalize the notion of feeling beyond that which is directly given in and with the body so as to cover all reality? We have already noted that the mind-body relation involves the sharing of feeling between the unitary experience of consciousness and the sub-human individuals we call the bodily cells.[37] But can the psychological categories which explain the mind-body relationship be universally applied to all individuals and similar concrete unities in nature? This, of course, is Hartshorne's contention,[38] and the resulting position may be called "an ontological monism of psychical occurrences,"[39] a universal subjectivism,[40] or, more commonly, panpsychism.[41]

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[33] "Anthropomorphic Tendencies in Positivism," op. cit., p. 202 [29]; "Ethics and the Assumption of Purely Private Pleasures," op. cit., p. 501 [3].

[34] "On Some Criticisms of Whitehead's Philosophy," op. cit., p. 331 [15]; "Causal Necessities: An Alternative to Hume," op. cit., p. 494 [90]; "Ethics and the Assumption of Purely Private Pleasures," op. cit., p. 502 [3].

[35] Beyond Humanism, p. 173.

[36] Reality as Social Process, p. 19; "Whitehead's Philosophy of Reality as Socially-Structured Process," Chicago Review, Vol. VIII, No. 2 (Spring-Summer, 1954), p. 68; Beyond Humanism, pp. 116f., 121.

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[37] "Metaphysics for Positivists," op. cit., p. 298 [14].

[38] See, for example, his three arguments for the universal extension of feeling to all reality in "On Some Criticisms of Whitehead's Philosophy," op. cit., pp. 300f. [15], and his six-point summary of the case for panpsychism in Reality as Social Process, pp. 78-84.

[39] "Outlines of a Philosophy of Nature," Part I, The Personalist, Vol. XXXIX, No. 3 (Autumn-October, 1958), p. 246.

[40] Reality as Social Process, p. 70; Beyond Humanism, pp. 176f.

[41] The term "panpsychism" accurately characterizes Hartshorne's ontology, for he quite consistently speaks of mind as "the theme of which the entire universe is a system of variations." (Man's Vision of God, p. 214.) Atoms and other "individuals" are regarded as very simple, low-grade types of minds or "psyches." (Ibid.; "Charles Sanders Peirce's Metaphysics of Evolution," The New England Quarterly,

If we place Hartshorne's panpsychism or psychic monism alongside other ontological possibilities, we may grasp some of the argumentative force with which he defends his position. Hartshorne holds that there are three possible views which may be held.

First, we may say that all nature is mere matter. The notion of "mere matter," however, seems to be a legacy of Aristotelian substance philosophy--a position which contemporary physics has abandoned in favor of an understanding of nature as a complex of events related together in a space-time system.[42] Yet this concept of event, coming to us as it does from modern physics, and being corroborated metaphysically by the independent tradition of process philosophy,

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Vol. XIV, No. 1 (March, 1941), p. 59.) The cells in a man's body are spoken of as "lowly minds," ("The New Pantheism--II," The Christian Register, Vol. CXV, No. 9 (February 20, 1936), p. 141.), though this should be taken only in the broadest sense. ("Husserl and the Social Structure of Immediacy," op. cit., p. 224 [24]; The Logic of Perfection, p. 125.) All of this is a logical correlate of the law of continuity, which holds that all individuals are one in principle, although some are quite diverse in degree. "It becomes only a verbal question whether we say, the least monad is a very low-grade 'mind' or 'soul', or something different from this only by representing peculiarly low values of the same variables by which minds or souls are composed, with one another." ("The Compound Individual," op. cit., p. 208 [16]. See also Chapter VIII, "The Cosmic Variables," in Beyond Humanism, pp. 111-124.)

[42] The Logic of Perfection, pp. 218, 222; cf. also "The Social Structure of Experience," op. cit., p. 98 [128] for a discussion of the ontological difficulties involved in the notion of "mere matter."

is not sufficient in itself to substantiate the panpsychist position. That is, the concept of reality as consisting entirely of events and their interrelationships does not of itself necessarily mean that such events are of a psychic character. The more significant reason for rejecting an inorganic monism of event is that such a view runs roughshod over the obvious facts of experience.[43] That is, from the idea of mere extended matter, which was supposedly at one time without any aspect of experience, there seems to be no logical path to the notion of experience except as sheer arbitrary addition.[44] As C. I. Lewis once said in Hartshorne's hearing, it amounts to "telling damn lies."[45]

This leads us to the second possible ontological position. We may hold that part of nature is mere behavior and part is behavior plus experience, the psychical as such.[46] Hartshorne, however, regards this dualistic distinction between mind and not-mind as an equally untenable view. For example, if we grant that there are two ultimate ontological realities, mind _and_ matter, then we have the problem of the nature of the conjunction "and," that is, the togetherness of the two. This bond is either material or mental (or some third kind of reality not yet accounted for).[47] Whichever alternative is taken, it seems that either mind or matter is reduced to a special case of the other. Thus in the totality, "mind and matter," mind is one constituent and matter the other. This togetherness, moreover, is itself one entity, or else there arises the dilemma of a vicious regress of relations that are perpetually seeking to get their terms genuinely related. "Thus there is something," Hartshorne concludes,

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[43] _The Logic of Perfection_, pp. 191f.

[44] _Ibid._

[45] "Present Prospects for Metaphysics," _op. cit._, p. 200 [145].

[46] _Ibid._, pp. 199f.

> the togetherness of mind and matter, which is either material, or mental, or some third sort of thing; and if this togetherness is material, then mind is only one part or aspect of matter; if it is mental, then matter is only one aspect of mind, and if it is neither mind nor matter, then both of these are but aspects of some 'neutral' kind of something.[48]

Now if we grant Hartshorne's contention that in all dualisms one of the two terms is the more inclusive, containing the togetherness of itself and the other term, then his case for the all-inclusiveness of experience seems to follow. Since experience contains the togetherness of both itself and matter or physical reality, experience is the more inclusive term and matter is somehow an aspect of experience.[49]

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[47] "Whitehead's Philosophy of Reality as Socially-Structured Process," op. cit., p. 63 [87].

[48] Ibid.

The third ontological possibility is that of panphychism itself, the view that all nature consists of experience of many kinds on various levels of complexity. This is the only philosophical position, Hartshorne argues, that can do full justice to all actual and possible dimensions of reality.[50] Where, for instance, in the downward series of forms can you say that feeling, memory, desire, etc., absolutely cease? Just where do you draw the line between mind and not-mind? It seems that an equally good case can be made for drawing it almost anywhere: at the limits of humanity, the vertebrate animals, the amoebae, viruses, genes, molecules, atoms, even sub-atomic particles.[51] Thus there seems to be no lower limit to comparative psychology,[52] for

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[49] Ibid., p. 64; The Logic of Perfection, p. 217.

[50] Beyond Humanism, p. 178.

[51] "The Social Structure of Experience," op. cit., pp. 99, 100 [128]; The Logic of Perfection, p. 225; and "Metaphysics for Positivists," op. cit., p. 297 [14].

[52] One of the advantages that panpsychism has over other views, according to Hartshorne, is that it promises a higher degree of integration of knowledge. He holds that a generalized comparative psychology will one day include all science. ("On Some Criticisms of Whitehead's Philosophy," op. cit., p. 333 [15]; "Present Prospects for Metaphysics," op. cit., p. 206 [145]; Beyond Humanism, p. 179; and The Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation, p. 268.) Physics, for example, would study the behavioristic psychology of particle-events, atoms and molecules, showing how they "respond" to their neighbors as "stimuli". (The Logic of Perfection, p. 225; cf. also "Metaphysics for Positivists," op. cit., p. 303

"if and where you stop short," Hartshorne contends, "that point will mark the limit of your understanding of things."[53]

A frequent misunderstanding of panpsychism, amounting to what Whitehead called the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness," is the attribution of feeling to composite aggregates rather than compound (or simple) individuals. Feeling is applicable only where there is a definite unit of individuality.[54] An army, for example, is not a sentient individual, but there are no armies without soldiers, who are sentient. Again, a stone does not feel, but from the apparent inertness of the stone-properties, it is not legitimate to infer that the molecule- and atom-properties may not possess qualities of feeling.[55] Here perception alone cannot give us a distinct picture of the individual constituents; but, then, the Greek atomists and, much more clearly, Leibniz have shown that perception often fails to reveal the

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[14].) In other places Hartshorne speaks of comparative sociology rather than psychology on the assumption that all psychology is in some sense social psychology. (Man's Vision of God, p. 160; "The New Metaphysics and Current Problems (II)," The New Frontier, Vol. I, No. 5 [November-December, 1943], p. 9.)

[53] "Whitehead's Philosophy as Socially-Structured Process," *op. cit.*, p. 70 [87].

[54] "The Structure of Metaphysics: A Criticism of Lazerowitz's Theory," *op. cit.*, p. 237 [116].

[55] "The Compound Individual," *op.cit.*, p. 215 [16].

individual constituents of which natural things are composed.[56] Where individuality is clearly perceived, such as in a vertebrate animal, then its presence may be taken as probably factual. But where we cannot perceive individuality in a given part of nature, this must not be turned into the positive affirmation that no such individuality is present. In order to avoid an unintelligible dualism, it may be necessary to look for indirect evidence of the presence of individuality.[57] "The likelihood of things being in certain places," Hartshorne asserts, "is not proportional to the ease of our finding them there."[58]

In the first chapter we noted the necessary character of metaphysical judgments.[59] Hartshorne holds that the panpsychist position can be stated propositionally so as to reveal a necessary, a priori status.[60] Take the statement, "Mind or experience in some form is everywhere." What sort of observations could conceivably falsify this statement? To be sure, we can factually falsify the proposition that the human type of mind is everywhere. Obviously cats do not think in the same way men do, still less, a fortiori, do frogs, protozoa, or molecules. But what intellectual content does the assertion have that none of these latter think or feel in any way whatever? Such an assertion amounts to

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[56] "Present Prospects for Metaphysics," _op. cit._, p. 199 [145].

[57] _Ibid._, p. 201.

[58] "Metaphysics for Positivists," _op. cit._, p. 297 [14].

[59] See above, pp. 31ff.

[60] "Metaphysical Statements as Nonrestrictive and Existential," _op. cit._, pp. 38f. [113]; _Beyond Humanism_, p. 280.

> an infinite negative which even infinite observation might still not suffice to justify. For an infinity of forms of conceivable feeling might be absent, and yet feeling might be present. Simple infinity is not enough to exhaust the possibilities of feeling and thinking.[61]

The statement, "Some experience occurs," is like the statement, "Something exists." Both are equally nonrestrictive and exclude no positive possibility or property. By way of illustration, when we perceive something to be "not red," it is because we recognize it as having some color or other positive property which it could not have and yet be red.[62] Thus every verified absence of a certain quality is the observed presence of some incompatible positive property.[63] Now if this denial of negative truth or facts be granted,[64] then we may rightfully ask what incompatible property would exclude the presence of feeling, for mind as well as body is in the system of spatio-temporal occurrences.[65] We have already seen that feelings have a social structure, and that this constitutes their extendedness.[66] Hartshorne concludes, therefore, that the statement, "Some experience occurs," being exclusive of no positive property, is a necessarily true, or a priori statement.[67]

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[61] The Logic of Perfection, p. 125.

[62] "The Structure of Metaphysics: A Criticism of Lazerowitz's Theory," op. cit., p. 236 [116].

[63] The Logic of Perfection, p. 281.

[64] For a discussion of Hartshorne's position on the question of negative facts, see The Logic of Perfection, pp. 281ff.; also below, chapter VII, p. 197, fn. 101.

The world view to which these ontological considerations lead is one in which all reality is formed of an infinite compounding of individuals into societies of societies, the all-inclusive society being the cosmic whole or God.[68] No individual unit of reality, with the exception of mere, unorganized composites is without feeling, sensitivity or responsiveness to others. To be real and to enter into social relations are inseparable notions.[69] "To be social is to weave one's own life out of strands taken from the lives of others and to furnish one's own life as a strand to be woven into their lives."[70] This irreducible social relatedness of all reality means that individuals are literally (not just metaphorically) "members one of another."[71] Hartshorne affirms, "I would about as soon die as give up this notion."[72]

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[65] "Outlines of a Philosophy of Nature," Part I, op. cit., pp. 241f. [110].

[66] "The Structure of Metaphysics: A Criticism of Lazerowitz's Theory," op. cit., p. 237 [116].

[67] "Metaphysical Statements as Nonrestrictive and Existential," op. cit., p. 38 [113]; Reality as Social Process, pp. 32f.

[68] Reality as Social Process, pp. 38ff. See Chapter VIII below.

[69] Ibid., p. 135.

Now full and unstinted participation in the life of others is, according to Hartshorne, the very meaning of love.[73] "To live is, at least, to participate in the life of another. It may be more than that, but we should not use the word for less."[74] Love seeks the good of others, ideally all others.[75] It is a sharing in the lives of others so that their needs become mine.[76] ". . . my most basic hunch about the meaning of life," Hartshorne maintains, "is that love or feeling-of-feeling is the primary principle, explanatory of everything . . ."[77] Love is the synthesis of all the categories. It is "the stone rejected of the builders, the almost secret bond . . . which holds the universe together. I cannot imagine that there is any other bond which can do this."[78]

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[70] _Ibid._, p. 136; see also p. 34.

[71] _Man's Vision of God_, p. 296; "The Structure of Givenness," _op. cit._, p. 31 [129]. As we shall see in the next chapter, this social mutuality, which relates individuals in the extensive continuum, also provides the element of "genetic identity" between the temporally distinct selves which make up the continuity of a personally ordered life.

[72] "The Structure of Givenness," _op. cit._, p. 31 [129].

[73] "Ethics and the New Theology," _The International Journal of Ethics_, Vol. XLV, No. 1 (October, 1934), p. 97; "The Social Structure of Experience," _op. cit._, p. 110 [128]; _The Logic of Perfection_, pp. 126, 129.

[74] "The Modern World and a Modern View of God," _op. cit._, p. 82 [138].

[75] _Man's Vision of God_, p. 14.

Hartshorne feels that there has been a general failure in the history of thought to develop a philosophical system in which the idea of love is really taken seriously as the supreme integrating factor binding the many individuals of the world into one universe.[79] If, as Hartshorne contends, all individuals literally embody what may be called love--meaning by this their sympathetic participation in the lives of other individuals in the surrounding social milieu, culminating ultimately in the supreme cosmic individual unto whom all hearts are open--do we not have what is perhaps the most consistent religious idea of the immanence of God that has ever been set forth?[80] As we shall note later in the dissertation, traditional theology, with its emphasis on the supremacy of absoluteness, really entailed indifference to others rather than divine sympathetic participation in the lives of every individual.

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[76] Ibid., p. 149. For the ethical implications of love as an ultimate metaphysical principle, see "Ethics and the Assumption of Purely Private Pleasures," op. cit., pp. 496-515 [3].

[77] "The Structure of Givenness," op. cit., p. 36 [129].

[78] Ibid.; cf. Man's Vision of God, pp. 216, 346; "The Compound Individual," op. cit., p. 219 [16].

[79] "Ethics and the New Theology," op. cit., p. 97 [11]; Discussion: "Is Whitehead's God the God of Religion?" Ethics, Vol. LIII, No. 3 (April, 1943), p. 219.

> To be relative is to take other things into account, to allow them to make a difference to oneself, in some sense to care about them. What else, then, can the ancient saying, _deus est caritas_, imply if not the supremacy of relativity?[81]

Thus Hartshorne believes that only in a panpsychic theism, where love is the supreme integrating factor of all the various forms of life and feeling, can we adequately describe the drama of the "cosmic symphony."[82]

> For the vision of perfect superhuman love, and of every member of the cosmic community as able in some measure to return this love and exemplify it, there can be no substitute. It is the only ideal that bears analysis to the end.[83]

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[80] "On Some Criticisms of Whitehead's Philosophy," _op. cit._, p. 340 [15]; _Man's Vision of God,_ p. 294.

[81] "Present Prospects for Metaphysics," _op. cit._, p. 209 [145].

[82] _Beyond Humanism,_ p. 259; _Man's Vision of God,_ p. 216.

[83] _Beyond Humanism,_ p. 260.

CHAPTER III

PROCESS AND TEMPORALITY

In the last chapter we showed how Hartshorne combines a realistic epistemology and an idealistic ontology into a world-view that is at once pluralistic, panpsychic and socially organic. In this chapter we shall discuss Hartshorne's conception of reality as social process, or creative synthesis, and temporality as the characteristic property of process.

The fundamental importance of the category of becoming for Hartshorne's thought can be established in two ways. First, it can be shown that the notion of process fulfills the requirement of a metaphysically ultimate category by virtue of its all-inclusive, nonrestrictive character. Second, the appeal to direct, intuitive experience itself discloses the asymmetrical temporal structure of creative process and provides an "answer to Hume" regarding the problems of causality and induction.

Hartshorne shares with Whitehead the doctrine of reality as inclusive process. Just as Hartshorne eliminates the mind-matter duality by means of an all-inclusive "monism of psychic occurrences," making matter or physical reality an aspect of experience, so he eliminates the duality (but not the contrast) of being and becoming by including the former in the latter.[1] This is neither the result of an arbitrary preference for becoming instead of being, nor the consequent annihilation of being altogether. That becoming is the more general, hence the more inclusive notion than being, follows from the simple logical insight that given a variable X and a constant C, then the togetherness of the two, XC, is a variable. Variability or becoming is the more ultimate conception.[2] Unless the togetherness of being and becoming itself becomes, nothing becomes, for the addition of a single new constituent within a totality means a new totality.[3] "Thus process," Hartshorne concludes, "as the becoming of new totalities, can include whatever there may be that is but does not become, while that which is, without becoming, cannot include what becomes. Becoming or process is the inclusive category."[4]

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[1] "Whitehead's Philosophy of Reality as Socially-Structured Process," op. cit., 64 [87]; "Absolute Objects and Relative Subjects: A Reply,"The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. XV, No. 1 (September, 1951), p. 178.

[2] "Whitehead's Philosophy of Reality as Socially-Structured Process," op. cit., p. 65 [87].

[3] "Process as Inclusive Category: A Reply," The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LIII, No. 4 (February 17, 1955), pp. 94f.; "Tillich's Doctrine of God," in Kegley, Charles W. and Bretall, Robert W., eds., The Theology of Paul Tillich (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952), p. 169; Hartshorne, Charles and Reese, William L., eds., Philosophers Speak of God (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 93.

Hartshorne contends that the other possible views give rise to serious difficulties. For example, if we say, on the one hand, that being contains becoming, then becoming is an illusion. For, as we have already shown, if the least part of a whole changes, then there is a slightly different whole--one that is not numerically the same.[5] If, on the other hand, we say that neither being nor becoming contains the other, then the relations between them must be predicates either of what is or of what becomes. But the relations cannot be predicates of what is or being, for if there are new terms, then there must be new relations. Therefore what includes the relations to that which becomes is not itself free from becoming.[6]

Another way of demonstrating becoming as the inclusive category is that it does not destroy the contrast between itself and being, while being, taken as inclusive, would destroy this contrast.[7] "The inclusive category . . . is the one which can contain the contrast which the category involves, while the non-inclusive is the one which, if taken as inclusive, would contradict the contrast and so destroy the basis of its own meaning."[8] This principle may also be illustrated by substituting the categories of contingent and non-contingent for being and becoming. The togetherness of the contingent and the non-contingent is itself contingent, for had the least item in the given totality been otherwise, the totality would have been different.[9] This notion is also reflected in logic, where the conjunction of a necessary proposition and a contingent proposition is always a contingent proposition. The necessary may be part of a contingent totality, but only as an abstract constituent.[10]

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[4] "Process as Inclusive Category; A Reply," op. cit., p. 94 [93].

[5] "The Divine Relativity and Absoluteness: A Reply," The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. IX, No. 1 (September, 1950), p. 33; "Absolute Objects and Relative Subjects: A Reply," op. cit., p. 178 [134].

[6] "The Divine Relativity and Absoluteness: A Reply," op. cit., p. 33 [69]; "The Philosophy of Creative Synthesis," The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LV, No. 22 (October 23, 1958), pp. 946f.

Now in holding process to be the category inclusive of being, Hartshorne does not intend that process should be the only reality in the sense that every ingredient of process must itself have the character of process, that is, that each item of the creative synthesis must undergo change. The principle of process does not affirm that everything changes, or flows, but rather that everything is in flux.[11] In other words, all things must be elements in change, but there are some elements in change which do not themselves change. Some of these unchanging factors of change are (1) past events of process which, as entities already having become, are used as objectified data in the becoming of new entities; (2) the universal structures generic to process as such in the form of abstract constituents of any and all units of process, for example, "synthesis as such," which does not and cannot become (the necessary essence of God is also of this nature); and (3) the emergent structures (universals) as less abstract constituents of process subsequent to their emergence.[12]

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[7] "The Philosophy of Creative Synthesis," op. cit., p. 946 [115].

[8] "Process as Inclusive Category: A Reply," op. cit., p. 96 [93].

[9] Ibid., p. 951.

[10] Ibid. (This concept is especially important in Hartshorne's discussion of the necessary essence of God, which is abstractly included within the contingent totality of the divine life. See Chapter VI below, pp. 151ff.)

The least unit of process or quantum of becoming may be called an "occasion" or "actual entity."[13] Process is thus not continuous but is made up of discrete unit-events.[14] Each of these events has a duration or "specious present," which at the atomic level may be thousands or millions of times shorter than the length of an average human experient-occasion.[15]

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[11] Review: "Whitehead's Theory of Knowledge" by John Blyth, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. III, No. 3 (March, 1943), p. 373.

[12] "Tillich's Doctrine of God," in Kegley and Bretall, eds., op. cit., p. 169 [76]; "Absolute Objects and Relative Subjects: A Reply," op. cit., p. 178 [134].

[13] Hartshorne seldom uses these Whiteheadian terms, preferring such phrases as "experient-occasion" or "unit-event." His position, however, is essentially that of Whitehead's.

Take a momentary occasion such as my total experience now, where "now" refers to the specious present or the least unit of conscious recollection that comes immediately after my perception of the word "now" as I wrote it above. This experient-occasion will always be what it was, even if it is referred to (although perhaps not distinctly remembered) years later.[16] To deny this is to deny our intuitive sense that the past is forever settled and determined with a definite content.[17] "The importance of the 'occasion' for philosophy," Hartshorne writes, "is that it, and it alone, combines complete identity with concreteness. No other concrete entity is immune to change, always simply and purely identical with itself."[18]

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[14] "The Philosophy of Creative Synthesis," op. cit., p. 949 [115].

[15] "Whitehead's Philosophy of Reality as Socially-Structured Process," op. cit., p. 71 [87]. Hartshorne says that a twentieth of a second is perhaps the length of an average human "specious present." Whitehead (somewhere) speaks of the shortest length as one-tenth of a second.

[16] "Strict and Genetic Identity. An Illustration of the Relations of Logic to Metaphysics," in Structure, Method, and Meaning: Essays in Honor of Henry M. Sheffer (New York: the Liberal Arts Press, 1951), pp. 243, 244.

[17] Ibid., pp. 243f.

This notion of strict identity or total nondifference in what is said to be identical has been subject to much criticism in philosophy. Hegel, for example, called the law of identity a useless proposition;[19] and Wittgenstein has said, "To say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing."[20] Indeed, Hartshorne agrees that it is meaningless to say X is X, if X is the only referent.[21] There must always be a difference somewhere if identity is to have meaning. Polar conceptions are mutually implicative. But the difference cannot be in the thing referred to as identical (except for perhaps internal differences of parts), but it must rather be limited to the way in which we refer to the entity. For example, the equation "two plus two equal four" is qualitatively identical in any proposition in which it is a referent: Each time I refer to this equation it is qualitatively the same. As referent the equation does not change, only the reference or context in which it is used changes.[22]

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[18] Ibid., p. 244.

[19] "Die Logic," Sec. 115 in Encyclopaedie (Berlin, 1840) as cited by D. H. Parker in Experience and Substance (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1941), p. 61.

[20] Tractatus Logico-philosophicus (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1922), 5.5301; cited in Parker, loc. cit. See also Parker's article on identity in an article entitled, "Reflexive Relations," Philosophical Review, Vol. XLII, No. 3, 1933, pp. 303-311.

[21] "Strict and Genetic Identity. An Illustration of the Relations of Logic to Metaphysics," op. cit., p. 242 [71].

Now if each unit-event is a distinct, numerically-identical actuality, the problem then arises as to how individuality or sameness may be predicated of a temporal series made up of many such atomic units of becoming. It is at this point that Hartshorne's concept of genetic identity has made an important contribution to Whitehead's theory of actual occasions. To be sure, this idea is already in Whitehead, but Hartshorne's particular development of this concept simplifies considerably Whitehead's technical doctrine of prehensions.[23]

Hartshorne holds that any enduring entity is never numerically or strictly identical throughout the whole temporal span of its existence.[24] It is, however, genetically the same by virtue of the continuity of essential qualities from one quantum of process to the next. In other words, the existence of an entity with a continuing identity is really the result of a sequence of momentary unit-events, each of which exemplifies or perpetuates a common character or essence and thereby gives the ordered series an enduring individuality.[25]

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[22] Ibid., p. 243.

[23] Hartshorne acknowledges indebtedness for the concept of genetic identity to Heinrich Scholz, who, in his Metaphysik als strenge Wissenschaft, contrasts individual or strict Identität with Gen-identität, a term which was first used by Kurt Lewin. ("Strict and Genetic Identity. An Illustration of the Relations of Logic to Metaphysics," op. cit., p. 242 [71]; Reality as Social Process, p. 102.)

This concept of genetic identity may be illustrated by Hartshorne's view of selfhood. My life, for example, consists of hundreds of thousands of selves, if one means by self a subject with strict identity.[26] Only the latest self, however, contains all that there is to the unity of the self as actual.[27] The momentary self is thus the true unit of personal existence.[28] It is a new reality each time reference is made to it.[29] The personal pronoun "I," for instance, is "token-reflexive" and gets its denotation from the context in which it is used.[30] Suppose one says "I am sleepy," or "I am hungry." The "I" in these cases clearly means the momentary self. If one says, however, "I have a tall, lean figure," then the "I" refers to a common factor in the long sequence of selves going back through the teen years.[31] This may explain why the notion of actuality is more basic than that of existence for Hartshorne and Whitehead.[32] Given the actuality of certain events which embody specific characters, then "things" or persons with a genetically similar identity will "exist." But from the mere notion of existence of some specified individual, it is still unsettled as to _how_ or in what particular states the individual may exist.[33]

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[24] "Whitehead on Process: A Reply to Professor Eslick," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. XVIII, No. 4 (June, 1958), p. 517.

[25] "The Philosophy of Creative Synthesis," op. cit., p. 949 [115].

[26] Reality as Social Process, p. 102; The Logic of Perfection, pp. 18, 122.

[27] "The Structure of Givenness," op. cit., p.31 [129]; "Whitehead on Process: A Reply to Professor Eslick," op. cit., p. 516 [108].

[28] Hume and James discovered this long after it had been taught by the Indians, Chinese and Japanese. (The Logic of Perfection, p. 18.)

Hartshorne, therefore, never speaks of events as

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[29] "Whitehead's Philosophy of Reality as Socially-Structured Process," _op. cit._, p. 73 [87]; "The Social Structure of Experience," _op. cit._, p. 105 [128]; _The Logic of Perfection_, p. 219.

[30] "The Philosophy of Creative Synthesis," _op. cit._, p. 949 [115]; "The Divine Relativity and Absoluteness; A Reply," _op. cit._, p. 58 [69].

[31] Cf. "Process as Inclusive Category: A Reply," _op. cit._, p. 97 [93].

[32] _Reality as Social Process_, p. 22; "Whitehead's Philosophy of Reality as Socially-Structured Process," _op. cit._, p. 72 [87].

[33] _Reality as Social Process_, pp. 215f.

"existing." Rather they occur or are actual (or possible). Existence more properly denotes an entity with enduring individuality. This distinction between actuality and existence is important in the light of Whitehead's epochal theory of time. According to this doctrine, there are really two kinds of process: (1) a "macroscopic" process of transition which is made up of (2) a succession of "microscopic" processes or concrescences. The former kind of process is discontinuous because it can be ultimately divided into component processes (actual entities) which are themselves indivisible. However, the processes of concrescence of actual entities, or "microscopic" processes, are not divisible at all (though they can be analyzed into component prehensions).[34] Thus the act of becoming that constitutes a given actual occasion "is not extensive."[35] That is to say, it is not temporally extended. Nevertheless, while the _becoming_ of an actual occasion is not extensive, the occasion as already having become, the completed entity, is temporally extended and is therefore divisible. As V. C. Chappell puts it, there is a contrast between the _product_ and the _process_ of becoming, the former being extensive and continuous (for both microscopic and macroscopic becoming), and the latter being discontinuous (for macroscopic becoming) and not extensive (for microscopic becoming).[36]

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[34] Alfred North Whitehead, _Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology_, (New York: Harper Torchbook Edition, 1960), p. 35 and _passim_.

[35] _Ibid._, p. 107.

We have seen that the identity of an enduring individual is logically derivative from (or consists in) the identity of experient-occasions, with their sequential relations. Symbolically, this may be stated in the following manner.[37] Take two states or unit-events, A and B, of an enduring entity. Let us use the letter I (for identity) to denote whatever is possessed in common by the two states, and numbers to represent the non-common accidential qualities and relations that are not mutually shared by the two states. Thus we can diagram the two states as follows:

A = (I:1, 2, 3, 4)

B = (I:1, 2, 5, 6)

The parentheses represent the unitary experiences of two distinct logical subjects, A and B. It is these unit-events which possess genetic identity by virtue of a mutually shared "essence." The sameness is an abstract constituent which is in the experient-occasions;[38] the occasions are not in an identical subject which embraces them as changing predicates.[39] This latter notion is the Leibnizian alternative to the theory of genetic identity. This view holds that there is a logical subject which exists at the times of both A and B.[40] Hartshorne contends, however, that there is contradiction in affirming that two different events can be constituents of but one identical subject.[41]

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[36] "Whitehead's Theory of Becoming," in George L. Kline, ed., Alfred North Whitehead: Essays on His Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 71f. Reprinted from the Whitehead Centennial Issue of the Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LVIII (1961), pp. 516-528.

[37] "Strict and Genetic Identity. An Illustration of the Relations of Logic to Metaphysics," op. cit., pp. 247ff. [71].

> For while space is the order of co-existence or co-actuality, time is the order of actualization, of potentiality-actuality; and this is negated by holding that there is just one actuality for successive events. Becoming is thus put inside mere being, and then it is not becoming at all. Thus there is absurdity in the notion that events can be treated as adjectives of something not itself an event. Events are the final nouns.[42]

This is not to say that there is nothing in which change from state to state takes place, for, retrospectively, the present occasion contains in itself its contrast with its predecessors. Change is contained in the becoming of the present occasion as "the actualizing of temporal difference with respect to earlier states embodying the same essence."[43] Real transition, then, is indeed in a subject, for in each occasion there is a becoming of novelty that distinctly sets off the entity from its predecessors.[44] Thus the transition from occasion A to occasion B _is_ the becoming of B as the successor to A. The only change is in the becoming of B. "The change from past to present can never be found unless in the present, as aspect of its becoming."[45]

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[38] *Man's Vision of God*, p. 237.

[39] "Whitehead on Process: A Reply to Professor Eslick," *op. cit.*, p. 517 [108]; "Tillich's Doctrine of God," *op. cit.*, p. 171 [76].

[40] Leibniz held that a man at any time includes all the events, experiences, acts, etc., of his entire life. From the first moment that he existed, all that "was to happen" to him was already somehow real in his individuality. Becoming is thus completely swallowed up in being. But then nothing can really become. ("Whitehead's Philosophy of Reality as Socially-Structured Process," *op. cit.*, p. 73 [87].)

[41] "Strict and Genetic Identity. An Illustration of the Relations of Logic to Metaphysics," *op. cit.*, p. 251 [71].

[42] *Ibid.*, italics his.

Recalling the symbolism above, we may now diagram this concept of change as follows. We have seen that A=(I:1,2,3,4). Now the succeeding state, B, should be indicated thus:

$$B=[(I:1,2,5,6)((I:1,2,3,4))]$$

The double parentheses represent the pastness of A as now included in the present synthesis of B. Expressed otherwise, B contains A as its past.[46] But in contrast to the Aristotelian view, B contains not merely the enduring common essence of A but A's past accidents as well.[47]

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[43] "Strict and Genetic Identity. An Illustration of the Relations of Logic to Metaphysics," _op. cit._, p. 248 [71].

[44] "Whitehead on Process: A Reply to Professor Eslick," _op. cit._, p. 517 [108].

[45] "Strict and Genetic Identity. An Illustration of the Relations of Logic to Metaphysics," _op. cit._, p. 248 [71]; cf. "Whitehead's Novel Intuition," in Kline, ed., _op. cit._, p. 19 [149].

The key to this cumulative view of time is the idea of synthesis. Every becoming furnishes a new datum for further becoming or synthesis.[48] As Whitehead has said, "The many become one and are increased by one."[49]

The becoming of each experient-occasion involves more than the mere objectification of its predecessors. Besides an element of genetic identity which preserves the individuality of a sequential series, each occasion has its own unique, momentary self or subjective pole.[50] While previous occasions may furnish the possibility for the new occasion, it possesses its own element of self-determining actuality. Actuality cannot come from anything else; it must become, and this is an act, not of the previous occasion, but of the becoming occasion itself. "Thus 'creation' with respect to events is inevitably, in part, self-creation."[51] Again, Hartshorne writes, "the entire world . . . is pervaded by an element of self-determination in each and every individual whatsoever."[52]

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[46] "Strict and Genetic Identity. An Illustration of the Relations of Logic to Metaphysics," op.cit., pp. 248f. [71]; "Whitehead on Process: A Reply to Professor Eslick," op. cit., p. 516 [108]. It is not so much events which become past as it is new events which become present and which possess relations of pastness with respect to their constituent events. ("Whitehead's Theory of Knowledge," op. cit., pp. 373f. [34]).

[47] "The New Metaphysics and Current Problems (I): Medievalism, Humanism and Beyond," The New Frontier, Vol. I, No. 1 (September, 1934), p. 30; "The Compound Individual," op. cit., p. 216 [16].

[48] "Whitehead on Process: A Reply to Professor Eslick," op. cit., p. 519 [108]. "Santayana's Doctrine of Essence," op. cit., p. 174 [25].

[49] Process and Reality, p. 32. Hartshorne speaks of this as the one novel intuition in Whitehead's philosophy which comes as close as any to expressing the organic structure of his thought. ("Whitehead's Novel Intuition," in Kline, ed., op. cit., p. 18 [149].)

In response to the criticism of this concept of spontaneous self-creation,[53] Hartshorne offers a brilliant defense. Suppose we say that X cannot create X but only Y. Now this means one of two things. (1) Either the entire determinateness of Y follows necessarily from X, or (2) it does not. On the first alternative, if Y's determination is wholly from X, then X must contain the determinateness of Y.

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[50] "Tillich's Doctrine of God," op. cit., p. 171 [76]; "Strict and Genetic Identity. An Illustration of the Relations of Logic to Metaphysics," op. cit., p. 250 [71].

[51] "Causal Necessities: An Alternative to Hume," op. cit., p. 497 [90]; cf. "Hume's Metaphysics and Its Present-Day Influence," op. cit., p. 160 [127].

[52] "The Modern World and a Modern View of God," op. cit., p. 79 [138].

[53] See Leonard J. Eslick, "Substance, Change, and Causality in Whitehead," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. XVIII, No. 4, pp. 503-413, esp. pp. 512f.

That is, nothing can follow necessarily from X except what X already is, and if X is creator-of-Y, Y must be a part of what X is. But if this is the case, there is no creation, since X, the creator, already possesses what is to be created--Y.

Now let us look at the other alternative. Suppose the determinateness of Y does not necessarily and entirely follow from X. Then something in the character of Y is not implied by X. X has made Y possible, but not inevitable. X accounts for the possibility of Y but not its actuality.[54] But what explains the actuality of Y? Since X does not "make" Y to be, either Y itself does or nothing does. Either Y is self-determined or it is undetermined. It is certainly not determined by X. The becoming of Y is an act that cuts off other possibilities--possibilities which cannot be cut off in advance but only with the act of becoming. "There must be an act which has no determining cause (though it has an enabling cause)."[55]

Thus far in this chapter our discussion has been concerned with the logical relation between being and becoming. We have showed that process is the inclusive category for Hartshorne and that the stable elements within the everchanging flux of reality can be explained by the notion of genetic identity.

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[54] "Whitehead on Process: A Reply to Professor Eslick," op. cit., p. 518 [108].

[55] Ibid., p. 518.

Now when we consider the nature of becoming from the standpoint of experience, we discover that temporality is the characteristic property of process. In the last chapter we saw that present experience never intends itself as a datum but always some subsequent experience.[56] Thus the subject-object structure of experience is basically the present-past structure.[57] This is the epistemological corollary of what we have seen in this chapter to be the basic structure of becoming. That is, once a momentary experient-occasion occurs (in the sense of having achieved its internal "satisfaction"), it immediately acquires the status of being past and is objectified as a datum of synthesis in a new occasion. The status of being past, then, always means being past for some new present, some new act of becoming.[58].

Now the manner in which a past occasion is present in the becoming of a present occasion is via memory.[59] Memory is direct awareness of the past as having a certain influence in the present.[60] It is the fashion in which the present "houses" the past.[61] Even one's direct awareness of himself is given in memory, for the datum self is the immediately past self--that self of the past fifteenth or twentieth of a second.[62]

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[56] See above, pp. 45ff.

[57] "The Structure of Givenness," op. cit., p. 37 [129].

[58] Reality as Social Process, p. 73.

[59] Ibid., pp. 9, 30; "Causal Necessities: An Alternative to Hume," op. cit., p. 482 [90]; "Santayana's Defiant Eclecticism," op. cit., pp. 36ff. [157].

Memory is not only the means of the inclusion of the past in the present; it is also the content of the past as such. Memory itself is what is remembered.[63] Introspection discloses the self as just having, in another act of memory, retrospected the immediately previous experience. Thus the datum is not only past, but it is also itself an experiencing or remembering occasion, whose own datum was yet one step further removed, and so on. All experience is therefore mnemonic in character, involving memory of memory of memory, and so on, ad infinitum.[64] There is in the very structure of reality, Hartshorne concludes, an "ambition to be remembered."[65]

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[60] "Contingency and the New Era in Metaphysics (II)," The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXIX, No. 17 (August 18, 1932), p. 465.

[61] "Causal Necessities: An Alternative to Hume," op. cit., p. 495 [90].

[62] "The Social Structure of Experience," op. cit., p. 106 [128]; "The Structure of Givenness," op. cit., p. 36 [129].

[63] "The Structure of Givenness," op. cit., p. 37 [129]; "The Logical Structure of Givenness," op. cit., p. 310 [114].

[64] "The Structure of Givenness," op. cit., p. 37 [129].

This relation of the present to the past in terms of memory provides a convincing "answer" to the otherwise mysterious problem of causality, which has continued to perplex philosophers since the time of Hume.[66]

Hume's inability to find any causal bond between successive events is due to his failure to take account of the very data of experience by which the notion of succession arises, that is, the experience of immediate memory and anticipation.[67] By concentrating on sense data and the problem of causation in objects outside the body, Hume could find only a bare succession of qualities or states. Visual perception revealed no necessary connection between events and their predecessors. Phenomenal appearances disclosed only a mere series of qualities connected by the blanket relation of "after."[68]

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[65] Reality as Social Process, p. 72.

[66] "Ideal Knowledge Defines Reality: What Was True in Idealism," The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XLIII, No. 21 (October 10, 1946), p. 578. Hartshorne acknowledges that his position on causality is essentially that of Whitehead's. Similar ideas may also be found in Peirce's writings. See Hartshorne and Weiss, eds., op. cit., Vol. VI, pars. 127-131, 135-142.

[67] Beyond Humanism, p. 267; "Hume's Metaphysics and Its Present-Day Influence," op. cit., p. 154 [127]; "Anthropomorphic Tendencies in Positivism," op. cit., p. 202 [29].

Hume did not seem to realize, however, that his idea of bare succession, without any internal relations either way, is a paradox.[69] Take two events, A and B. Does the relational property "successive to A" imply anything further as to the qualifications of event B having this relation to A? Hume's position is that anything can be conceptually combined with "successive to A," except of course the verbal contradictory "not successive to A."[70] Yet it is not clear what the status of "successive to A" is, if no later impression has this relational property in itself.[71] Is the relation a third entity "between" the two?

The problem can be solved if B, irreducibly in its own nature, is just successor-of-A. What is needed, then, is an internal relation of succession.[72]

Now such succession is given as a relation obtaining within immediate memory in such a manner that the later experience refers to the earlier, but not conversely.[73] Take, for example, a relation of B to A, intrinsic to B but extrinsic to A. Thus the occurrence of A would not entail the occurrence of B. But the occurrence of B would entail A's having occurred, since B involves a relation to A requiring A as relatum.[74] The only positive way to conceive this relation is that succession itself is a datum obtaining in immediate memory. If B remembers A, while A is unaware of B, then it is possible to affirm the following objective temporal order: A by itself, not involving B; then B-remembering-A.[75] The earlier event, A, is innocent of the temporal relation, while the later one, B, is not.[76] It is thus impossible to separate succession from memory.[77] To be a conceivable "successor of A" is to be a conceivable "rememberer of A."[78] A causal relation, then, does obtain between B and A, for it is nonsense to say "B experiences A but is not influenced by it."[79] Hartshorne concludes:

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[68] "Whitehead's Philosophy of Reality as Socially-Structured Process," op. cit., p. 68 [87]; "Anthropomorphic Tendencies in Positivism," op. cit., p. 202 [29].

[69] "The Logical Structure of Givenness," op. cit., p. 311 [114].

[70] "Causal Necessities: An Alternative to Hume," op. cit., p. 489 [90].

[71] "The Logical Structure of Givenness," op. cit., p. 311 [114].

[72] Ibid.

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[73] "Causal Necessities: An Alternative to Hume," op. cit., p. 490 [90]; Anthropomorphic Tendencies in Positivism," op. cit., p. 199 [29].

[74] Reality as Social Process, p. 74.

[75] Ibid.

[76] "Causal Necessities: An Alternative to Hume, op. cit., p. 490 [90].

[77] "Whitehead's Philosophy of Reality as Socially-Structured Process," op. cit., p. 69 [87].

[78] Ibid., pp. 490f.

> If we do not make memory explain causality, then we shall have to presuppose causality to explain memory, with the double disadvantage that while memory is a datum, causal integration apart from memory is not, and that causality taken as independent of memory explains away memory by making it a mere present intuition of the effect of past events instead of the intuition of those events.[80]

The asymmetrical view of time to which these considerations lead is one of the most significant conceptions in Hartshorne's philosophy.[81] The principle of non-symmetry is based on our intuition of the temporal process--the sense that the past is settled forever, but that the future has not yet been determined in detail.[82] There is thus a "retrospective contrast" inherent in our experience of process but not a "prospective contrast," except for the contrast between the present and the more or less general and indeterminate scheme of events to come.[83] A present event is relative only to earlier events; with respect to later events, however, the present is absolute (meaning non-relative). That is to say, there is no mutual relativity between the present and the future but only a one-way relation.[84] In the closing portion of this chapter we shall now consider briefly these two temporal perspectives in Hartshorne's process philosophy--the determinate, settled nature of the past and the determin*able*, contingent nature of the future.

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[79] "The Logical Structure of Givenness," op. cit., p. 312 [114].

[80] Beyond Humanism, p. 268.

[81] He has said in conversation that the ideas of spatial symmetry and temporal asymmetry are two poles around which his entire thought might be explicated. This is no doubt true to a considerable extent, but as Hartshorne himself has said elsewhere, "Probably no philosophy . . . is limited to the elucidation of an organic insight. Eclectic elements, I suspect, always enter in." (Whitehead's Novel Intuition," in Kline, ed., op. cit., p. 18 [149].)

[82] "Hume's Metaphysics and Its Present-Day Influence," op. cit., p. 158 [127]; Man's Vision of God, p. 131; "Contingency and the New Era in Metaphysics (I)," The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXIX, No. 16 (August 4, 1932), pp. 421-431.

We have seen that Hartshorne shares with Bergson and Whitehead the view of process as the perpetual creation of new elements in which past events are contained as data in the syntheses of new occasions. Each new act of creative becoming is not gain which is cancelled by loss, but pure gain.[85] The past is not annihilated or destroyed but is objectified by new occasions. To be sure, human and other occasions of experience do not embrace all of their pasts, but, as we shall see, there is for Hartshorne a superhuman mode of experience, a cosmic memory, in which the entire world to date is always given in fully conscious fashion without any loss.[86]

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[83] "Santayana's Doctrine of Essence," *op. cit.*, pp. 141f., 146f. [25]; "Hume's Metaphysics and Its Present-Day Influence," *op. cit.*, p. 162 [127]; Hartshorne and Reese, eds., *Philosophers Speak of God*, p. 501ff.

[84] "The Relativity of Nonrelativity: Some Reflections on Firstness," in Phillip P. Wiener and Frederic H. Young, eds., *Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 220; "Present Prospects for Metaphysics," *op. cit.*, p. 203 [145]. Royce's determinism led him to assume that all asymmetrical relations, that is, relations of antecedence and consequence, could be reduced to what he called the perfectly symmetrical O-relation. ("The Relation of the Principles of Logic to the Foundations of Geometry," *Transactions of the American Mathematical Society*, July, 1950.)

Now one of the reasons why the past is not to be equated with non-being is that propositions about the past must have referents. "Facts must be preserved into the present," Hartshorne affirms, "or nothing that we say about them can be true. For it is in the present that we have to describe the past."[87] The truth about X (a past event) is impossible without X.[88] If X were simply annihilated, it would be meaningless to say so, for there would be no term to correspond with the relational function of the proposition about X. Therefore, if a proposition about X is true, its truth obtains in the relation between itself and X. If X were nothing at all, if it had been annihilated, then the relation of which it is said to be a term would also be destroyed.[89] Temporal relations must be somewhere; they must be properties of something. Where the relations are, the terms of the relations must be, for particular relations are nothing without their terms.[90]

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[85] "Whitehead on Process: A Reply to Professor Eslick," op. cit., p. 519 [108]; "The New Metaphysics and Current Problems (I); Medievalism, Humanism, and Beyond," op. cit., p. 31 [9].

[86] "On Some Criticisms of Whitehead's Philosophy," op. cit., p. 339 [15]; "The Structure of Givenness," op. cit., p. 31 [129]. Hartshorne and Reese, eds., Philosophers Speak of God, p. 94.

[87] "Hume's Metaphysics and Its Present-Day Influence," op. cit., p. 158 [127].

[88] "New Propositions and New Truths," The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. IX, No. 4 (June, 1956), p. 660.

Now in contrast to the determinate character of the past, the future is experienced as a more or less indefinite outline of incompletely particularized generalities. The process of time is the objectification of the general-particular relationship in which the less universal implies the more universal, but not conversely.[91] For example, the mature man contains all the details of his boyhood experiences (though most of them are not consciously remembered), while his boyhood, even in retrospect, contains only a general anticipation of the details of maturity.[92] In Hartshorne's descriptive language, one's past is "a photograph in full color" in contrast to one's future which is in principle only "a rough blueprint."[93]

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[89] "The Logical Structure of Givenness," op. cit., p. 310 [114].

[90] Ibid., cf. The Divine Relativity, p. 104.

[91] "Contingency and the New Era in Metaphysics (II)," op. cit., p. 461 [5].

[92] Man's Vision of God, p. 287.

This means that, while Hartshorne concurs with Whitehead's vindication, contra Hume, of a definite causal connection between events, neither he nor Whitehead is affirming that the exact particularity of process is necessitated by antecedent events.[94] Causal necessities may be logical without connecting events in their specifically individual natures. By dropping determinism, it is possible to view the logical connection between events as approximate or statistical and not unqualifiedly necessary. The logic of events then becomes an inductive logic like that of our knowledge of events.[95] The "outline" of the future must indeed be filled in somehow, but the antecedently given possibilities for doing this have probability only. However, when the possibilities are taken in their total disjunction, they are necessary, for what does happen will conform to some one or the other of them.[96]

It was Peirce who first saw that induction leads in principle not to necessity but probability. Since the logic of our knowledge of events is inductive, it should be presumed that the logic of events is also inductive. If the course of nature were strictly determined, it would at best be irrelevant to the logic of science.[97] Determinism treats the logic of events as purely deductive. Antecedent causes are the premises and the resulting effects are the conclusion. But this is to equate process with the timeless interrelations of mathematical abstractions, whereas just the opposite is the case. The conclusion which is drawn from the premises in inductive reasoning is always something which is probable or a matter of statistical regularity.[98]

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[93] Beyond Humanism, p. 136.

[94] "New Propositions and New Truths," op. cit., p. 656 [103].

[95] "Causal Necessities: An Alternative to Hume," op. cit., p. 481 [90].

[96] Ibid.; "Metaphysical Statements as Nonrestrictive and Existential," op. cit., p. 40 [113].

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[97] "Charles Sanders Peirce's Metaphysics of Evolution," op. cit., p. 52 [28].

[98] Ibid.

CHAPTER IV

THE LOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THEISTIC POSSIBILITIES

In the foregoing chapters our discussion has been focused upon some of the general principles and fundamental categories of Hartshorne's thought, with little or no indication as to their relevance to his doctrine of God. It should not be assumed, on this account, that these first chapters are meant to be "prolegomena" to the remaining portion and central concern of this dissertation, which is Hartshorne's doctrine of God. If we have chosen to discuss such generic notions as panpsychism and process in apparent isolation from the wider theistic context in which they ultimately have their place in Hartshorne's philosophy, it has been in the interest of a more detailed analysis that would have proved awkward if undertaken in conjunction with the specifically theological categories.

Hartshorne feels that our age desperately needs a "spiritually illuminated science and scientifically controlled religion."[1] There has never been a more appropriate time, he holds, for the development of a natural religion based on reason.

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[1] "The New Metaphysics and Current Problems (II)," _op. cit._, p. 13 [10].

> Now surely the best opportunity for such a religion of reason is not to be seen in the thirteenth century--which had only a meager understanding of the nature of reason, whether in its deductive-mathematical, or in its inductive-observational aspects; nor yet in the eighteenth century--which fell under the dominance of the errors of an adolescent science before it had time to escape from those of a pre-scientific metaphysical tradition. The opportunity is in the twentieth century. It is now![2]

While Hartshorne has been an outspoken critic of the theological tenets of Thomism, he firmly supports the Roman Catholic position on the possibility of natural theology. In a recent (and as yet unpublished) essay, Hartshorne comments: "Although I am not a Romanist, I honor the theologians who have steadily maintained this tenet through the centuries of discredit into which natural theology has passed since Hume and Kant."[3]

Hartshorne's philosophical procedure with regard to the problem of God has been "without benefit of grace or 'special' revelation."[4] In fact his position regarding the relationship between reason and revelation is a radical departure from the widely accepted Tillichian correlation. It is revelation, Hartshorne contends, which defines the questions, while philosophy, or secular reason, gives the answers.[5] One begins by asking religion, including revealed religion, what it means by "God," for natural theology must support belief in the God who is worshipped, or why speak of natural theology at all? "*Theos* is fundamentally a religious word."[6]

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[2] Ibid.

[3] "Can There Be Proofs for the Existence of God?" p. 1 (to be published by the University of Georgia Press).

[4] Ibid.

Hartshorne's philosophical theology may be viewed as a many-faceted attempt to provide a rationally persuasive and logically consistent "answer" to the crucial question with which he begins *The Divine Relativity*--probably his most important single work:

> Can the idea of deity be so formulated as to preserve, perhaps even increase, its religious value, while yet avoiding the contradictions which seem inseparable from the idea as customarily defined? . . . The question is whether and how God . . . can be conceived without logical absurdity, and as having such a character that an enlightened person may worship and serve him with whole heart and mind.[7]

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[5] *Ibid.*

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] *The Divine Relativity*, p. 1. In a review of *The Divine Relativity*, Henry Nelson Wieman cogently summed up the rationalistic temper of Hartshorne's philosophy: "The great merit of this book is that it makes no appeal to revelation, faith, intuition, mystic vision, authority, paradox, or any of the devices by which religious teachers and thinkers exempt their ideas from rational criticism. It is impossible to conduct religious inquiry with any hope of reaching warranted conclusions so long as this evasive practice continues,

The concern of this chapter is to discuss Hartshorne's method of formal analysis of theistic possibilities, the intended purpose of which is to vindicate the superior rationality and coherence of what he calls the "Neglected Alternative" of panentheism.

Hartshorne believes that all but one of such formally conceivable doctrines are unacceptable, exhibiting upon critical analysis one of two kinds of difficulty: (1) intolerable contradiction, which is the inevitable result of arbitrary exclusion of certain dimensions of reality from the divine nature, or (2) the absence of sufficient supremacy or uniqueness in the divine nature to warrant religious adoration.[8]

The polemical nature of much of Hartshorne's writing is no more clearly seen than in those works which develop his theory of God in confrontation with other theistic positions. For example, Man's Vision of God begins with an analysis of the formally possible doctrines of God and seeks to defend the logical superiority of what Hartshorne calls "Theism of the Second Type," or the view that admits of both absolute and relative elements in the divine nature. In the "Introduction" and "Epilogue" of Philosophers Speak of God

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and, by repudiating it, Hartshorne serves us all." (The Philosophical Review).

[8] Man's Vision of God, p. 82; "The Kinds of Theism: A Reply," The Journal of Religion, Vol. XXXIV, No. 2 (April, 1954), p. 128.

Hartshorne defends the rational integrity of panentheism among other various possible views, while the main portion of the text (in collaboration with William L. Reese) is a systematic presentation of historical types of theism, each of which only affirms some of the attributes and relations historically predicated of God. The theory of panentheism, in contrast, effects a comprehensive synthesis of all those aspects of deity which reason and religious insight have held to be essential. In addition, to these main works, Hartshorne has devoted a number of articles to the logical analysis of theistic doctrines.[9]

Our procedure in this chapter will be to discuss several of Hartshorne's logical typologies and to indicate some of the difficulties involved in traditional positions which such analysis helps bring to light.

Hartshorne's concern is to formulate "a logically complete classification of possible ideas about God, a non-controversial statement of what the theistic controversy might conceivably be about."[10] Traditional classifications are often so vague as to be almost meaningless. Furthermore, they involve contrasts that do not exhaust all the possibilities for formulating an intelligible theistic position.[11] It is necessary to have the full range of possibilities in view in order to arrive at the true or meaningful theory. The tendency is for prejudice or taste to prompt decision in favor of one among several equally tenable theories.[12] Only if all the possibilities are set forth can one be sure that truth has had the opportunity of showing itself over error.[13]

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[9] See, for example, two articles reprinted in Reality as Social Process: "Relative, Absolute, and Superrelative: The Concept of Deity," pp. 110-125, and "Three Ideas of God," pp. 155-1962. Also, "The Kinds of Theism: A Reply," op. cit., pp. 127-131 [85], and "A Mathematical Analysis of Theism," The Review of Religion, Vol. VIII, No. 1 (November, 1943), pp. 20-38 (appears in a revised form as the "Epilogue" in Philosophers Speak of God).

[10] Man's Vision of God, p. x; cf. p. 32.

Hartshorne proposes to provide for philosophy an equivalent theory of conic sections in astronomy, or what he speaks of as a "mathematics of theistic possibilities."[14] By relying on the precise method of mathematical analysis, he has sought to "arithmetize theology"[15] and hence to exhaust the possible theistic alternatives. The purpose of such typological analysis is to facilitate the survey, almost at a glance, of the possible combinations of "Yes" and "No" answers to certain questions which historically have been predominant in discussions about the meaning of God. "The procedure is not intended to decide automatically between 'Yes' and 'No' in each or any case," Hartshorne contends, "but rather the opposite--to prevent short cuts to decision, to discourage the unexamined exclusion of any combination of answers, prior to discussion on a more than merely formal level."[16]

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[11] Ibid., pp. xf.

[12] Ibid., p. 82.

[13] Philosophers Speak of God, p. 499.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Man's Vision of God, p. 21.

The various forms of theism can be differentiated from one another principally by their attitude toward two questions: (1) Is God a perfect being, and in what sense?, and (2) Is God independent of the universe and capable of existing without it, or is he not thus capable?[17]

The possible ways of answering the first question provide the logical format of Man's Vision of God. Whatever more the concept of perfection may imply, a minimal definition of a perfect being would regard it as somehow better than or superior to all non-perfect beings. Now in purely logical terms the superiority between one individual and others admits of three possible cases: (1) superiority to _no_ others, (2) superiority to _some_ others, and (3) superiority to _all_ others.[18]

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[16] "The Kinds of Theism: A Reply," op. cit., p. 128 [85].

[17] Philosophers Speak of God, p. 500. These two questions are also at the heart of Hartshorne's first attempt at formal analysis ("Whitehead's Idea of God," in Paul Arthur Schilpp, The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1941), pp. 515-559). Our analysis, however, will rely on his later formulations, which are more clearly articulated and are not developed in a context where major attention is directed to Whitehead's doctrine of God. As will be noted below, there is a more detailed set of five questions which Hartshorne employs in the "Introduction" to Philosophers Speak of God.

This last option, however, which is the traditional theistic understanding of perfection as given classical expression in Anselm's definition of "that than which none greater can be conceived," reveals two major equivocations which add to the complexity of the otherwise exhaustive triad of "all," "some," or "none."

In the first instance, an individual may be perfect in the sense of being absolutely superior to all others _as it actually is_. On this view the perfect being would be unsurpassable both in conception and possibility _even by itself_.[19]

On the second view, the perfect being would be unsurpassable by all others but would be capable of surpassing _itself_. The first type of unsurpassability may be called "absolute perfection" and will be indicated below by the symbol A. The second type may be called "relative or reflexive perfection" and will be indicated by R. Thus we have two types of perfection or superiority to others--a reflexive or self-transcending form, and a non-reflexive or sheerly maximal form.[20]

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[18] _Reality as Social Process_, pp. 11f.; cf. "God's Existence: A Conceptual Problem," in Hook, ed., _op. cit._, p. 214 [130].

[19] _Man's Vision of God_, p. 7.

Now when these two meanings of perfection (and the negation of both, indicated by I or imperfection) are combined with the three modalities of "superior to" ("all," "some," or "none"), we can derive seven possible cases, of which only the last proves to be the unequivocal negation of "none greater":

(1) A Absolute perfection in *all* respects.

(2) AR Absolute perfection in *some* respects, relative perfection in all others.

(3) ARI Absolute perfection, relative perfection, and imperfection (neither absolute nor relative perfection), each in *some* respects.

(4) AI Absolute perfection in *some* respects, imperfection in all others.

(5) R Absolute perfection in *no* respects, relative, in all.

(6) RI Absolute perfection in *no* respects, relative perfection and imperfection in the others.

(7) I Absolute perfection in *no* respects, imperfection in all others.[21]

Thus it can be seen that the question, Is there a perfect being? is really six distinct questions rather than one. "Has anyone a right to assure us," Hartshorne argues,

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[20] *Reality as Social Process*, p. 113.

[21] *Man's Vision of God*, p. 8.

> in advance of the exploration of the other five, that the Anselmian (unconscious) selection of one among the six--as the faithful rendering either of the religious question or of the most fruitful philosophical one--is safely established by the fact that the choice has been repeated no less unconsciously by multitudes of theologians? If anyone asserts this, I must doubt his understanding of good reasoning.[22]

It can be seen that the above seven possibilities fall logically into three groups, which may be differentiated from one another propositionally in the following way: (1) There is a being who is in all respects absolutely perfect and in no way surpassable or perfectible (A); (2) There is a being who is not absolutely perfect in all respects but who is in some respects or aspects thus perfect, and in some respect or aspects not so, being surpassable either by self or others (AR, ARI, AI); and (3) There is no being that is in any respect absolutely perfect; all beings are in all respects surpassable by something conceivable, either others or by themselves in another state (R, RI, I). This division, it would seem, is exhaustive of all the possibilities.[23]

Now to prove any two of these propositions false is to establish the truth of the third.[24] Hartshorne regards only the second of these as philosophically and religiously tenable (although as we shall see, only one of the three possibilities in this group, AR, fulfills the requirements of Hartshorne's criteria). The various types of theism which fall under the first group have always led to antinomies and absurdities, while the third group contradicts the unique status of the religious object of worship--either by introducing sheer imperfection into the divine nature, or by depriving God of any categorically unique status among the other beings in the universe.[25]

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[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid., pp. 11f.

[24] Ibid., pp. 12, 82; "The Kinds of Theism: A Reply," op. cit., p. 128 [85]; "God and Man Not Rivals," The Journal of Liberal Religion, Vol. VI, No. 2 (Autumn, 1944), pp. 9f.

Let us begin first with the difficulties involved in the third group of theistic possibilities (bearing in mind that (I) or sheer imperfection is synonymous with atheism). There are several basic objections. First, the complete denial of any absolute perfection (A) to God, which is involved in any of the three possibilities, R, RI, I, would mean that he could conceivably be surpassed in any aspect of his being by other individuals. However, this would deprive God of the essential quality of supremacy or categorical uniqueness which religious devotion has always felt to be a necessary aspect of deity.[26] Second, by restricting God to only relative perfection (R), or by introducing sheer imperfection (I) into his nature, he could thereby change in any or every way and might therefore cease to be recognizable at all.[27] In other words, if even the highest being is in all respects without unsurpassability, then no being whatever is incapable of change (in any or every respect), with the result that there would be no enduring individual whose identity is assured through all time.[28]

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[25] Man's Vision of God, pp. 342f.

[26] Ibid., p. 15.

By far the largest portion of Hartshorne's polemical writing is directed against theisms falling in the first group, particularly Thomism,[29] though his criticisms would apply to all types of theological absolutism. The chief difficulty with a God who is in no way relative, who eternally contains within his being all possible value, is that he cannot in any intelligible sense be loved or served.[30]

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[27] Reality as Social Process, p. 159.

[28] Man's Vision of God, p. 15.

[29] Some of Hartshorne's early inveighing against Thomism lacks the sophistication (and the charity) of the closely reasoned polemic of such later writings as The Divine Relativity. For example, in an early article he writes: "Thomism is appropriate to a society in which the mass of men are expected to remain in ignorance, and must be sustained by remnants of primitive superstition, and by other phases of religion than its rational theological aspects. So long as religion remains explicitly or implicitly Thomistic in its metaphysics it will appeal chiefly to the ignorant and stupid, who will not try to understand it . . ." ("The New Metaphysics and Current Problems (II)," op. cit., p. 12 [10].)

[30] "Philosophy of Religion in the United States," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. XI, No. 3 (March, 1951), p. 410; "The Divine Relativity and Absoluteness: A Reply," op. cit., p. 36 [69].

In Hartshorne's own words the essence of the problem is this:

> It appears to follow inexorably that no act can, in its consequences, be better than any other, for in either case the outcome can be neither better nor worse than the continued or eternal reality of a value from which real subtraction and to which real addition are meaningless. The notion that through right conduct we can 'serve' a deity in whom all possible value is actual is metaphysical nonsense. Love of such a God and ethical choice are mutually irrelevant. This is the paradox at the heart of medieval theism.[31]

Thus, on such a view, we cannot genuinely live for God. We can have no motive in relation to the divine joy, for this will be just what it is no matter how badly we live.[32] The greatest saint can do no more for God than the worst sinner, for neither one could possibly add to, or subtract from, a God who is always wholly perfect.[33] Religious motivation becomes not an altruistic desire to contribute some value to God but "solely individual or collective egoism on the part of the creatures, who serve themselves through God, but never God through their achievements."[34] But then the whole point of religion is destroyed.[35]

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[31] "Ethics and the New Theology," The International Journal of Ethics, Vol. XLV, No. 1 (October, 1934), pp. 92f.

[32] "Philosophy of Religion in the United States," op. cit., p. 410 [72].

[33] Reality as Social Process, p. 156; The Divine Relativity, pp. 58, 130f; "The New Metaphysics and Current Problems (I)," op. cit., p. 26 [9].

[34] Man's Vision of God, p. 114.

If God is perfect in all ways, possessing all possible value, then so far from our not being able really to love or serve him, he himself cannot love us in any genuine or proper sense. For to love is to share in the joys of others and to sorrow in their sorrows.[36]

Thus far in our discussion we have been concerned with the possible ways in which different ideas of God can be distinguished by their attitude toward the question of divine perfection. A second way in which the kinds of theism can be differentiated from one another is in their attitude toward the question, Is God independent of the universe and capable of existing without it, or is he not thus capable?[37] There are three possible ways of answering this question. They may be stated symbolically as follows: Let C stand for universal cause, that is, for that which everything else requires, or upon which everything else depends. Let W stand for the all-inclusive whole of reality. Now if we set aside the purely negative assertion that God is neither universal cause nor all-inclusive reality, there are three possible combinations of these two variables. We may say (1) God is C or universal cause; (2) God is W or all-inclusive reality;

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[35] Ibid., p. 117.

[36] Reality as Social Process, p. 156.

[37] Philosophers Speak of God, p. 500.

and (3) God is CW, that is, both universal cause and the inclusive whole of what he has caused. This third position is Hartshorne's and will be discussed in detail in the following chapters. Our primary concern now is to analyze the difficulties involved in the first view.[38]

To say that God is the independent cause of the universe and capable of existing without it is to exempt God from all relations to his creatures.[39] According to Thomism, while the absolute being or essence of God cannot be known apart from revelation, it is rationally possible to know God as cause of the world. But then the question immediately arises, How can we know a God who is causally related to the world if he is not related at all, that is, if there is no relative aspect in his being?[40]

A possible solution is to make God a term but never a subject of relationships. That is, we could speak of the world-related-to-God but not God-related-to-the-world. Now Hartshorne accepts this asymmetrical distinction between term and relation as a valid corollary of his doctrine of time. For example, as a twentieth century philosopher, Hartshorne is richly indebted to such earlier thinkers as Plato and Leibniz, neither of whom is thus dependent upon him. In other words, Hartshorne as a contemporary subject may have relations to his intellectual forbears who serve as terms in the relation; but the converse relation, involving either of the earlier philosophers as the subject of a relation of which Hartshorne might be the term, is unthinkable.

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[38] The second view, which is pantheism, seems naturally more amenable to Hartshorne's own position and his attacks against it are not quite as strong or as sustained as those directed against classical theism. To be sure, both classical pantheism and classical theism are alike in affirming the absoluteness of deity, but as we shall see, classical theism ends in intolerable paradox when it affirms both the absoluteness (and hence non-relative independence) of God and the contingent reality of the world. This "both-and" distinction does not occur in pantheism, where the world, which is not distinguished from God, is merely the necessary totality of God's being.

[39] The Divine Relativity, p. 16.

[40] Ibid., p. 15.

Hartshorne contends, however, that these distinctions are not applicable to most relations between God and the world, for theologians have not been content to say that the world is merely caused by God, but that it is also known and loved by him. But if God is wholly absolute or solely the universal, independent cause, of the world, a term but never a subject of relations, it follows that he cannot love or know or will us as his creatures. At most, all we could say is "I am loved by God" but not "God loves me."[41] Now, according to Hartshorne, this is far from being a mere semantical distinction. Everything in our experience points to the fact that a relation such as love is genuinely constitutive of the lover rather than the loved.[42] "The merely absolute God," Hartshorne concludes, "was by logical implication, conceived as a thing, not a subject or a person."[43]

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[41] Man's Vision of God, p. 235.

In all of Hartshorne's writing one cannot find a more scathing indictment of the classical conception of a God wholly independent of the world than in the following passage:

> I dare affirm that this assumption is a blunder so great--and so influential--that one might scarcely hope in the whole history of thought to find a greater or more influential. And this unwarranted assumption, this metaphysical snobbery toward relativity, dependence, or passivity, toward responsiveness or sensitivity, this almost slavish . . . worship of mere absoluteness, independence, and one-sided activity or power, this transcendentalized admiration of politico-ecclesiastical tyranny, the ideal of which is to act on all while avoiding reaction from them, this spiritual blindness and false report upon experience is . . . the chief source of the metaphysico-theological paradoxes of which so much has been heard.[44]

In terms of its frequent appearance and often extended treatment in Hartshorne's writings, it seems that the paradox in classical theism that he is most anxious to expose (and the one that is most vulnerable) is that which arises from the joint affirmation of a wholly absolute, necessary and omniscient God, on the one hand, and the non-necessary or contingent character of the world as the object of God's knowing, on the other. This contradiction can best be analyzed by examining three propositions ("the inconsistent trio of classical theology") which, when affirmed together, lead to intolerable paradox:[45] (1) There is an infallible, omniscient knower (God) who is incapable of error or ignorance. (2) All the properties of this knower are necessary. (That is to say, since God is without accidents or potentiality, there is nothing in him but pure actuality.) (3) There are properties *contingently* related to existence. (The essence of finite things does not imply their existence.) Let us test the mutual consistency of these three propositions when they are jointly affirmed. Hartshorne uses the following symbolism to facilitate the analysis: Let K stand for the notion that God knows such and such a thing to exist. (There is a being with infallible knowledge that . . .) Let W stand for the existence of a world such as ours and -W for the negation of W (There is no such world as ours).

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[42] The Divine Relativity, p. 17, italics mine.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid., p. 50.

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[45] The following discussion is a closely paraphrased account taken from "The Rationalistic Criterion in Metaphysics," *op. cit.*, pp. 439ff. [58]. A similar and less complicated version of the argument is given in *The Divine Relativity*, pp. 10ff. The argument also occurs in the following articles: "Efficient Causality in Aristotle and St. Thomas," *The Journal of Religion*, Vol. XXV, No. 1 (January, 1945), pp. 25-32; "Reply to Father Meehan," *The Journal of Religion*, Vol. XXVI, No. 1 (January, 1946), pp. 54-57; "Metaphysics and the Modality of Existential Judgments," *op. cit.*, pp. 115f. [126]; *Man's Vision of God*, pp. 242ff.; "Reflections on the Strength and Weakness of Thomism," *op. cit.*, p. 53 [37]; and *Philosophers Speak of God*, pp. 132f.

Now to say that there is an infallible God is to affirm the following disjunctions, taken as exclusive: either a world such as ours exists, or God knows no such world exists; and either no such world as ours exists, or God knows such a world exists.[46] By these two exclusive disjunctions, the combinations of K and W are limited by logical necessity to KW.W and K-W.-W. Both divine error (KW.-W, K-W.W) and divine ignorance (-KW.W, -K-W.-W) are excluded as absurd. Error in God would mean that at least one of the above disjunctions failed to be exclusive. For example, KW.-W would mean both -W and KW. Divine ignorance would also mean that one of the disjunctions does not hold. Thus -K.W would mean that neither KW nor -W obtains.

When we rule out the above limitations of divine infallibility (error or ignorance), there are three, and only three possible ways in which we may affirm an omniscient God:

(X) KW.W is true in fact, but contingently so, since while K-W.-W is false in fact, it is nevertheless conceivable or logically possible.

(Y) KW.W is true in fact and by necessity, since K-W.-W is inconceivable or logically impossible.

(Z) KW.W is false or meaningless as well as its alternative, K-W.-W.

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[46] (W v K-W):(-W v KW) and -(W.K-W):-(-W.KW).

Now any theological doctrine which tries to evade this exhaustive trichotomy is thereby convicted of illogicality. But this is precisely the predicament into which classical theism falls. Let us look at the evidence and outline the three steps in Hartshorne's analysis.

A. In accordance with its affirmation of proposition one on the previous page (There is an infallible, omniscient knower (God) who is incapable of error or ignorance.), classical theism must reject alternative Z in the above trichotomy.

B. Similarly, by proposition two (All properties of this knower are necessary.), it is obliged to reject alternative X in the above trio, since X, by admitting of a possible alternative (K-W.-W) concedes that the positive affirmation (KW.W) is logically contingent. In order to affirm X classical theism would have to deny the tenet that there is nothing contingent in God, or else make the absurd assertion that God's knowing is something contingent which is _outside_ of his nature. (But then how could it be _his_ knowing?)

C. Finally, in affirming proposition three (There are properties contingently related to existence.), classical theology contradicts alternative Y, which holds that if God knows the world to exist, it must exist in fact and by necessity. Hartshorne concludes (p. 441): "Since X, Y, and Z are logically exhaustive, classical theology in contradicting all three contradicts itself."

Let us summarize the argument in a more direct fashion. According to propositions one and two, KW is true absolutely and necessarily, while according to proposition three, W is not necessary. Now if KW is necessary, then K-W is impossible. But if K-W is impossible, and the disjunction, W or K-W, necessarily obtains, then W is necessary. There is no logically possible way of affirming the contingency of W and the necessity of KW. The only possible way in which contradiction can be avoided is to admit contingent elements in the divine cognitive states. The denial of real contingency in God is the principal source of the difficulties in traditional theology.

In the remaining portion of this chapter it remains for us to discuss briefly Hartshorne's most ambitious attempt to classify the various theistic alternatives. In contrast to the purely formal analysis of Man's Vision of God, Hartshorne's procedure in Philosophers Speak of God is to organize typologically the historical kinds of theism in terms of their attitude toward five questions:[47] (1) Is God eternal?, (2) Is he temporal?, (3) Is he conscious?, (4) Does he know the world?, and (5) Does he include the world? To simplify analysis, Hartshorne symbolizes the content of these questions in the following manner:

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[47] The discussion that follows is taken from the "Introduction" to Philosophers Speak of God, pp. 16ff.

E Eternal--God is in some (or, if T is omitted, in all) aspects of his reality devoid of change.

T Temporal--God is in some (or, if E is omitted, in all) aspects of his being capable of change.

C Conscious--God has awareness of himself.

K Knowing the world--God is omniscient of all reality.

W World-inclusive--All things are constituents of the divine nature.

The assertion of all five factors together is Hartshorne's own doctrine of panentheism. By omitting one or more of the five factors, various "truncated" views may be set forth. A few combinations, however, may be dismissed at the outset as not having a plausible meaning. For example, it seems meaningless to suppose that there could be a God with full knowledge of the universe who lacked consciousness or self-awareness. Hence, such combinations as EKW or EK, which affirm knowledge of the world but not consciousness, may be eliminated. Again, if we assume that a being with supreme self-awareness will know what it includes, it is possible at the outset to omit a combination such as ETCW, which implies a world-including divine consciousness, without knowledge of the world which is included. Finally, on the basis that every being has some status with respect to time as well as eternity,[48] Hartshorne eliminates those combinations which would involve no relation to either of these dimensions.

Having thus narrowed down the plausible alternatives, Hartshorne proposes the following classification of doctrines (given in the order of their historical appearance, along with representative proponents):

ETCKW	The Supreme as Eternal-Temporal Consciousness, Knowing and including the World. Panentheism. Plato, Sri Jiva, Schelling, Fechner, Whitehead, Iqbal, Radhakrishnan.
EC	The Supreme as Eternal Consciousness, not knowing or including the world. Aristotelian theism.
ECK	The Supreme as Eternal Consciousness, Knowing but not including the world. Classical theism. Philo, Augustine, Anselm, al-Ghazzali, Aquinas, Leibniz.
E	The Supreme as the Eternal beyond consciousness and knowledge. Emanationism. Plotinus.
ECKW	The Supreme as Eternal Consciousness, Knowing and including the World. Classical pantheism. Sankara (so far as the world is "real"), Spinoza, Royce.
ETCK	The Supreme as Eternal-Temporal Consciousness, Knowing but not including the world. Temporalistic theism. Socinus, Lequier.
ETCK(W)	The Supreme as Eternal-Temporal

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[48] One of the following, Hartshorne holds, must obtain: (1) in all aspects eternal; (2) in all aspects noneternal or temporal; (3) in some aspects the one and in some aspects the other.

Consciousness, partly exclusive of the World. Limited panentheism. James, Ehrenfels, Brightman.

T(C)(K) The Supreme as wholly Temporal or emerging Consciousness. Alexander, Ames, Catell.

T The Supreme as Temporal and nonconscious. Wieman.

Hartshorne holds that this classification reveals that the history of theological speculation is primarily a "long experiment in omission." (page 17) He further concludes that "none of the omissions succeed, that the 'truncated' views really are mutilations, and that thought has been forced back, more and more imperatively, to the integral panentheistic conception adumbrated by Plato." (page 18) To substantiate such a claim as this in any but a cursory way would amount to a lengthy critical review of Philosophers Speak of God. All we can do here is to indicate briefly the chief difficulties Hartshorne finds with each of the "truncated" alternatives.

He contends, first of all, that eternity in total abstraction from time (in such views as EC, ECK, and ECKW) is deficient in fullness of actuality, of which time or the temporal dimension is an essential ingredient. Even more deficient of actuality is the view (E) that would posit God in abstraction from conscious knowledge and the actual universe. Such a view (as the One of Plotinus) is mere form without content, a unity which unifies nothing.

Again, a view such as Aristotle's (EC) posits consciousness in God, but self-awareness is empty of content unless the self has some other mode of awareness than its awareness of its own awareness, ad infinitum. Every subject must have an object of awareness other than itself.

We have already seen the paradox involved in classical theism (ECK) when it posits divine knowledge that is wholly necessary and hence unchanging, while the objects of the knowledge are contingent and hence subject to change.

Those views which deny world-inclusiveness of deity, that is, which hold that the divine knowing is a self-inclosed reality with the known entities outside it, are faced with the difficulty of a total reality, God-and-the-world, which is more inclusive than either God alone or the world alone. "If it is held an impiety that God have constituents," Hartshorne argues, "what about the more obvious impiety that he should *be* a mere constituent?" (page 19)

All the views other than ETCKW sacrifice *categoriality*. For example, EC, ECK, E, and ECKW deprive God of the category of temporality, and with it, by implication, also contingency, relativity, diversity, and complexity. The Aristotelian view, EC, in addition cannot predicate of deity knowledge of contingent objects, while classical theism (ECK), by doing so, ends as we have seen in contradiction. "Thus

ETCKW," Hartshorne concludes, "is the truly categorical conception of the supreme, the conception that reduces the categories to their proper status as essentially expressions of deity." (page 21)

CHAPTER V

THE THEORY OF DIPOLARITY

In the preceding chapter we noted some of Hartshorne's contentions against the difficulties involved in traditional theisms. In particular, we pointed out his rejection of paradox or logical contradiction, much of which arises from the "monopolar bias" of attempting to exempt God from the polarity of categorical contrasts. For example, in considering such pairs of ultimate contraries as absolute and relative, being and becoming, one and many, actuality and potentiality, necessity and contingency, classical theology regarded one member of each of these pairs of concepts as more excellent than the other and hence worthy of being predicated of God. The other pole of each contrast was not affirmed of God.[1] Hartshorne succinctly sums up the traditional position as follows:

> I look upon classical metaphysics and theology . . . as a long experiment with a suspiciously simple doctrine, that God is entirely or simply necessary, entirely

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[1] "Present Prospects for Metaphysics," op. cit., pp. 189f. [145]; Philosophers Speak of God, p. 2.

> or simply unsurpassable, immutable, independent, without parts, in all respects infinite, absolute, and eternally complete.[2]

There are two related methodological principles in traditional theology that have helped to reinforce this monopolar prejudice. The first principle, which is known as the *via negativa*, is based on the alleged insufficiency of human language to describe the ultimate mystery of the divine nature.[3] That is to say, human conceptions must be denied rather than affirmed of deity. We cannot know what God is but only what he is not. The difficulty with this principle, however, is that it seems to support the contention of atheism that the word "God" stands merely for what is left when we deny all that we know. In short, the word "God" represents what we know when we know nothing at all.[4] There seems to be no difference between refraining from applying any human concept to something (such as God) and just not thinking about it at all.[5] Nevertheless, if a "negative" theologian is really thinking and talking about God, he must be doing something more than merely refusing to predicate human conceptions of deity. Is he not really in the end applying human conceptions to God after all--even though they are used negatively?[6]

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[2] "What Did Anselm Discover?" *Union Seminary Quarterly Review*, Vol. XVII, No. 3 (March, 1962), p. 220, italics his.

[3] "For all we know, the trouble at this point," Hartshorne contends, "is not with the mysteriousness of God, but with the pretentiousness and stubbornness of the human mind which, having once dared to forbid deity to enjoy the advantages of concreteness (contingency), will not be induced even by contradictions to withdraw this negative legislation." (*Saint Anselm*, *Basic Writings*, trans. by S. W. Deane, intro. by Charles Hartshorne, 2nd ed. (LaSalle: Open Court, 1962), p. 16 of introduction.)

[4] *Man's Vision of God*, p. 22.

Moreover, if our language is so inadequate that it must be negated in order for us to arrive at God, then the only alternative to arriving merely at non-being would seem to be that some positive content must be given to the concept of God.[7] How is it possible, Hartshorne asks, to deny such qualities in God as dependence, potentiality or change unless there is something positive in him which is incompatible with such categories?[8] Once an essentially negative theology has been renounced, Hartshorne maintains that "it is alone consistent to follow systematically the procedure of regarding every positive conception as applicable in some sense to God, searching for the sense in which it is applicable, rather than cutting off discussion by asserting its inapplicability in any and every sense."[9]

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[5] The Divine Relativity, p. 35.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Man's Vision of God, p. 22.

[8] The Divine Relativity, p. 35.

The second principle, which is sometimes called the via eminentia, asserts that human concepts can only be applied to God analogically, never literally or univocally. Those who follow this principle (a majority of both Roman Catholic and Protestant theologians, as well as a large number of Muslim thinkers) do not generally repudiate negative theology but, on the contrary, profess to accept it. However, regarding the negative way as inadequate when taken by itself, they endeavor to supplement it in such a manner as to be able to go beyond it. By way of illustration, God was said to be neither one nor many, actual nor potential (to take only two polar contrasts) in any sense which could be positively illustrated from our experience of things. Rather, there is in God something "more simple than the one" (Philo), something more unitary than the unity that can be apprehended by human knowledge, something more actual than actuality as men know of it.[10] In this fashion a "transcendent analogue" was posited for certain human categories, but only one pole of a given contrast, the one thought to be more excellent or superior, was predicated of deity.

However, when the position is taken that God cannot be described by the so-called inferior pole of any categorical contrast, then the following two-horned dilemma immediately arises: either (1) there is something outside of God (the rejected contrast), making the totality of the real to be God-and-something-else, with the implication that God is merely one constituent within the whole of things; or (2) the supposedly inferior pole of each contrast is regarded as illusory. If theism takes the first horn of the dilemma, some forms of pantheism take the second.[11]

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[9] Man's Vision of God, p. 295.

[10] Philosophers Speak of God, p. 3.

Hartshorne contends, however, that this is an artificial dilemma, based on the questionable assumption that the highest form of reality may be reached by a kind of ontological diastasis that would separate the "superior" from the "inferior" pole of each ultimate contrast. It may be argued, in the first place, that the contrast "superior-inferior," which Hartshorne calls "the truly invidious contrast," has no tendency to coincide with a given contrast such as one-many, implying the superiority of the first term and the inferiority of the second.[12] There is both superior unity and inferior unity, good complexity as well as inferior complexity. If we can speak of a supreme actuality which surpasses all other actuality, why not a supreme potentiality which embraces all potentiality?[13] And, finally, if there may be a supreme cause of which all else is effect, why not a supreme effect of which all else is cause? If it is maintained that effect is inferior to cause, then it would also follow that since later is to earlier as effect is to cause, process itself is transition to the inferior and hence change is degeneration.[14]

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[11] Ibid., p. 2.

[12] Ibid., p. 4; The Divine Relativity, p. 78.

In the second place, it may be argued that it is at best problematic to what extent one pole can retain its meaning in total exclusion from the contrasting meaning of the other. For example, what is unity where there is no diversity to unify, or diversity that is not summed up in some unitary, overall value? What is permanence except in the relation to change, or change, except where there is a permanent subject of change?[15] The same is true of the contrast between contingency and necessity. If everything were contingent, then contingency would be emptied of any distinctive meaning. It would cease to express any real contrast between one thing and another. Unless something is necessary, nothing can be significantly contingent.[16]

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[13] Philosophers Speak of God, pp. 4, 5, 13.

[14] The Divine Relativity, p. 78.

[15] "The Formal Validity and Real Significance of the Ontological Argument," The Philosophical Review, Vol. LIII, No. 3 (May, 1944), p. 231.

Hartshorne is thus led to affirm the irreducibly polar nature of existence, whereby

> ultimate contraries are correlatives, mutually interdependent, so that nothing real can be described by the wholly one-sided assertion of simplicity, being, actuality, and the like, each in a 'pure' form, devoid and independent of complexity, becoming, potentiality, and related contraries.[17]

Furthermore, if God is inclusive of all reality (and we have already seen the difficulty that Hartshorne contends arises if he is not), then all contrasts must somehow be held together within the totality of his being.[18] Both poles of each pair of ultimate contraries must be equally affirmed of God.[19] God is, accordingly, the union of supreme actuality and supreme potentiality, supreme activity and supreme passivity.[20] He is not being as contrasted to becoming, nor becoming as contrasted to being, but categorically supreme becoming in which there is a factor of categorically supreme being.[21] In short, for Hartshorne the only God that could possibly exist is one who is on both sides of every contrast.[22]

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[16] "The Philosophy of Creative Synthesis," I in Symposium: Creativity as a Philosophical Category, *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. LV, No. 22 (October 23, 1958), p. 952.

[17] *Philosophers Speak of God*, p. 2; "The Kinds of Theism: A Reply," *op. cit.*, p. 127 [85].

[18] *Man's Vision of God*, p. 224; "Whitehead on Process: A Reply to Professor Eslick," *op. cit.*, p. 519 [108].

[19] *Philosophers Speak of God*, pp. 4, 15, 24; "The Structure of Metaphysics: A Criticism of Lazerowitz's Theory," *op. cit.*, p. 227 [116].

[20] *Philosophers Speak of God*, p. 14.

It is at once evident, however, that Hartshorne's "theory of dipolarity"[23] would lead precisely to that kind of intolerable paradox, which he has elsewhere taken such pains to eradicate, if some logical clarification were not made regarding the legitimacy of this notion of the "coincidence of opposites" in the divine nature.[24] That is to say, to contend, as Hartshorne does, that God is the most strictly absolute as well as the most strictly relative of beings is obviously nonsense unless there be some logically permissible way by which to resolve what is otherwise sheer contradiction.[25] It is not enough to posit a merely absolute God that has the illusion of being relative, or a purely relative God that has the illusion of absoluteness.[26] Both concepts must be fully predicated of deity, while at the same time avoiding all contradiction.

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[21] Ibid., p. 24. It is important to stress that while the principle of polarity embraces both being and becoming, becoming is the more inclusive category (see above, pp. 69f.) and hence the unity of being and becoming must itself become. If the unity itself were something absolute, necessary, and eternally the same, the polar principle would yield pantheism, which is quite different from the process philosophy underlying panentheism.

[22] "God's Existence: A Conceptual Problem," in Hook, ed., op. cit., p. 218 [130].

[23] Philosophers Speak of God, p. 4.

[24] "Present Prospects for Metaphysics," op. cit., p. 196 [145].

[25] Man's Vision of God, p. 349.

Now the only way that both poles of each pair of ultimate contraries can be affirmed equally of God is to posit two aspects in the divine essence, the first of which will relate to the one pole and the second to the other pole.[27] The only thing that must be strictly denied of God is that either aspect be allowed to admit of a nonsupreme form of any categorical contrast.[28] This is not to say that mediocre or ordinary forms of reality will not be contained in God, for as supreme all-inclusive reality, he will be qualified by them in part (although never in the whole) of his being. Such mediocre forms, however, will not be included in the divine essence but only in God's accidental "nature."[29]

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[26] Ibid., p. 350.

[27] Philosophers Speak of God, p. 4; Man's Vision of God, p. 131.

[28] Philosophers Speak of God, p. 4.

[29] Ibid., pp. 28, 57f. The word "nature" is used here and elsewhere for want of a better term. It must not be taken to mean that God has some kind of "substantial" reality, for the term "God" is token-reflexive for Hartshorne, referring to a new totality each time it is uttered. On occasion, however, Hartshorne himself employs the terms "Primordial Nature" and "Consequent Nature," even in places where he is not expounding Whitehead's thought.

That is to say, non-supreme forms of reality will be in God, but they will not be a part of his essence; for the divine essence is that which is abstracted from all that is accidental in God, from all that without which God would still be "himself."[30]

In introducing this conception of a God having an essential and an accidental nature, we must bear in mind that this distinction is not principally what Hartshorne means by the theory of dipolarity. This notion more properly concerns the polar or two-aspect character of the divine essence and not the fact that God has two "natures." However, as we shall presently see, it is by virtue of the polar elements in God's essence that he would necessarily have an accidental aspect to his being. Hence, in practice the concept of dipolarity may be used to describe both the polar aspect of God's essence and the polar contrast of his two "natures."

Now if the dipolar character of God's essence embraces all contraries in a supremely maximal form,[31] then we appear to be involved in a contradiction. For example, it seems inadmissible to predicate of God's essence, which by definition is that which is strictly necessary in him, such polar contrasts as absolute-relative, or necessary-contingent. How is it possible that the relative or the contingent should qualify that which is unqualifiedly absolute and necessary? To admit relativity or contingency within the very essence of God would be to eliminate any distinction between the essential and accidental. The very meaning of essence would thus be destroyed.

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[30] Ibid., p. 4.

[31] Ibid., p. 5.

The apparent paradox disappears, however, when we see that it is of the very essence of God that one aspect of his being should necessarily be contingent. Expressed otherwise, it is necessary _that_ God have some accidents or other, but _which_ particular accidents he may have is entirely outside his essence and hence non-necessary. As Hartshorne puts it, "It is no accident that there should be accidents [in God]; rather, there are bound to be accidents, just as it is predictable that unpredictable events will never cease to occur."[32] The same may be said for the divine relativity, or, as Hartshorne sometimes prefers to express it, the divine relatedness to all things. Its existence has no special conditions. It is that which could not not be. It is therefore the absolute principle.[33] "'Nothing is absolute but relativity'--this saying," Hartshorne writes, "which I heard as a student, and which meant nothing much to me at the time, I have come to see as, properly construed, the secret of secrets . . ."[34]

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[32] "Present Prospects for Metaphysics," _op. cit._, p. 194 [145].

[33] _Ibid._, pp. 193-203.

We have previously noted that according to Hartshorne every contrast must ultimately fall within the inclusiveness of the divine life. If there were something beside, outside, or merely additional to God, then we would be confronted with the metaphysical dilemma of a whole of things of which God would be only a part.[35] But this notion would do violence to the very meaning of God as "that than which nothing greater can be conceived." For God-and-something-else, comprising a totality of which God would be but a constituent, is certainly inferior conceptually to God himself as the whole of reality, with all the lesser parts functioning as constitutive elements within his all-inclusive life.[36] In short, either the universe is God (in a sense to be presently clarified), or there are two eminent beings--God and the universe. Or, more problematical still, there are three eminent beings or unities--the world, God, and the unity which embraces them both.[37] Hartshorne's conclusion is that "the God who creates and the inclusive creation are one God."[38]

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[34] Ibid., p. 192. Hartshorne notes that there is no more difficulty in affirming that relativity is not relative than in the similar affirmation that concreteness is not concrete, for concreteness as such is a highly abstract term. ("Present Prospects for Metaphysics," op. cit., p. 194.) See also "Metaphysics and the Modality of Existential Judgments," op. cit., p. 108 [126].

[35] "The New Pantheism--I," The Christian Register, Vol. CXV, No. 8 (February 20, 1936), p. 119; "Whitehead on Process: A Reply to Professor Eslick," op. cit., p. 520 [108].

[36] To be sure, the above difficulty would hardly even arise in traditional monopolar theism, which exempted God from any temporal relations to a created, non-eternal world. This is because the distinction between time and eternity, being one not of degree but of kind, would render innocuous

Hartshorne maintains that the notion of God as a constituent within a whole is not only inferior conceptually to the notion of God himself comprising the inclusive whole of reality; it also offends the religious consciousness, which must think of the divine as all-inclusive reality.[39] Hartshorne follows Tillich in making Mark 12:30 and Deuteronomy 6:5 his key texts for interpreting the meaning of the divine. All of our being--heart, mind, soul and strength--is to be expressed in our relation to God. He is to be loved completely and without reservation. Hence any

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the problem of having a whole (God plus the world) of which God was only a part. There would be no point in positing a whole greater than the togetherness of God and the world for the reason that no finite addition, such as the world, to the infinity of God could yield a totality greater than the already infinite divine reality.

[37] "The New Pantheism--I," op. cit., p. 119 [17]. This will be discussed further in chapters VIII and IX below.

[38] The Divine Relativity, p. 79; cf. "Metaphysical Statements as Nonrestrictive and Existential," op. cit., p. 45 [113].

[39] "A Philosopher's Assessment of Christianity," in Walter Leibrecht, ed., Religion and Culture: Essays in Honor of Paul Tillich (New York: Harpers, 1959), p. 167.

love of one's neighbor must already be embraced in one's love of God.[40] Indeed, since God is the proper all-inclusive object of our devotion and interest, he must embrace all that is worthy of our interest, and this means all that is; for it is impossible to speak of anything as intrinsically uninteresting--such an admission being already an interest.[41] "For to recognize anything as real outside God is to express at least some slight interest in it, an interest by hypothesis not directed to God. An all-inclusive interest cannot have a less than all-inclusive object!"[42]

Because Hartshorne's dipolar doctrine of God represents an attempt to reconcile the contrasting "half truths" of pantheism and classical theism into a "higher synthesis" that combines the positive values of both,[43] we should expect to find a pantheistic overtone pervading much of his thought. In fact, he can quite explicitly say: "My position . . . is that, if the term 'pantheism' means only that the divine reality includes all things, then Christianity necessarily is a form of pantheism."[44] And in another place he writes: "So long as anything that would possibly be suggested by the term pantheism was considered beyond the pale of respectable theology, there could be no serious analysis of the relations of God to the world."[45]

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[40] Ibid.; cf. The Logic of Perfection, pp. 100, 113.

[41] "The Idea of God--Literal or Analogical?" The Christian Scholar, Vol. XXXIX, No. 2 (June, 1956), p. 131.

[42] "A Philosopher's Assessment of Christianity," in Leibrecht, ed., op. cit., p. 167 [118].

[43] Man's Vision of God, p. 3; Philosophers Speak of God, p. 5.

An analysis of the following quotations indicates just how strong this pantheistic dimension actually is. For example, he tells us: "God is the whole of things . . . the unity of nature which is the unity of the divine personality and of all that is."[46] Similarly, he speaks of the world as "the self-identical with God, not a second entity."[47] "God is the world in its aspects of self-existence and of totality."[48] " . . . the concrete character of God and the concrete unity of the cosmos are the same."[49] God is "the eternal and omnipresent unity of space-time, without which that unity is not positively conceivable."[50] God is "the living universe in which all beings have their life."[51] If a God external to the universe be rejected, then those attributes that were traditionally predicated of him to make the universe intelligible "must be transferred to the universe itself."[52] It then becomes possible to say, "God is 'the world' understood, the world is 'God' understood."[53]

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[44] "A Philosopher's Assessment of Christianity," in Walter Leibrecht, ed., op. cit., p. 168 [118]. See chapter VIII below.

[45] Man's Vision of God, p. 273.

[46] "The New Pantheism--I," op.cit., p. 119 [17], italics his; cf. Man's Vision of God, p. 293; The Logic of Perfection, p. 196. See the further discussion in chapter VIII below.

[47] Man's Vision of God, p. 230; "Whitehead's Philosophy of Reality as Socially-Structured Process," op. cit., p. 67 [87].

[48] "Redefining God," The New Humanist, Vol. VII, No. 4 (July-August, 1934), p. 14, italics his.

[49] "Santayana's Doctrine of Essence," Schilpp, ed., op. cit., p. 80 [25]; cf. The Divine Relativity, p. 80.

Now, while these statements, taken in and of themselves, certainly point to pantheism in one form or another, there are two important qualifications which immediately serve to distinguish Hartshorne's position from that of pantheism.

First of all, pantheism itself poses the problem that if God were merely identified with the system of actual things, then, should a different system be possible, it would also be possible that God might not exist, or that he might somehow cease to be himself.[54] Thus if we admit sheer identity between God and the world, it seems that one of two things would be true: either God would be a purely contingent being, changing in accordance with every varying configuration of the whole (in which case anything might happen to him, even his destruction); or all things would have to be necessary just as they are. On either reading, God would be on the same metaphysical level as other things, having the status of either pure contingency or pure necessity.[55]

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[50] Man's Vision of God, pp. 273f.; cf. p. 279; "A Critique of Peirce's Idea of God," The Philosophical Review, Vol. L, No. 5 (September, 1941), p. 521.

[51] "The Formal Validity and Real Significance of the Ontological Argument," op. cit., p. 236 [40].

[52] "The New Pantheism--II," The Christian Register, Vol. CXV, No. 9 (February 27, 1936), p. 143; cf. "The Compound Individual," op. cit., p. 205 [16].

[53] Man's Vision of God, p. 339.

Hartshorne's position, in distinction from the above, is that God has a self-identical essence that is independent of the totality of things which exist and of the particular whole which they form. Thus in his essential nature God neither is the world nor does he include it.[56] His essence infinitely transcends the *de facto* totality of the universe.[57] While in his *actuality* God is "surrelative" to the total state of the universe at a given moment, in his *essence* he is quite independent of the totality, since any possible totality would still have been compatible with his essence.[58] Every moment, then, a partly new totality contains and embodies God's unchanging, absolute essence, which, though contained in the divine actuality, does not depend on that actuality but is externally related to it.[59]

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[54] Entry on "Panentheism," in Vergilius Ferm, ed., *An Encyclopedia of Religion* (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1945), p. 557.

[55] *Ibid.*

[56] *Philosophers Speak of God*, p. 15.

[57] *The Divine Relativity*, p. 89.

There is a second consideration which distinguishes Hartshorne's position from that of pantheism. In describing God's actuality as all-inclusive of the world, Hartshorne does not mean that God as the whole of the world is merely the summation or collection of the many parts which comprise the whole. A total containing A, B, and C is distinguishable from A or B or C. The total may therefore have a reality of its own without being the sole object.[60] The properties of the whole are really distinguishable from the properties of the parts.[61] God as the All is more than the sum of his parts, but this "more" is not outside the parts but a factor of them--much in the same way that a man is more than any of his cells and yet is a factor in all of them.[62] We shall give more detailed attention to these considerations in chapter VIII.

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[58] Ibid.

[59] Ibid. See chapter VI for a discussion of the nature of this relation.

[60] The Divine Relativity, p. 139.

[61] Philosophers Speak of God, p. 511.

[62] Man's Vision of God, p. 285; The Logic of Perfection, pp. 199f.

Panentheism is the one word that best sums up Hartshorne's position, for it expresses the view that while all things are within the being of God, he is not merely the whole of actual things.[63] God is really distinguishable from and independent of any and all relative items; yet he includes all of these items when they are taken as a totality.[64] Panentheism represents a middle ground between pantheism and classical theism[65] in that it grants to theism something in God, the divine essence, that is wholly independent of the world, while also granting to pantheism something in God, the content of the divine experience or actuality, that is not independent of the world. In the next chapter and chapter VIII we shall examine Hartshorne's doctrine of the essence and actuality of God and the relation between them.

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[63] Entry on "Panentheism," in Ferm, ed., op. cit., p. 557 [45]. The term panentheism was first coined by Karl Christian Friedrick Krause who, along with some of the "late idealists," promulgated panentheism in reaction to Hegel's absolute reconciliation of transcendence and immanence.

[64] The Divine Relativity, p. 89; "Whitehead and Berdyaev: Is There Tragedy in God?" The Journal of Religion, Vol. XXXVII, No. 2 (April, 1957), pp. 71-84.

[65] Hartshorne does not always explicitly indicate just what kind of theism he has in mind when he speaks of "classical" or "traditional" views. In some places, for example, Man's Vision of God, he is evidently referring to deism, which represents a position diametrically opposed to pantheism and hence is the one which offers the kind of polar extreme which lends itself to a synthesis of opposites. The examples of "classical" theism which he presents in Philosophers Speak of God are representative of Thomism and Augustinianism and cannot be classified with deism. Yet, while these views are not deistic, they resemble deism at the point where they posit the absoluteness of God in abstraction from the world. It is this one-sidedness that Hartshorne's criticism is intended to correct.

CHAPTER VI

THE DIVINE ESSENCE

Hartshorne's panentheism represents an attempt to do justice to both the interrelation and the distinction between God and the world. Traditional theistic positions have generally favored one of these attitudes at the expense of the other. Thus pantheism, by emphasizing the interrelation between God and the world, has destroyed their distinction; and the deistic extreme of classical theism, by emphasizing their distinction, has lost sight of their interrelation.

Now as we saw in the last chapter, Hartshorne's theory of dipolarity enables him to synthesize both of these attitudes by affirming two aspects or "natures" in God. In his accidental nature God includes the totality of the world within the concrete actuality of his experience. In his essential or primordial nature God is independent of, and wholly distinct from, the particular things which exist and the totality they form.

Now to affirm a duality of natures in God is to raise the inevitable question as to the relation between them. The problem is immediately complicated, moreover, by the polar character of the two natures to be related. How is it possible to relate God's essence, which is absolute, necessary, and eternal, to his concrete actuality, which is relative, contingent and temporal? Indeed, how is it possible to bring the absolute, which by definition implies the absence of relations, into relation at all without forfeiting the categorical independence that constitutes the very meaning of absoluteness? We are thus confronted with Hartshorne's view of relations, which forms the logical core of his doctrine of panentheism and which is virtually identical with the absolute-relative problem.[1]

From what we have already seen of the synthetic temper of Hartshorne's philosophy, we might well expect that his doctrine of relations would not take either of the extreme views of affirming solely internal relations, on the one hand, or solely external relations, on the other, but would somehow bring together complementary elements from both positions.

Now this is precisely what Hartshorne does. Either of the above alternatives, taken by itself, ends in difficulties; but when the two views are brought together in a compatible synthesis, the strength of each is retained without the difficulties of either.[2] Before considering Hartshorne's own position, let us examine the problems that arise when either of the above views is taken alone.

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[1] "God as Absolute, Yet Related to All," The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. I, No. 1 (September, 1947), p. 30; The Divine Relativity, p. 67. These two references are for the most part identical in content, the former being included as a chapter in The Divine Relativity.

The problem with purely external relations is that no provision can be made for the inclusive unity of the whole of reality.[3] The most vigorous opponent of external relations was F. R. Bradley,[4] who argued that when terms and relations are taken as ultimate (this being the case if there is no inclusive whole), then a vicious regress results. Let us take the example of A related to B, symbolized by ARB. According to the theory of external relations, A is one entity, R is another, and B still a third, each being just what it is in distinction from the others. Now difficulty arises when we try to get A really related to B. If A is not, in its very being or identity, related to B, then we must relate A to the relation, R, to get A genuinely related. But this not only pushes the problem of getting A related to B one step further removed from solution; it also introduces the additional difficulty of relating A to the relation between A and R (call it R'). It can readily be seen that this leads to a series of relations to relations to relations, ad infinitum--a series which is vicious because it can never really arrive at a relation to B which is really A's.[5]

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[2] Man's Vision of God, p. 235; "God as Absolute, Yet Related to All," op. cit., p. 29 [56]; The Divine Relativity, p. 66. .

[3] Man's Vision of God, pp. 287f.

[4] It should be pointed out that Bradley ultimately regards all relations, whether external or internal, as unreal. [See his Appearance and Reality (London: Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1925), pp. 477-481 and passim.]

The problem with affirming purely internal relations is that one ends up denying any real individuality short of the entire universe.[6] Any statement about the relation between two individuals becomes a statement about a whole which they form. The real subject of a relational proposition is not any one of its terms but the whole which they constitute, the relation asserted being a predicate of that whole. But then, since a relation is a quality of a total situation, in so far as things are related, they are subservient and secondary to the whole which they form. Relationship is thus reduced to a quality of a whole. Now since all things are related, individuality is reduced to membership in the one absolute individual, which is the universe itself. For example, if two things are, as such, different, they must (since difference is a relation) form a whole of which difference itself is a quality. But then difference becomes not a quality of the things which are said to be different but of the whole which includes them, and through including them makes them different. Thus even difference is determined by the whole, and all individuality is forfeited.[7]

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[5] "God as Absolute, Yet Related to All," op.cit., p. 28 [56]; The Divine Relativity, p. 64.

[6] "God as Absolute, Yet Related to All," op. cit., pp. 29ff. [56]; The Divine Relativity, pp. 65ff.

Now Hartshorne affirms what each of these positions, taken in the extreme, denies. If the theory of external relations, taken by itself, denies the inclusive unity of reality, then Hartshorne affirms the integrity of the whole, within which the multiplicity of the individuals are included as parts. If the theory of internal relations ultimately sacrifices the distinctiveness of the parts to the all-inclusive individuality of the whole, then Hartshorne affirms the individual integrity of the parts by virtue of their being externally related to the whole.[8]

Because of the importance of the theory of external relations to Hartshorne's understanding of the divine essence (and to the divine actuality as well, as we shall see in chapter VIII), we must now turn to a more detailed exposition.

Hartshorne concurs with Bradley's rejection of external relations at one point: relations cannot be external to all their terms.[9] If no term were constituted by virtue of its being related to another term, then relatedness would be something additional to all the terms. This would, as we have seen, lead to endless regress.[10]

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[7] We shall deal with this in more detail below and in chapters VIII and IX.

[8] The Divine Relativity, p. 92; "The Divine Relativity and Absoluteness: A Reply," op. cit., pp. 52f. [69].

Hartshorne parts company with Bradley, however, at the point where the latter's argument is taken to mean that relations are external to no terms, meaning that every term must be constituted by the relations in which it is situated.[11] To show that this need not be the case (and, as we shall see below, cannot be the case if there is to be an all-inclusive reality) Hartshorne offers the following argument.[12] Let us take the complex ARB, supposing that the relation is internal to A and external to B. Being internal to A, the relation is thus nothing additional to A but is just A's manner of being A, that is, A as just something-related-to-B. This means that A's experience of B is not first the experience, plus A's relation to B; rather there is but one entity--experience-of-B.[13] So much for A's experience of, and hence relation to, B.

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[9] Man's Vision of God, p. 235.

[10] "God as Absolute, Yet Related to All," op. cit., p. 28 [56]; The Divine Relativity, p. 64.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid., pp. 28f; The Divine Relativity, p. 64f.

[13] It may seem that the concept "experience" or "experience-of" refers to a separate constituent in the entity, "experience-of-B." What is meant by "experience," however,

If we now try to get B related to A, then the problem of regress arises in the following manner. We have supposed that B is not in itself (that is, intrinsically or internally) related to A. In order to get B related to A, then, it appears that we would have to add to B's mere "being-B" the additional quality of its being-related-to-A. But this addition would itself be a relating of B to relation to A, and so on, ad infinitum.

Now the whole thrust of Hartshorne's argument is that we do not have to get B related to A. The reason behind this assertion is one of the most important logical principles in Hartshorne's thought, which he expresses as follows: "It is not that certain terms externally have relations, but that certain relations have terms . . ."[14] Applying this notion to our example of ARB, we may say that the "inness" of B to the relation is only a nominal one. That is to say, B does not really "have" relation in the situation in question. However, the relation does possess the term, B; and this means,

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is not a concrete term standing in relation to B but rather the mere class concept of experience in general. It is nonsense to speak of just "the experience of," for there can only be experience of a particular term, such as B or C. A "relation to" is just nothing. (Ibid. Cf. Man's Vision of God, p. 295.)

[14] "God as Absolute, Yet Related to All," op. cit., p. 29; italics his [56]; The Divine Relativity, p. 64.

accordingly, that the other term, A, to which the relation is internal, in possessing the relation, also possesses the term, B. Thus the term that has the relation has also the other term, for relation-to-B includes B.[15] To take another example, the complex XY is related to X, for it has X as a constituent. Now this "having" is the relation. If we say that X is a constituent had by XY, we are only repeating in another way the assertion that XY has X in a certain manner. It is thus the complex that here has the relation, not the constituent.[16] "To deny this," Hartshorne concludes, "is to deny the very ideas of analytic complex and constituent; it is, as Bradley admits, to make all rational thought and analysis self-contradictory."[17]

We just saw in the above paragraph that, while the whole contains, and is thus related to, all the parts, it does not follow that all the parts are related to the inclusive whole.[18] Thus the status of "being contained" within the whole is a nominal, external relation. Now if this were not the case, if the included parts were to have relation to the including whole, then, since "to have the relation is to have the term,"[19] the parts would include the including whole and all distinction between including and included would vanish. "Thus only if some relations are external," Hartshorne affirms, "can there, in a significant sense, be an all-inclusive reality!"[20]

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[15] "Radhakrishnan on Mind, Matter, and God," in The Philosophy of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan: The Library of Living Philosophers, Vol. VIII (New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1952), p. 319. (See below footnote #20.)

[16] Cf. Man's Vision of God, p. 235.

[17] "God as Absolute, Yet Related to All," op. cit., p. 29 [56]; The Divine Relativity, p. 64. Cf. "The Divine Relativity and Absoluteness: A Reply," op. cit., p. 53 [69].

[18] The Divine Relativity, pp. 69, 92; "The Divine Relativity and Absoluteness: A Reply," op. cit., pp. 52f. [69].

From our discussion thus far we have seen that external relations obtain when some one term (the externally related one) is "involved in without involving" the other (the internally related one).[21] Our emphasis, however, has been more on the meaning of the relation, "to be involved in without involving," than on the intrinsic nature of the externally related term itself. To this we must now turn.

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[19] While we shall deal with this notion in some detail in chapter IX, a word of explanation is in order at this point. What Hartshorne means by this phrase is that the really related term includes the term to which it is related. Expressed otherwise, the subject of the relation includes the "term" of the relation. From an epistemological standpoint, this amounts to saying that the knower includes the known, an assertion which runs counter to the realism of our everyday experience, which holds that the things which are known are independent of and external to us. Hartshorne's position, however, is that "being a constituent of the knower is not a real relation, hence cannot infringe upon the independence of the object. To call the latter a 'state' of the subject is not a real description of the object at all, but only of the subject." ("The Divine Relativity and Absoluteness: A Reply," op. cit., p. 54, italics mine [69].)

[20] The Divine Relativity, pp. 92f; cf. Man's Vision of God, pp. 235ff.

[21] Man's Vision of God, p. 285.

Hartshorne holds that external relations are possible if the involved but not involving term is more abstract than the other.[22] To be abstract is to be without wholly determinate character, to be relatively unindividual, in a relation.[23] Indeed, it is the very meaning of the abstract, as such, "that it can be identified without considering all the relational contexts, the concrete cases, in which it might be embodied."[24] The abstract is what can be detached in thought and, at least potentially, in actuality, from various relationships and yet still be the same identical entity.[25] For example, the number two is an absolute, externally related term with reference to its being an object of a particular human consciousness.[26] It would have been the number two even if I had never thought of it. In its formal, mathematical sense, then, the number two remains itself, regardless of whether it is, for example, the number of eyes in my head. Even if I had never existed with my two eyes, two would have still been one more than one, a half of four, and one less than three.[27] "To deny this independence of mathematical two is to assert that mathematics is the study of the biographies of all persons who count to two that ever have existed. . . ."[28]

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[22] Ibid., pp. 235, 285f. Since our concern in this context is with the essence of God and how it, as absolute, can be related to God's concrete actuality, we have stressed the possibility of external relations when the involved term is more abstract than the involving one. However, external relations may also obtain between two terms which are concrete, providing the asymmetrical structure of time is taken into account. For example, a present awareness may be related to a past event, bu the converse is not true. (The Divine Relativity, p. 68.)

[23] Man's Vision of God, pp. 236, 237.

[24] Ibid., p. 237.

[25] "God as Absolute, Yet Related to All," op. cit., p. 31 [56]; The Divine Relativity, p. 68.

[26] Ibid.

If we consider a universal such as whiteness, the same independence of context can be predicated of it as with the number two. The whiteness of the paper on which I am typing is not made anything other than it was before it was brought into relation with my consciousness. It is for this reason that the relation of my consciousness to the abstract term whiteness is external.[29]

We are now ready to consider the question which we posed at the beginning of this chapter: How are the two aspects of God, his absolute essence and his relative actuality, to be related? Hartshorne succinctly describes the problem to which we must now turn our attention: "Unless

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[27] "God as Absolute, Yet Related to All," op. cit., p. 27 [56]; The Divine Relativity, p. 63.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Man's Vision of God, p. 236.

. . . .it is possible to be 'in relation' without in any way becoming 'relative,' without the relations qualifying the things said to be terms of the relations, there can, it seems, be no intelligible treatment of either relativity or absoluteness."[30]

In contrast to the relative, the absolute means that which is nonrelative or independent of relationships.[31] For this reason the all-inclusive, which is supremely relative or "surrelative," could not possibly _be_ the absolute, although it could _include_ something absolute.[32] To conceive of the absolute, then, in distinction from what is all-inclusively relative, we must posit that which is free from relatedness, abstracting from all relative terms and relations to the concrete. What is thus conceived must be something extremely abstract.[33] Why, then, should we try to avoid the conclusion? Hartshorne asks. "The absolute, as such, is a radically abstract, not a concrete, entity. More than twenty centuries have sought, nevertheless, to find a way to dodge this conclusion."[34]

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[30] _The Divine Relativity,_ p. 6.

[31] _Ibid._, p. 67; "Radhakrishnan on Mind, Matter, and God," _op. cit.,_ p. 317 [75].

[32] _The Divine Relativity_, p. 86; "The Relativity of Nonrelativity: Some Reflections on Firstness," _op. cit._, p. 222 [74]. This can be logically demonstrated in the following manner. If A is independent, but B dependent, then whatever includes A _and_ B is dependent upon that upon which B depends. The same is true if we say that A is necessary and B is contingent, for AB, or anything including A and B, cannot be necessary. "Thus logic supports throughout the notion that the absolute, or the constant, independent, and necessary, is in the relative, dependent, and contingent happening, not vice versa . . ." ("The Divine Relativity and Absoluteness: A Reply," _op. cit._, p. 34 [69].)

Thus, when applied to God, the absolute refers to that abstract aspect in him which is objectively distinguishable from his nature as a whole and which is related to that whole "by a relation which does not enter into the being of the abstract aspect."[35] Because the absolute is included as a term and not a subject within the divine actuality, it can exist in the supremely relative in complete independence and exemption from relativity. "For it is not the absolute which has the relation, 'in' the actual relative, but rather and only the relative which has the relation, 'containing' the absolute."[36]

This whole notion radically inverts Bradley's doctrine that the relative is a mere appearance of the absolute. On Hartshorne's view the absolute is only an abstract feature of a total reality that is more than absolute--in the sense in which the concrete is more than the abstract.[37] There is nothing contradictory in affirming the totality of things as that which is "more than absolute," providing we keep in mind that the absolute, defined as the nonrelative, does not coincide with the all-inclusive reality of God.[38] The absolute is God with something left out of account, or, what is the same thing, God is more than his absolute essence.[39]

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[33] The Divine Relativity, pp. 67, 70, 80f., 83; "Radhakrishnan on Mind, Matter, and God," op. cit., p. 317 [75].

[34] "Radhakrishnan on Mind, Matter and God," op. cit., pp. 317f. [75]; cf. "Hume's Metaphysics and Its Present-Day Influence," op. cit., p. 169 [127]; "The Relativity of Non-relativity: Some Reflections on Firstness," op. cit., p. 222 [74].

[35] Man's Vision of God, p. 237.

[36] The Divine Relativity, p. 86; cf. pp. 71f., 81.

Thus far our discussion has focused upon the relationship between the divine essence and the divine actuality in Hartshorne's doctrine of God. What we have presented seems to be logically defensible and religiously unobjectionable, given the initial assumption that a polar conception of deity is best capable of satisfying the quest for a doctrine of God that is at once rationally coherent and religiously worshipful.

We turn now to an analysis of the nature of the divine essence itself, apart from the question of its relationship to the divine actuality. We have already seen that according to Hartshorne God's total concrete actuality cannot be absolute, for by internally containing all things, he is consequently relative to all things.[40] Since actuality is the realm of definiteness, including definiteness of relatedness, then in order to arrive at the nonrelative or absolute, it is necessary to abstract from all relations.[41] What we arrive at is something incomparably less than the divine actuality.[42] It is an empty abstraction, a mere outline.[43] But this is not to say that the divine essence is a mere nothing, an emptiness that has no objective designation at all.[44]

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[37] "Radhakrishnan on Mind, Matter, and God," op. cit., p. 318 [75]; The Divine Relativity, pp. 18, 83.

[38] The Divine Relativity, p. 83.

[39] Ibid.; cf. "The Philosophy of Creative Synthesis," op. cit., p. 953 [115].

Rather Hartshorne describes the divine essence as "the realm of primordial possibilities, apart from all particular actualizations. Objective nothing can only be pure possibility."[45] Such pure possibility, however, is not completely without difference, but only without any particular actual difference. It has a certain structure, which is that of "God-world"--not any particular world, and not God as knowing any particular world, but God-as-such knowing world-as-such. God in his essence is thus the inseparable correlate of world-in-general.[46] "This correlation, God-as-such and world-as-such," Hartshorne affirms,

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[40] "The Relativity of Nonrelativity: Some Reflections on Firstness," op. cit., p. 222 [74].

[41] Ibid., p. 221.

[42] "The Kinds of Theism: A Reply," op. cit., p. 129 [85].

[43] "The Divine Relativity and Absoluteness: A Reply," op. cit., p. 44 [69]. In a convocation address at the Southern California School of Theology on August 20, 1964, Hartshorne described God's necessary essence as "the empty, featureless invariant in all possible variations."

[44] This was the contention of John Wild in his review of The Divine Relativity. [See the Review of Metaphysics, Vol. II, No. 6 (December, 1948), pp. 68ff. [69].]

> is not "nothing" in the sense of a phrase without designation, but is an objective abstract aspect of every actual state of God-world. God-as-such is not an actuality, but yet it exists, by virtue of some

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[45] "The Divine Relativity and Absoluteness: A Reply," op. cit., p. 44, italics mine [69]. The equation which Hartshorne makes between the nonrelative and the purely possible is analogous to Peirce's category of Firstness. [See Hartshorne and Weiss, eds., The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931-1935), Vol. I, pp. 303ff.] According to Peirce, Firstness or the Monad is whatever does not contain in itself reference to another. It is thus nonrelative or absolute. It has no parts and is without locus in space-time (which would constitute a reference to things before and after). It is neither an event nor an experience. Indeed, it is nothing actual, which would involve the category of Secondness or reaction. It is not a general like color, for being such it would have reference to a plurality of colors coming under it. "What then, if anything, is the Monad?" Hartshorne asks. "It can only be that nonactual but also nongeneral something which Peirce calls a possibility . . ." ("The Relativity of Nonrelativity: Some Reflections on Firstness," op. cit., p. 215; cf. p. 219 [74].)

[46] "The Divine Relativity and Absoluteness: A Reply," op. cit., p. 44 [69]; "The Structure of Metaphysics: A Criticism of Lazerowitz's Theory," op. cit., p. 231 [116].

suitable actuality or other.[47]

This correlation can be illustrated in terms of God's knowledge of the actual world.[48] God's knowledge-of-X is, by the very meaning of the terms involved, relative to X. Now if X is the actual world, and assuming, as traditional theism had always done, that the world is contingent, then the nonexistence of the world is just as conceivable as its existence. However, the possibility of the world's not having existed also includes the possibility of God's not knowing that it exists. God's knowledge, therefore, is the actualization of a possibility which might not have been. Had a different world existed, the content of God's knowledge, accordingly, would have been different from that which actually obtains for this actual world. Only in his *possibilities* of knowledge, then, is God independent of which world exists. Whichever world *does* exist, God will know it as existing. However, he was capable also of knowing those worlds which he had power to bring into existence. No actualization can therefore affect God's pure possibilities of knowing.[49]

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[47] "The Divine Relativity and Absoluteness: A Reply," *op. cit.*, p. 44 [69].

[48] "The Relativity of Nonrelativity: Some Reflections on Firstness," *op. cit.*, pp. 222f. [74].

We thus arrive at Hartshorne's notion of the absolute or nonrelative as the realm of purely universal possibility--that which is left when we abstract from everything particular or specific as such.[50] This is that

> primordial potency which . . . is theologically indistinguishable from the pure power of God. It is not the actuality of his exercise of this power, not his doing or enjoying, but his ability to do or enjoy; not his feeling but his power of feeling.[51]

In short, God's primordial power consists in his containing the ultimate dimensions of determinateness (though not all possible determinations).[52] "This is the Primordial Nature of God, whose content . . . is one with the continuum of 'eternal objects.'"[53]

Hartshorne's position regarding eternal objects is decidedly "more nominalistic" than Whitehead's view.[54] For Hartshorne there is no multitude of disjunctive, self-identical universals which somehow subsist as determinate possibilities apart from actualization.[55] There is rather a primordial continuum of determinable potentiality--a continuum which is "a unity transcending all discrete multitude."[56]

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[49] Cf. "The Structure of Metaphysics: A Criticism of of Lazerowitz's Theory," op. cit., p. 110 [116]. Hartshorne is, of course, redefining the meaning of omniscience, or what he prefers to call "cognitive adequacy," to account for potentiality as well as actuality in God. Divine omniscience is "an infinite class of relationships, not all of which are actual." (The Divine Relativity, p. 121.) God thus knows the actual as actual and the possible as possible.

[50] "The Relativity of Nonrelativity: Some Reflections on Firstness," op. cit., p. 223 [74].

[51] Ibid.

[52] Man's Vision of God, p. 244.

[53] "The Relativity of Nonrelativity: Some Reflections on Firstness," op. cit., p. 223 [74].

> If one defines the universal as the continuum of its possible instances, this does not mean that it is the instances which as a multitude make up the continuum, for the latter is defined as a principle inexhaustibly generative of multitude rather than identical with any distinct multitude.[57]

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[54] "Whitehead and Contemporary Philosophy," op. cit., p. 35 [125].

[55] Ibid.: "The Relativity of Nonrelativity: Some Reflections on Firstness," op. cit., pp. 223f. [74]. Hartshorne speaks of Whitehead's view of eternal objects as involving "excessive concessions to a Platonism of Santayana's type." ("Santayana's Doctrine of Essence," op. cit., p. 148 [25].) Elsewhere Hartshorne says that the study of mathematical universals, which are only one type, "may have led Whitehead to a one-sided view of universals in general." ("The Compound Individual," op. cit., p. 212 [16]; cf. also "Metaphysics for Positivists," op. cit., pp. 302f. [14].) For an excellent analysis and critique of Whitehead's Platonic view of universals see Everett W. Hall, "Of What Use are Whitehead's Eternal Objects?" Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXVII, 1930, pp. 29-44. Reprinted in George L. Kline, ed., op. cit., pp. 102-116.)

[56] "Continuity, the Form of Forms, in Charles Peirce," op. cit., p. 527 [2]; Reality as Social Process, p. 20; Man's Vision of God, p. 37.

[57] "Continuity, the Form of Forms, in Charles Peirce," op. cit., p. 527 [2].

What is eternal, therefore, is not some realm of specific qualities but the inexhaustible creative possibilities of the primordial continuum.[58] Essences thus emerge in the universe, not merely in the world of actuality but in the total universe of actuality and possibility.[59] Specific characters are "emergents at a certain date, created rather than 'selected' out of the primordial potentiality.[60]

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[58] Ibid. Hartshorne's departure from Whitehead in this regard can be documented from a number of sources. "Whitehead includes among 'eternal objects' specific qualities like 'blue'; and here I should dissent from him." ("Whitehead's Philosophy of Reality as Socially-Structured Process," op. cit., p. 67 [87].) "Some of Whitehead's 'eternal objects' appear much too specific to belong to the necessary and therefore eternal furniture of the universe." ("The New Metaphysics and Current Problems (II)," op. cit., p. 9 [10].) In another place Hartshorne says that Whitehead's doctrine of God "would be clarified and strengthened--if one eliminated the idea of eternal species, while retaining that of eternal highest genera, including the genus of specificity as such." ("Whitehead's Idea of God," op. cit., pp. 558f., italics his [27].) "There is no reason why characters may not have a certain degree of universality without possessing the absolute degree of it which is eternity." ("On Some Criticisms of Whitehead's Philosophy," op. cit., p. 334 [15].) In a tape-recorded discussion with several graduate students at the Southern California School of Theology on August 20, 1964, Hartshorne gave what is probably his clearest statement on eternal objects. "If you make a specific shade of blue an eternal entity rather than a specific emergent, then it seems to me that everything becomes equally universal. I think that eternity ought to be the highest grade of universality. Whitehead seems to have different grades of universality in the eternal itself, and I don't believe that works. You have got to have the potentiality of different grades of universality. That's eternal. There's eternally the possibility of differentiation, but you must not put actual differentiation into the eternal, actual particularization into the eternal. . . . Whitehead's theory of extensive abstraction treats space not as a multitude of points but points as a way of looking at the unity of space. I put this to him: Why not treat eternal objects that way and my only reply was: 'That's a very subtle argument; perhaps I have missed something'."

To be sure, before an essence emerges, there must have been the possibility of its appearance, of which its ingression is the actualization. But the question is whether the possibility needs to be as definite as the quality which actualizes it.[61] If, on the one hand, we hold that essences have identical natures both as ingredient and not ingredient in something (which amounts to saying that essences are determinate and individual as non-actual), then we run into the difficulty of reducing the process of actualization to a

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[59] "On Some Criticisms of Whitehead's Philosophy," op. cit., pp. 334f. [15].

[60] "The Compound Individual," op. cit., p. 217 [16]. In a recent publication Hartshorne made the following rather startling comment: "I think there is but one eternal object: God's fixed essence, as distinct from his contingent actuality." (Sydney and Beatrice Rome, eds., Philosophical Interrogations (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964), p. 347.

[61] "On Some Criticisms of Whitehead's Philosophy," op. cit., p. 335 [15]. It is one thing to argue that the proposition "red is red and not blue" is eternally true, and another to say that red itself must be eternal. While it can never be false that red is red, it may be that if red is an emergent in the universe, then before its appearance it was neither true nor false that red was red, there being no such referent as red to which the proposition might refer. ("On Some Criticisms of Whitehead's Philosophy," op. cit., pp. 335f. [15]; cf. Man's Vision of God, pp. 245f.; and "Santayana's Doctrine of Essence," op. cit., p. 141 [25].)

"mere shuffling . . . of primordial qualitative factors."[62]

But if, on the other hand, the distinction between possible and actual is equivalent to that between the relatively indefinite and the relatively definite, between the determinable and the determinate, then "the strictly non-emergent factors of the universe must be simply its most general determinables, that is to say, the categories in the strictest sense of the word."[63]

While Hartshorne dismisses the notion of any Platonic realm of determinate essences, he does admit a hierarchy of differing levels of indeterminates or intrinsic generality.

> . . . the realm of characters will be a hierarchy, with the most general character or characters enjoying a unique status such that it can, in entire consistency, be viewed as the only really eternal character, at all times necessarily given some embodiment, some determination, or expression of its character as a determinable; while the other, less general or more determinate characters would be relevant, not to all time, but to stretches of time proportional to their generality . . .[64]

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[62] "On Some Criticisms of Whitehead's Philosophy," op. cit., p. 335 [15]. Hartshorne speaks of Whitehead's "selection" as all too suggestive of this view.

[63] "On Some Criticisms of Whitehead's Philosophy," op. cit., p. 335 [15]; cf. "The Compound Individual," op. cit., p. 217 [16]; The Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation, p. 208.

[64] "Santayana's Doctrine of Essence," op. cit., p. 150 [25].

In making this hierarchical differentiation between essences which emerge out of the primordial continuum of possibility and those which of necessity must always be given some particular, concrete embodiment in the actual world, Hartshorne seems implicitly to be making a distinction between the divine essence and the Primordial Nature of God. That is to say, the divine essence would be characterized by those categories of the most strict generality, and hence necessity--categories in the absence of which there could not possibly be any world at all, conceivable or actual.

Since in Hartshorne's view a vast multitude of the essences which comprise the Primordial Nature of God are specific emergents at some particular time within the creative world-process, it would be impossible to equate simpliciter the divine essence, which by definition could not involve any element of emergence and hence contingency, with the Primordial Nature. To my knowledge, Hartshorne nowhere explicitly makes this distinction, but it would seem to be a logical correlate of his affinity with a Peircean rather than a Whiteheadian understanding of potentiality.

In the foregoing discussion we have analyzed Hartshorne's doctrine of the divine essence in terms of "the realm of primordial possibility." We have argued that there seems to be some justification for making a distinction between the unchanging, necessary essence of God, by which is understood those abstract characteristics of the divine nature apart from which God would not be God, and the Primordial Nature, which would include all possibilities that have emerged or may emerge at some specific date.

We turn now to a second way in which Hartshorne has described the nature of the divine essence. Since God's essence is not only absolute but strictly (in contrast to conditionally) necessary,[65] then, on the premise that the strictly necessary is necessitated by anything and everything,[66] Hartshorne further posits the divine essence as "the absolutely pervasive factor of reality."[67] God qua absolute is abstract constituent of all things, the universal common denominator of process as such.[68] In any possible state of affairs God will be included. He is thus the universally immanent ground of all things.[69] "The sense in which God is part of each thing," Hartshorne writes,

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[65] The two amount to the same thing, since either of the other renderings--the absolute is contingent or the contingent is necessary--contradicts the definitional status of the terms involved.

[66] Hartshorne here follows Lewis' logic of strict implication, that is, a necessary proposition is implied by any and every contingent proposition. (See The Logic of Perfection, p. 56.)

[67] "The Philosophy of Creative Synthesis," op. cit., pp. 952f., italics his [115]; cf. The Logic of Perfection, pp. 38, 43f., 65, 80f., 85, 98, 99f., where the same idea is developed under the notion of "universal existential tolerance."

[68] The Divine Relativity, p. 70; "Absolute Objects and Relative Subjects: A Reply," op. cit., p. 178 [134]; "Whitehead's Philosophy of Reality as Socially-Structured Process," op. cit., p. 65 [87].

> is that generalized sense better expressed as "factor of," meaning something in abstraction from which the thing would be less than it is. Now in abstraction from God, were such abstraction possible, we would be nothing, and that is certainly less than we are. So in that sense, God is a factor of everything, and he is precisely that one factor which alone sums up all that each thing is, and infinitely more besides.[70]

Another way in which Hartshorne describes the immanence of the divine essence is in terms of its unique status of being universal object-for-all-subjects.[71] To be known by all subjects is just as distinctive as knowing all objects. "Only God can be so universally important that no subject can ever wholly fail or ever have failed to be aware of him (in however dim or unreflective a fashion)."[72] In short, God as absolute, God in his essence, is being itself.[73]

Now it is our contention that these two views of the divine essence which we have been discussing--namely, (1) the view that it refers to the realm of purely universal possibility, and (2) the view that it is to be identified with that abstract aspect of deity which is immanently pervasive of all reality--are not incompatible with one another but represent legitimate variations within the framework of dipolar theism. Nevertheless, we shall maintain in the concluding chapter that the second position entails the difficulty of presupposing an absolute contemporaneity between God and the world which Hartshorne has recently rejected. However, before considering this and other related problems which arise out of Hartshorne's characterizing the divine essence as coextensive with the actual world, we must complete our analysis of his doctrine of God by examining his concept of the divine actuality, and his treatment of the arguments for the existence of God. Since Hartshorne's reformulation of the traditional arguments is within a dipolar framework in which the "existence" of God refers not to the concrete fullness of the divine actuality but to the abstract necessity of the divine essence, we turn to the arguments first as a logical sequel to this chapter.

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[69] Man's Vision of God, p. 53, footnote 5; "Outlines of a Philosophy of Nature," Part II, The Personalist, Vol. XXXIX, No. 4 (Autumn, October, 1958), p. 386.

[70] Man's Vision of God, p. 285.

[71] The Divine Relativity, p. 70.

[72] Ibid.; "Process as Inclusive Category: A Reply," op. cit., p. 98 [93].

[73] The Divine Relativity, pp. 87f.

CHAPTER VII

ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

While it is quite possible to understand Hartshorne's doctrine of God without including a chapter on his development of the arguments for God's existence, it seems highly desirable that some attention be given to this dimension of his philosophical endeavor.

With the recent renewal of interest in the ontological argument and the ensuing lively debate on the subject in the literature,[1] it is quite possible that some may first confront Hartshorne's doctrine of God through this channel. (It is interesting to note that Union Seminary is currently offering a course on the theistic proofs, "with special attention to the recent revival of interest in the ontological proof.")[2]

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[1] See, e.g., Norman Malcolm, "Anselm's Ontological Arguments," The Philosophical Review, Vol. LXIX (January, 1960), pp. 41-62; reprinted in Malcolm, Knowledge and Certainty; Essays and Lectures (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 141-162. Cyril Richardson, "The Strange Fascination of the Ontological Argument," Union Seminary Quarterly Review, Vol. XVIII, No. 1 (November, 1962), pp. 1-21; Readers' Responses: "Further Fascination of the Ontological Argument," Union Seminary Quarterly Review, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, Part 1 (March, 1963), pp. 243-255. Jerome Shaffer, "Existence, Predication, and the Ontological Argument," Mind, Vol. LXXI, No. 283 (July, 1962), pp. 307-325. William Alston, "The Ontological Argument Re-Visited," The Philosophical Review, Vol. LXIX (October, 1960), pp. 452-474. John Hick, "The Idea of Necessary Being," The Princeton Seminary Bulletin, Vol. LIV, No. 2 (November, 1960), pp. 11-21; John Hick, "God as Necessary Being," Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LVII, Nos. 22

The first (and by far the most important) section of Hartshorne's most recent book, The Logic of Perfection, represents the mature reflection of some forty years of consideration of the ontological argument. In reading and rereading the important sections of this work, one cannot help but be impressed by the cogent and persuasive manner in which Hartshorne not only marshalls evidence for his own eloquent defense of the argument, but also the virtually exhaustive way (at least up until the present) in which he summarizes some twenty of the objections that have all too cavalierly been leveled against the argument in its traditional form

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and 23 (October 27 and November 10, 1960), pp. 725-734. J. N. Findlay, "Can God's Existence Be Disproved?" in Flew and Macintyre, New Essays in Philosophical Theology (London: SCM Press, 1955), pp. 47-56. Dieter Henrich, Der Ontologische Gottesbeweis (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1960). Some interesting polemic is to be found in recent reviews of Hartshorne's most thorough treatment of the argument in The Logic of Perfection. See John B. Cobb, Jr., "'Perfection Exists': A Critique of Charles Hartshorne," Religion in Life, Vol. XXXII, No. 2 (Spring, 1963), pp. 294-304. John Hick, Review of The Logic of Perfection, Theology Today, Vol. XX, No. 2 (July, 1963), pp. 295-298. Julian Hartt, Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 16 (June, 1963), pp. 749-769. H. W. Johnson, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LX, No. 16 (August 1, 1963), pp. 467-472.

[2] Union Seminary Quarterly Review, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, Part 1 (March, 1963), p. 243.

with an unwarranted air of finality.

One notes an unmistakable overtone of confidence which pervades Hartshorne's defense of neoclassical metaphysics in general and the ontological argument in particular:

> . . . if there be those who have thought about them [metaphysical questions], even in some small aspect, more carefully or precisely, or with more intellectual freedom, or more adequate acquaintance with the various standpoints and writings, than four and one-half decades of effort have enabled me to do, it will be an honor to be instructed by them.[3]

Even those who may not find themselves in full agreement with Hartshorne's conclusions regarding the argument will still probably want to concur in the following judgment of John Hick:

> The philosophical world is probably due for a sustained encounter with the thought of this most logically disciplined and rigorous of contemporary religious philosophers. . . . Hartshorne's new book [The Logic of Perfection] both demands and rewards careful study. It is not a volume to be exhausted in a single reading, but is immensely rich and stimulating and will no doubt draw the reader back many times to a re-reading.[4]

The amount of material in Hartshorne's writing regarding the ontological argument alone would provide sufficient warrant for an entire dissertation. It is therefore quite evident that this present attempt, which deals with Hartshorne's doctrine of God against the backdrop of the principal categories of his philosophical system, cannot possibly do full justice to the vast amount of detail and the intrinsic importance of this topic. Hence our purpose in this chapter will be to delineate those features in Hartshorne's reformulation of the ontological argument which have practical bearing on the general categories of his thought that have been discussed in the foregoing chapters.

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[3] The Logic of Perfection, p. xiii.

[4] Theology Today, Vol. XX, No. 2 (July, 1963), p. 295.

Before beginning our treatment of the ontological argument in particular, a number of general comments about Hartshorne's use of philosophical argumentation for the existence of God are in order.

Hartshorne believes that _the_ philosophical question of our time "turns chiefly on the possibility of proofs for the existence of God, that is, exhibitions of absurdity in atheism, positivism, and other versions of the view that all beings are fallible, and otherwise imperfect."[5]

Refusing to accept the finality with which the arguments for God's existence were supposedly refuted by Hume,

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[5] "The Rationalistic Criterion in Metaphysics," _op. cit._, p. 445 [58]. It should be noted that in his more recent writing Hartshorne is more reluctant to dismiss positivism as quickly as the above reference would indicate. While he has always considered positivism as the most obvious rival opponent to any metaphysical program, he now regards the positivistic temper in its contemporary linguistic expression as being the chief contender and only "defensible" alternative

Kant, Russell, Carnap, and others, Hartshorne has described his persistent attempt to reformulate the traditional arguments in the following manner:

> . . . the growing point of knowledge is where a solitary individual decides to risk his time, energy, and perhaps reputation, in testing, and if the test turns out well, in challenging, a proposition which all his fellow investigators regard as established. It is in some such position that I find myself.[6]

Hartshorne recognizes that the traditional arguments have been legitimately rejected in light of the confusions and absurdities in the definitions of a wholly absolute God which they were intended to support.[7] But just because convincing arguments have not yet been formulated, it should never be assumed that this is an impossible task--provided, of course, that a more coherent conception of God than the classical one may be worked out.[8] New arguments are capable of being formulated in such a way as to eliminate those

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to theism. (See Discussion: "How Some Speak and Yet Do Not Speak of God," op. cit., p. 274 [144]; The Logic of Perfection, pp. 70, 103, 111, 114; "Rationale of the Ontological Proof," Theology Today, Vol. XX, No. 2 (July, 1963), p. 281; Readers' Responses: "Further Fascination of the Ontological Argument," op. cit., p. 245 [148].

[6] The Logic of Perfection, p. 29.

[7] Reality as Social Process, p. 124; "Can There Be Proofs for the Existence of God?" pp. 2ff. (to be published by the University of Georgia Press).

[8] Reality as Social Process, p. 168.

weaknesses which vitiated the earlier conceptions of them.[9] "They may still not be coercive demonstrations, but there is something between absolute demonstrations--as in mathematics--and no rational evidence at all."[10] "I see no reason to suppose and good reason to doubt," Hartshorne further contends, "that Aquinas, Kant, or Royce were equipped to achieve finality in the exploration of the logic of the theistic problem. [Neither is Hartshorne, we might add!] Metaphysics shows signs of having a future as well as a past . . ."[11] As one reviewer has justifiably remarked:

> I strongly suspect that Hartshorne has established that the ontological argument has not been refuted. If the ontological argument is not taken much more seriously in future philosophy than it has been in the recent past, I will regard this as expressing the refusal of philosophers to be open-minded.[12]

We heartily agree!

Hartshorne holds that there are as many arguments as there are conceptions which have an absolute or cosmic range of generality--notions that are relevant to "all time and existence."[13]

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[9] *Ibid.*, p. 169.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 168.

[11] *Reality as Social Process*, p. 168.

[12] John B. Cobb, Jr., "'Perfection Exists': A Critique of Charles Hartshorne," *op. cit.*, p. 298. To be sure, Cobb finds a number of serious difficulties with the argument, some of which will be dealt with below.

> There can be as many arguments for God as one can distinguish fundamental aspects of experience and thought, and it seems unlikely that there is but one possible way of making such distinctions, or one fixed number of resulting arguments.[14]

In actual practice, however, Hartshorne refers to six basic arguments, three corresponding respectively to aesthetics, ethics, and the theory of knowledge, or what is the same thing differently expressed, beauty, goodness, and truth; and the other three corresponding respectively to the idea of cosmic order, the idea of cosmic contingency or change, and the idea of God, or the supremely excellent being, Himself.[15] In the order named, the six arguments are as follows: (1) the aesthetic argument, (2) the ethical argument, (3) the epistemological argument, (4) the design argument,[16] (5) the cosmological argument, and (6) the ontological argument.

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[13] Man's Vision of God, p. 251. Cf. the notion of the "cosmic variable" in chapter II above.

[14] Philosophers Speak of God, p. 24.

[15] Ibid., pp. 24f. A somewhat different list is given in Man's Vision of God, p. 251, where the following generic notions are mentioned: existence, possibility, knowledge, value, and the idea of God.

[16] It is interesting to note that Hartshorne explicitly omitted the design argument in Man's Vision of God (p. 253), while in the above list he includes it. The reason for its appearance in Philosophers Speak of God is that in this instance he intends that the argument should have reference to cosmic order and not try to prove God from the observed goodness of the world. Because these two concepts were not

We shall deal with the ontological argument at considerable length later in the chapter. It is instructive at this point, however, to take one of the traditionally empirical arguments, the cosmological, and discover the way in which Hartshorne develops it in a nonempirical, a priori manner.[17]

Hartshorne's formulation of the cosmological argument does not begin with the contingent, factual premise that such and such a world as ours exists, but rather with the nonempirical conception of world as such--not this world but any world. He then proceeds with the a priori disjunction: Either something exists or nothing does. But since the second disjunct, nothing exists, fails to have any clear meaning (If nothing were to exist, certainly no one could possibly know this, for in order to have such knowledge in order to make this judgment, one would have to exist, thus contradicting the original assertion.), then something must necessarily exist. Next comes another a priori disjunction: Either what exists is God (who exists necessarily), or what

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clearly distinguished in the earlier work, the argument as a whole was rejected. The argument is also given brief attention in "Can There Be Proofs for the Existence of God?" pp. 10ff.

[17] The following discussion is taken from a convocation address entitled, "Religious Aspects of Contingency and Necessity," delivered at the Southern California School of Theology, August 21, 1964.

exists, exists contingently. If it is the former, that is, God, then we have the conclusion already. If it is the latter, something which exists contingently, then we have the following two propositions: (1) Necessarily something rather than nothing exists, but (2) this something itself exists contingently. However, had this something not existed, then by (1) something else must have existed instead, since we have already eliminated the possibility that nothing should exist. But if that other something which exists is itself contingent, how shall we understand the necessity that something must exist? We would have an unconditional necessity whose only real ground in existence would be something contingent. Since this is scarcely intelligible, there must be something which is itself real by necessity.

Hartshorne holds that none of the arguments is ultimately independent of the others, for each involves conceptions of ultimate generality that are implicated in all the others.[18] Because of the a priori or purely conceptual nature of the arguments, each one either proves God to be necessary or it is fallacious.[19] No number of contingent, factual arguments could be added together to give necessity.[20] Herein lies the weakness of a purely empirical theology: "the study of mere facts, as such, yields only facts, more or less universal or particular; but God as a mere fact, however important or comprehensive or basic, is God as not God."[21] Any argument proceeding from special facts could only prove a God who was himself a special fact. By definition, however, God is no mere fact but "a universal principle not only of all actual but also of all possible facts."[22] There is no way of escaping the necessity of arguing from purely general categories, rather than inductively from particulars, if one seeks to establish the existence of God.[23] It is clear from the foregoing that none of the arguments, as such, is concerned with the contingent actuality of God but rather with his necessary essence.

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[18] Man's Vision of God, p. 251.

[19] "God's Existence: A Conceptual Problem," in Hook, ed., op. cit., pp. 215, 217 [130]; "The Structure of Metaphysics: A Criticism of Lazerowitz's Theory," op.cit., p. 230 [116].

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[20] Man's Vision of God, p. 251.

[21] Philosophers Speak of God, p. 14; cf. "Hume's Metaphysics and Its Present-Day Influence," op. cit., p. 170 [127].

[22] "Outlines of a Philosophy of Nature," Part II, The Personalist, Vol. XXXIX, No. 4 (October, 1958), p. 386.

[23] Man's Vision of God, p. 254; Philosophers Speak of God, p. 14; "God's Existence: A Conceptual Problem," in Hook, ed., op. cit., p. 219 [130]; "Hume's Metaphysics and Its Present-Day Influence," op. cit., p. 170 [127]. In a convocation address delivered at the Southern California School of Theology on August 21, 1964, entitled, "Religious Aspects of Contingency and Necessity," Hartshorne ably defended the thesis that philosophers have often combined two doctrines, each of which is dubious in itself but when taken together

However, God merely qua necessary is infinitely less than God in the fullness of his actuality.[24]

> The God demonstrated by a correct ontological proof, or any other proof, is unspeakably less than the actual God.[25] However, this very truth that there necessarily is an actual God who is unimaginably more than our proofs can describe, this too is proved, if the proving process succeeds at all.[26]

From this it follows that what reason cannot know about God is not his essence, or what God is in purely general terms, such as all-loving, all-knowing, but rather the particular form this loving or knowing takes when a given

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prove to be clearly contradictory. These two doctrines are (1) that God is a wholly necessary being, devoid of any element of contingency, and (2) that his existence may nevertheless be argued for only on empirical or a posteriori grounds. Hartshorne contends that neither assertion is correct and that it is a logical impossibility that both should be. Since no experience could conceivably conflict with necessity, there cannot be any empirical test for the reality of a wholly necessary being. One must either surrender the notion of divine necessity or the attempt to arrive at divine existence by means of empirical proofs.

[24] "Metaphysics and the Modality of Existential Judgments," op. cit., pp. 116f. [126]; The Logic of Perfection, pp. 94, 102.

[25] Conversely, it of course follows that the divine actuality is incomparably more than the divine essence, which by itself is but an empty abstraction. ("The Kinds of Theism: A Reply," op. cit., p. 129 [85].)

[26] "Metaphysics and the Modality of Existential Judgments," op. cit., p. 118 [126].

particular object in the real world is involved.[27] "Not the essence, but the most particular of the accidents of God have to be felt rather than demonstrated, if we can know them at all."[28] Nevertheless, God's essence, because it is completely independent and abstract, or general, is "the most sharply definable of all individual characters."[29] "One may admit the impenetrable divine mystery but believe also in the unrivaled lucidity of the divine essence . . ."[30] "It is not so much the abstract or necessary which we cannot grasp--mathematics might have taught us that--but the concrete and contingent in its fullness, whether divine or not divine. Our intellects are at home in the abstract, the concrete is an infinitely-receding goal."[31] God is the one individual who is conceivable a priori.[32] His character and status are metaphysically unique.[33] As Kierkegaard said, "God" is a concept, not a name; for some adjectives can be used only with reference to him, such as omniscient, infallible, eternal, etc.[34] As a unique, conceptually specifiable individual, God is not in a class of possible similar beings but is necessarily sui generis.[35] " . . . the purely conceptual identification possible for God alone is logically one with the nonempirical status of his existence. The problem is conceptual, not factual."[36]

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[27] Reality as Social Process, pp. 171f.; cf. The Logic of Perfection, pp. 109, 119; "The Kinds of Theism: A Reply," op. cit., p. 129 [85].

[28] Reality as Social Process, pp. 171f.

[29] "Metaphysics and the Modality of Existential Judgments," op. cit., p. 117 [126]; Man's Vision of God, p. 133; The Divine Relativity, p. 38; The Logic of Perfection, p. 102.

[30] The Logic of Perfection, p. 4.

[31] Ibid., p. 109; cf. The Divine Relativity, p. 38.

[32] The Logic of Perfection, pp. 54, 62, 66, 80f.; "The Structure of Metaphysics: A Criticism of Lazerowitz's Theory," op. cit., pp. 230, 237 [116]; "The Divine Relativity and Absoluteness: A Reply," op. cit., p. 40 [69]; The Divine Relativity, p. 31. The paragraph from which this last

One final general comment is in order before we begin a discussion of the ontological argument. Hartshorne holds that if the theistic arguments are sound (and this, of course, is his contention--with the proper reformulating),

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reference is taken is wholly unintelligible as it reads, due to improper placement of the lines of type. The second line, ending with the word "existence," should be followed by the line (third from the bottom) beginning with "namely." This line, in turn, should be followed by the third line in the paragraph. The sentence beginning "The latter we . . ." (fourth line from bottom) continues on the next-to-last page.

[33] The Divine Relativity, pp. 31, 37f.

[34] "God's Existence: A Conceptual Problem," in Hook, ed., op. cit., p. 211 [130].

[35] Ibid., p. 212; "Metaphysics and the Modality of Existential Judgments," op. cit., p. 117 [126].

[36] "God's Existence: A Conceptual Problem," in Hook, ed., op. cit., p. 213 [130]; cf. Readers' Responses: "Further Fascination of the Ontological Argument," op. cit., p. 244 [144]; "Can There Be Proofs for the Existence of God?" p. 18 [165].

then no one is really without faith in God, any more than there are absolute skeptics.[37] God is involved as datum in all experience. Everyone experiences him at every moment.[38] To be sure, one may be in a state of "verbal confusion" regarding his basic beliefs, as, for example, when the atheist contends that the word "God" is a sound which fails to refer to any object.[39] But, Hartshorne argues, it may well be possible that there is in the mind of the supposed atheist something to which the word "God" could be properly attached, "and which if redeemed from its obscurity in his mind would turn out to have the positive properties of which theists (in their more precise moments) talk."[40] If it can be assumed that there are implicit religious assumptions in certain secular concepts which are commonly employed, such as those of time or space or the cosmos, then

> it follows that the nonbeliever is mistaken in thinking he does not believe, since merely to live a secular life is, on this hypothesis, to affirm God in the same sense, whatever it be, in which the religious person affirms him, although in the latter case there is fuller consciousness of the content of the affirmation. I am totally unable to conceive any argument for the religious

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[37] Man's Vision of God, p. 340.

[38] "God's Existence: A Conceptual Problem," in Hook, ed., op. cit., p. 211 [130]; Man's Vision of God, p. 79.

[39] Man's Vision of God, p. 340.

[40] Ibid., pp. 340f.

> conception . . . which does not imply that the difference between believers and unbelievers is nothing but a difference in self-consciousness and consistency in regard to what all believe 'at heart' . . .[41]

Since God is thought to be ubiquitous by nearly all theologies, he is present in the experience of both the hardened skeptic and the committed believer.[42]

> . . . the very idea of God implies that all beings who are aware of anything must be aware of him. For he is the all pervasive unsurpassably comprehensible being, absent nowhere, functioning in and through all things so intimately that in abstraction from him (per impossible) they would be nonentity.[43]

Thus if God is in every part of our experience (or else nowhere), we must either be contradicting everything we say when we deny God, or else God is not a part of anyone's experience, and the believer consequently means nothing at all when he says, "There is a God."[44] But to assume that any event could be fully described without mentioning (or implicitly affirming) God as the ordering power in this world is by logical implication "to assume the untruth of theism."[45] "Think God, and that requires God. Think atoms, and they require God. Think the mere possibility of atoms: that, too, requires God."[46] Ultimately, then, all theistic argument must show that "doubt of God is doubt of any and all truth, renunciation of the essential categories of thinking."[47] In short, the arguments prove that even in denying God we know him, and that the conclusion which is reached is only a clearer way of seeing the premises--premises which state what we all believe, or which explicate the most general dimensions of human thought.[48]

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[41] Ibid., p. 79; cf. pp. 339f.

[42] Ibid., p. 79.

[43] "The Formal Validity and the Real Significance of the Ontological Argument," op. cit., p. 235 [40].

[44] Man's Vision of God, p. 79; The Logic of Perfection, pp. 55, 57, 80f.

Before we are ready to examine Hartshorne's specific redevelopment of the ontological argument, there are two general considerations which help bring to focus the central importance which the argument presently holds in his thinking. We shall show, first of all, that in the light of both traditional and more recent criticisms of the argument, Hartshorne has increasingly come to recognize that its only defensible form seems to be in terms of a dipolar theism, where a distinction is made between the existence and the actuality of God. In the second place, we shall indicate how Hartshorne now recognizes the whole metaphysical enterprise itself to be ultimately involved in the defensibility of the logical principles which underlie the argument.

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[45] "Hume's Metaphysics and Its Present-Day Influence," op. cit., p. 164 [127].

[46] The Logic of Perfection, p. 104.

[47] Man's Vision of God, p. 340.

[48] Ibid., p. 320; The Logic of Perfection, p. 110.

Turning now to the first of these considerations, we note Hartshorne's contention that apart from his own neoclassical reformulation of the Anselmian definition of perfection,[49] the argument not only cannot prove the existence of God but, ironically, turns out to be a disproof of theism.[50]

> If perfection or divinity must be defined and conceived as Anselm, Descartes, and many another philosopher or theologian, conceived it, then I hold that the Proof amounts to a cogent argument against theism. For . . . it would commit us to necessary existence in a form which really does violate logical principles.[51]

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[49] The Logic of Perfection, pp. 34ff., 104f.; "The Formal Validity and the Real Significance of the Ontological Argument," op. cit., pp. 229ff. [40].

[50] The Logic of Perfection, pp. 24, 104; Readers' Responses: "Further Fascination of the Ontological Argument," op. cit., p. 245 [144]. This important discovery was made by J. N. Findlay, who, along with Sartre, is probably the only philosopher ever to have devised an a priori proof for the non-existence of God. (See "Can God's Existence Be Disproved?" Mind, Vol. LVII, 1948, p. 176; reprinted in Anthony Flew and A. Macintyre, eds., New Essays in Philosophical Theology (London: SCM Press, 1955), pp. 47-56.)

[51] The Logic of Perfection, p. 33; cf. "Metaphysics and the Modality of Existential Judgments," op. cit., p. 121 [126]. Referring to Kant's dismissal of the classic form of the argument, Hartshorne comments: " . . . Kant met a somewhat muddled argumentation for an impossible positive conclusion with a muddled critique leading to an ambiguous

Thus Hartshorne's persistent attempt to elaborate a doctrine of divine perfection that combines the polarities of the absolute and the relative--an attempt which perhaps at first did not have as its rationale the rehabilitation of the ontological argument--now becomes the indispensable conceptual framework within which the argument may be articulated without contradiction.

In the traditional Anselmian form of the argument, the contradiction involves the inadmissible commingling of logical types. That is to say, the argument appears to derive the concrete actuality of God from an abstract definition of his perfection.[52] However, it is plainly contradictory to affirm that a concrete, particular existence should be implied by an abstract concept like "perfection," which is defined by employing such abstract terms as "greater than," "none," and "conceived."[53] "Such abstractions could not, without contradiction, logically entail any concrete

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negative conclusion. The classical idea certainly was not, and (in my opinion) could not be, established by this or any argument; however, what collapsed was not the argument, but rather its alleged conclusion." (The Logic of Perfection, pp. 104f.)

[52] Discussion: "How Some Speak and Yet Do Not Speak of God," op. cit., p. 275 [144]; "Metaphysics and the Modality of Existential Judgments," op. cit., p. 117 [126]; "What Anselm Discovered," Union Seminary Quarterly Review, Vol. XVII, No. 3 (March, 1962), pp. 217f.

[53] "Hume's Metaphysics and Its Present-Day Influence," op. cit., p. 167 [127].

particular whatever."[54] The concrete is richer than the abstract; the more, of necessity, cannot follow from the less. Furthermore, necessity cannot relate concepts to particular existing things.[55] Hartshorne therefore concurs that "from an abstract definition (and such is Anselm's) nothing concrete can be deduced."[56] From abstractions alone nothing but abstract conclusions could follow.[57]

How, then, is this gulf between logical levels to be bridged? Both levels, it would seem, are essential for the argument: the abstract level of perfection, with which the argument begins, and the concrete level of existence, which the definition supposedly entails by logical necessity.[58]

Hartshorne maintains that there are only two ways in which the Anselmian form of the argument can meet this dilemma.[59] Either God in his concrete actuality must be conceived as a contingent instance of perfection, such an instance being extrinsic to the property perfection and serving as its contingent exemplification;[60] or else the concept of perfection is admittedly self-contradictory, implying the illogical identity of the abstract and the concrete.[61]

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[54] Ibid.

[55] The Logic of Perfection, p. 92.

[56] Readers' Responses: "Further Fascination of the Ontological Argument," op. cit., p. 245, italics his [148]. Cf. "The Logic of the Ontological Argument," Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LVIII, No. 17 (August 17, 1961), pp. 471f.

[57] Introduction to the second edition of Saint Anselm: Basic Writings (La Salle: Open Court, 1963), p. 13.

[58] See below, pp. 188ff.

[59] "Hume's Metaphysics and Its Present-Day Influence," op. cit., p. 168 [127].

Since either horn of the dilemma was unacceptable in the classical definition of God, Anselm's form of the argument neither proved or failed to prove the medieval idea of God. What it did, in effect, was to refute, or at best render meaningless, the classical conception.[62] When

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[60] *The Logic of Perfection*, p. 63.

[61] *Ibid.*; "The Divine Relativity and Absoluteness: A Reply," *op. cit.*, p. 45 [69].

[62] "Hume's Metaphysics and Its Present-Day Influence," *op. cit.*, p. 168 [127]. The Anselmian proof does accomplish something, however, according to Hartshorne. " . . . it simplifies the question of the truth of theism by making this truth equivalent to the falsity of the positivistic contention that there is no logically possible idea of God. Atheism is at best a confusion; theism or positivism is the choice we have to make." (Discussion: "How Some Speak and Yet Do Not Speak of God," *op. cit.*, p. 274 [144]; cf. *The Logic of Perfection*, pp. 70, 103, 111, 114; "Rationale of the Ontological Proof," *op. cit.*, p. 281 [151]; "What Did Anselm Discover?" *op. cit.*, pp. 216f.) John Cobb has made a most significant comment at this point: "Since it is highly questionable that a thoroughgoing positivism provides a place at which reason can existentially remain, and if Hartshorne has really succeeded in reducing the alternatives in this way, his conclusions have immense rational--and religious--importance." ("'Perfection Exists': A Critique of Charles Hartshorne," *op. cit.*, p. 298.)

Anselm's confusion of logical types is seen, Hartshorne insists that the traditional argument "not only cannot be valid but must turn into a disproof."[63]

How is Hartshorne's form of the argument able to meet the logical-type difficulty? We noted above that he readily admits the illegitimacy of confusing one logical level with another, of moving from the abstract idea of perfection to the concrete existence of God. But the contradiction is resolved when both levels are embraced within God, although each refers to logically different aspects of the divine life. On the lowest logical level there will be a concrete form of divine actuality which is extrinsic to the property perfection and serves as a contingent instance of it.[64] But there is in addition to this level a higher, necessary one which is intrinsic to the property perfection and, hence, like that property, is also abstract.[65] The distinction of logical levels is thus between *two kinds of existence* rather than between property and existence.[66] In conceiving of necessary existence, therefore, one does not have to deny all distinction between the abstract and the concrete, or between property and instance.[67] "The necessity need not be for this or that instance, but only for 'some instance or other,' an idea which is certainly abstract; for it treats different concrete cases as equivalent."[68]

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[63] Readers' Responses: "Further Fascination of the Ontological Argument," *op. cit.*, p. 245 [148]; cf."Hume's Metaphysics and Its Present-Day Influence," *op. cit.*, pp. 168, 170 [127]; *Saint Anselm: Basic Writings*, p. 4 [137]; *The Logic of Perfection*, p. 33. "Metaphysics and the Modality of Existential Judgments," *op. cit.*, p. 121 [126].

[64] *The Logic of Perfection*, p. 63.

[65] *Ibid.*

What Hartshorne often speaks of as God's "bare existence"[69] (in contrast to the fullness of actual, particularized existence) is "the mere abstract truth that an abstraction is somehow concretely embodied," while actuality has reference to the how of that embodiment.[70] "Change the facts and you change the divine actuality, how God exists, but not that he exists."[71]

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[66] Ibid; cf. "The Structure of Metaphysics: A Criticism of Lazerowitz's Theory," op. cit., pp. 230, 237 [116].

[67] The Logic of Perfection, p. 64.

[68] Ibid.

[69] "Metaphysics and the Modality of Existential Judgments," op cit., p. 116 [126]; "God's Existence: A Conceptual Problem," in Hook, ed., op. cit., p. 217 [130]; "How Some Speak and Yet Do Not Speak of God," op. cit., p. 275 [144]; The Logic of Perfection, pp. 93, 102, 109; "What Anselm Discovered," op. cit., pp. 217f. [140]; "The Logic of the Ontological Argument," op. cit., pp. 472f. [133].

[70] "How Some Speak and Yet Do Not Speak of God," op. cit., p. 276 [144]; The Logic of Perfection, pp. 93, 106, 158f.

[71] "God's Existence: A Conceptual Problem," in Hook, ed., op. cit., p. 217 [130].

> . . . actuality is always more than bare existence. Existence is that the defined abstract nature is somehow concretely actualized; but how it is actualized, in what particular state, with what particular content not deducible from the abstract definition, constitutes the actuality.[72]

The fact that God exists is thus analytic, while the actual state of his existence is contingent.[73] The bare existence of God does not intend a particular aspect of the real world but only the purely general status of any world whatsoever. The proposition, "God exists," is therefore true in any possible world.[74] The necessity inhering in the existential status of God's essence means that there is an "unlimited tolerance for alternative possibilities of actuality, so that the requirements of existence are certain to be fulfilled."[75]

Thus while there are innumerable factual questions about God (in as much as the total reality of God must be as rich as all the contingent details of the universe), these are not questions as to whether God exists or does not exist;

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[72] "What Anselm Discovered," op. cit., p. 218 [140]; cf. "The Kinds of Theism: A Reply," op. cit., p. 129 [85].

[73] The Divine Relativity, p. 87; The Logic of Perfection, pp. 93, 94; "The Structure of Metaphysics: A Criticism of Lazerowitz's Theory," op. cit., pp. 230f. [116].

[74] "How Some Speak and Yet Do Not Speak of God, op. cit., p. 274 [144].

[75] Philosophers Speak of God, p. 72; cf. "The Structure of Metaphysics: A Criticism of Lazerowitz's Theory," op. cit., p. 230 [116].

rather they are questions of how he exists, or the actual state of his existence.[76]

A second reason why the ontological argument assumes such fundamental importance in Hartshorne's recent writing is that he views the viability of its contemporary reformulation to be an essential factor in the vindication of the metaphysical enterprise itself. Many of the questions of metaphysics are tied in with the problem of the ontological argument. The very status of metaphysics itself is at stake.[77]

> That those who dismiss the Argument as a mere sophistry also, and especially in recent times, dismiss the possibility of metaphysical inquiry (unless in some trivialized form having little to do with historical models) seems to me only what should be expected. Nor is it surprising that as a result philosophy threatens to become the elegant trifling we have often witnessed of late.[78]

Again, Hartshorne contends, "To know just what is right and just what is wrong with Proslogion II-IX is to have an essentially complete metaphysics (or antimetaphysics) of religion."[79]

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[76] "God's Existence: A Conceptual Problem," in Hook, ed., op. cit., p. 217 [130]; Readers' Responses: "Further Fascination of the Ontological Argument," op. cit., pp. 244f. [148]; The Logic of Perfection, p. 159.

[77] The Logic of Perfection, p. 30.

[78] Ibid.

If metaphysics is defined as the study which seeks to clarify our conceptions of the necessary, absolute, infinite and strictly universal, then the denial of metaphysics is simply the assertion that everything, in so far as it is knowable or conceivable, is contingent, relative, finite, and less than strictly universal.[80] Ultimately, then, it is the question of necessity, which has not ceased to disturb philosophers since Hume's skeptical rejection of it, that is the crucial problem underlying the tenability of metaphysics and the successful defense of the ontological argument.

Now if Hartshorne is to prove the validity of the argument, he must establish several things. First, against the contention that all existential judgments are contingent, he must make a case for the applicability of the mode of necessity to judgments about existence. Second, by applying the logic of modalities to the idea of God, he must show (a) that perfection and contingency are incompatible; (b) that the idea of perfect being is not nonsensical and hence impossible; and (c) that the only modal status perfection can possibly have is that of necessity. Third, having established the logical possibility of the necessity of the divine perfection, he must show that this strictly implies factual or real necessity of existence. That is to say, Hartshorne must defend the position that there is ultimately no distinction between logical and real possibility. We shall now give extended treatment to each of these considerations and offer some critical reflection at the conclusion of the chapter.

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[79] Readers' Responses: "Further Fascination of the Ontological Argument," op. cit., p. 245 [148].

[80] "Metaphysics and the Modality of Existential Judgments," op. cit., p. 107 [126].

Hartshorne vigorously rejects the theory that all existential judgments are contingent.[81] He contends that this theory arbitrarily puts forth the dictim that contingency is a predicate which is universally entailed by all predicates whatsoever--an assumption which amounts to the exclusion of necessary existence by fiat.[82] In other words, the admitted contingency of ordinary judgments (regarding which nearly all philosophers are in agreement) is generalized to cover all affirmations of existence.[83] All existential judgments are assimilated into the "one modal basket" of contingency.[84]

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[81] The Logic of Perfection, p. 30.

[82] "Rationale of the Ontological Proof," op. cit., p. 280.[151].

[83] The Logic of Perfection, pp. 73, 89f.

However, in the very attempt to deny the modal status of necessity to statements about existence, the critic of the ontological argument ends up making an equally metaphysical counter-assertion: he universalizes the modality of contingency.[85]

> That modality with respect to existence is [sic] a predicate is assumed by the critics of the Argument themselves. For they hold, in effect, that to every predicate there is attached the status of contingency, i.e., its existence and non-existence must alike be conceivable.[86]

This is precisely the metaphysical assumption underlying Hume's treatment of necessity. He held that nothing can exist by necessity.[87] It was not that nothing *does* so exist, but rather that nothing *could* so exist.[88] Even if

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[84] *Ibid.*, pp. 31, 89f.; "Metaphysics and the Modality of Existential Judgments," *op. cit.*, p. 110 [126]. For an example of this procedure in a contemporary philosophical theologian who is not unmindful of Hartshorne's work, see John Hick, "The Idea of Necessary Being," *Princeton Seminary Bulletin*, Vol. LIV, No. 2 (November, 1960), p. 16.

[85] "Hume's Metaphysics and Its Present-Day Influence," *op. cit.*, p. 165 [127].

[86] *The Logic of Perfection*, p. 52.

[87] *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, ed. by N. K. Smith, second ed. (London, 1947), p. ix; cited by Hartshorne, "Hume's Metaphysics and Its Present-Day Influence," *op. cit.*, p. 165 [127].

[88] "Hume's Metaphysics and Its Present-Day Influence," *op. cit.*, p. 164 [127].

Hume had been more cautious and had merely said, "In fact nothing exists by necessity," he still would have been making a modal or metaphysical statement by implication.[89] "For he would be implying that it is at least possible that all things should be contingent in their mode of existence, and this is a modal or metaphysical statement about being as such."[90]

This latter assertion of Hartshorne's is based on an important principle in modal logic known as "Becker's Postulate," which holds that modal status can be affirmed or denied in the mode of necessity only.[91] That is to say, modal status is itself always necessary.[92] If a proposition could be necessary, it must be and is necessary; if it could be contingent, it must be and is contingent. If p is possible, then necessarily p is possible; or if it is possible that p is necessary, then necessarily p is necessary.[93] That ordinary kinds of facts are contingent is not itself contingent; they could not be necessary.[94]

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[89] Ibid., p. 165.

[90] Ibid., italics his.

[91] The Logic of Perfection, p. 39.

[92] Ibid., pp. 51, 55; "Hume's Metaphysics and Its Present-Day Influence," op. cit., p. 165 [127]; "Rationale of the Ontological Proof," op. cit., p. 280 [151]; Man's Vision of God, p. 307; "The Divine Relativity and Absoluteness: A Reply," op. cit., p. 41 [69]; "What Anselm Discovered," op. cit., p. 215 [140]. As will be noted below as well, modality of existence is always a predicate, which is an entirely different state of affairs than the traditional rejection of existence as a predicate.

> Either contingency can, and therefore, must be universalized to cover all types of existential statement, or there can and therefore must be an exception, a necessary type of such statement. And since to take either side is to make a necessary statement about existence,[95] it is not the anti-ontological side which is most obviously self-consistent! [96]

We must now turn our attention to the above-mentioned exception to the universality of contingent existential judgments and discover what criteria Hartshorne offers in defense of the assertion that necessity (non-contingency) may (and therefore must!) be predicated of certain judgments regarding existence.

Let us begin by asking what the word "contingency" really means. Until this is clear, the contrasting term "necessity" cannot be understood.

That which is contingent arbitrarily selects among the conceivable possibilities, affirming some and excluding others.[97] Factual existence is always a matter of specific alternatives, of this rather than that instead.[98] Thus the contingent implies something "instead of" something else which is incompatible with it.[99] This may be done, or that, but not both.[100]

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[93] The Logic of Perfection, p. 40.

[94] "Hume's Metaphysics and Its Present-Day Influence," op. cit., p. 165 [127]; cf. Cobb, "'Perfection Exists': A Critique of Charles Hartshorne," op. cit., p. 296.

[95] To deny a modal statement is to make one.

[96] "Hume's Metaphysics and Its Present-Day Influence," op. cit., p. 165 [127].

Furthermore, the arbitrary selection among possibilities is not between something positive and something merely negative,[101] but between mutually incompatible positive possibilities.[102] Hence a statement which excludes only mere negations does not exclude any genuine positive assertion.

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[97] "Metaphysics and the Modality of Existential Judgments," op. cit., pp. 110, 111 [126]; The Logic of Perfection, pp. 73f.

[98] The Logic of Perfection, p. 294.

[99] Ibid., p. 68.

[100] Ibid.

[101] Hartshorne holds that "a negative fact is always some positive fact incompatible with a positive hypothesis." (The Logic of Perfection, p. 69; cf. pp. 281ff.) For example, when we perceive that a thing is "not red," we perceive it as having some color or other positive property which it could not have and still be red. "Blank nothing is not a datum . . . every verified privation of a property is the observed presence of an incompatible property." ("The Structure of Metaphysics: A Criticism of Lazerowitz's Theory," op. cit., p. 236 [116].) Knowledge must be something positive. ("Metaphysics and the Modality of Existential Judgments," op. cit., p. 111; "Real Possibility," op. cit., p. 596.) "Some contact with existence is the sine qua non of meaning." (Hume's Metaphysics and Its Present-Day Influence," op. cit., p. 166 [127].) Unknowability and lack of positive significance amount to the same thing. ("Metaphysics and the Modality of Existential Judgments," op. cit., p. 111 [126].) In short, there is nothing in Hartshorne's philosophy that is relevant to what Hegel called "the power of the negative"; his ontology is thoroughly positive. (Cf. H. W. Johnson, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LX, No. 16 (August 1, 1963), pp. 468, 471.)

Now if contingency means the selective exclusion of positive possibilities, then it follows that a *statement which excludes only negations cannot be contingent*.[103] Hartshorne therefore proposes the following criterion of non-contingency: "the absence of any positive meaning for the denial of a statement, or--the same thing--the failure of the statement to exclude any positive state of affairs."[104]

This idea that the non-contingent or the necessary does not exclude any positive existential assertion is a corollary of the logical dictum that the necessary gives no information about the world.[105] If something were excluded from the world, then some kind of information would certainly be given. Now what Hartshorne proposes to do is to convert the rule, "What is necessary is without positive exclusiveness," into the following form: "What is without positive exclusiveness is necessary."[106] He holds that it is "counter-intuitive" to deny the convertibility of this rule.[107]

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[102] *The Logic of Perfection*, pp. 73f.; "Causal Necessities: An Alternative to Hume," *op. cit.*, p. 488 [90].

[103] "Metaphysics and the Modality of Existential Judgments," *op. cit.*, p. 111 [126].

[104] *Ibid.*; cf. "Causal Necessities: An Alternative to Hume," *op. cit.*, p. 486 [90].

[105] "Metaphysics and the Modality of Existential Judgments," *op. cit.*, p. 112 [126].

This brings us to the proposition, Perfection exists, which Hartshorne contends is a necessary proposition for reasons we have just considered. For what specific positive alternative is there to the existence of perfect being? It cannot be the existence of imperfect beings, because there is no incompatibility between them and perfect being.[108] "A being absolutely unlimited in creative and cognitive capacity cannot, by existing, conflict with the existence of any possible thing;"[109] it would seem that nothing whatever could constitute the positive side of the notion "absence of deity."[110] Since a perfect being is non-localized, it needs no space which something else might occupy. Neither does perfect being play any role which any other being could play.

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[106] _Ibid._

[107] _Ibid._

[108] "Hume's Metaphysics and Its Present-Day Influence," _op. cit._, p. 167 [127]; _The Logic of Perfection_, p. 68; "What Anselm Discovered," _op. cit._, pp. 219f. [140].

[109] "Metaphysics and the Modality of Existential Judgments," _op. cit._, p. 113 [126].

[110] _The Logic of Perfection_, p. 69; cf. pp. 55, 80, 86, 87, 156. Hartshorne does not mean to say that God in his totality excludes nothing, but that his _mere existence_ excludes nothing, in contrast to imperfect individuals which always exclude certain things merely by existing.

"There is no function exercised by God which any other being could take over in his stead. He is the sole non-competitive, non-exclusive, conscious agent . . ."[111]

If the notion of non-exclusiveness represents the negative aspect of the criterion of necessity, the positive side is represented by what Hartshorne calls "universal existential tolerance." By this Hartshorne means God's modal coincidence with all possibility and with all actuality.[112]

It is at this point that we again note the central importance of Hartshorne's idealistic presuppositions, without which the argument could not be sustained in its neo-classical expression. For it is on the basis of the epistemological analogy of an infallible knower that the notion of modal coextensiveness is articulated.[113] Both God's actuality and his potentiality are all-inclusive. "Item for item, everything actual is accounted for in His actual knowing, as everything possible is in His potential knowing."[114] Any particular event or state of the universe will have as its correlate an appropriate particular state in the infallible knower.[115] God's all-inclusive knowledge is thus the measure of the real.[116] The coextensiveness of his knowing with all that there is to be known constitutes the definition of reality.[117] If there were a state of affairs which the existence of God might exclude, then God's cognitive capacity would be conceived as less than perfect.[118]

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[111] "Metaphysics and the Modality of Existential Judgments," op. cit., p. 117 [126]; cf. "What Anselm Discovered," op. cit., p. 219 [140].

[112] The Logic of Perfection, pp. 38, 43f., 65, 80f., 85, 98, 99f.; "The Structure of Metaphysics: A Criticism of Lazerowitz's Theory," op. cit., p. 230 [116]; "Existential Propositions and the Law of Categories," op. cit., pp. 343f. [59].

[113] "Metaphysical Statements as Non-restrictive and Existential," op. cit., p. 45; Philosophers Speak of God, pp. 197f.; The Logic of Perfection, pp. 99f.; "Ideal Knowledge Defines Reality: What Was True in 'Idealism'," op. cit., pp. 573ff.[54].

Hartshorne concludes that the idea of God cannot mean a being whose existence would be exclusive in any respect. If the contingent is in some sense exclusive, God's existence cannot be a matter of contingent fact but only of necessity, whether positive or negative. He must be conceived as existentially non-contingent--or impossible.[119]

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[114] The Logic of Perfection, p. 38.

[115] "The Structure of Metaphysics: A Criticism of Lazerowitz's Theory," op. cit., p. 231 [116].

[116] The Divine Relativity, p. 146; "The Kinds of Theism: A Reply," op. cit., p. 131 [85].

[117] "Ideal Knowledge Defines Reality: What Was True in 'Idealism'," op. cit., pp. 273ff. [54]; "Royce's Mistake--and Achievement," op. cit., pp. 125, 128 [99]; "Metaphysical Statements as Nonrestrictive and Existential," op. cit., p. 45 [113]; The Logic of Perfection, p. 296.

[118] "Metaphysics and the Modality of Existential Judgments," op. cit., p. 113 [126]. For a discussion of Hartshorne's reply to Findlay's contention that existence must "make an observable difference" and hence must exclude something, see The Logic of Perfection, Sec. XV, pp. 108ff.

Hartshorne believes that this was precisely the principle that constituted Anselm's basic discovery, namely, that there is a fundamental incompatibility between perfection and the existential modality of contingency.[120] From the modal status of contingency neither existence nor non-existence may be inferred. But, by contrast, from the status of non-contingency one may infer necessarily existent unless impossible.[121]

Virtually all of the critics of the argument seem to have missed altogether this important discovery of Anselm's, being preoccupied with his first formulation in Proslogion 2--the question whether or not what exists is greater than what fails to exist.[122] In a bitingly sarcastic comment

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[119] The Logic of Perfection, pp. 50, 57.

[120] Ibid., pp. 52, 73; "The Formal Validity and the Real Significance of the Ontological Argument," op. cit., pp. 231ff. [40].

[121] The Logic of Perfection, pp. 57ff.; Man's Vision of God, p. 300, 311; "The Formal Validity and the Real Significance of the Ontological Argument," op. cit., p. 231 [40].

[122] The Logic of Perfection, p. 58; "Rationale of the Ontological Proof," op. cit., pp. 279f. [151]. The fallacy of the first form of the proof, it should be noted, is not so much that it supposes existence to be a predicate in the one unique case of deity, but rather that it tries to prove this unique status by a questionable rule regarding existing things in general as compared to merely conceived things. "Rationale of the Ontological Proof," op. cit., p. 280. Both Hartshorne and Malcolm have recently defended the position that there are two distinct forms of argumentation in the

Hartshorne refers to the prevalent attitude scholars have taken regarding Anselm's reasoning: " . . . one refutes him essentially unread, so decisively that reading him would be needless toil."[123] The important question is not, to repeat, is the fact of non-existence a defect "but is the contingency which is deducible from the mere possibility of non-existence a defect?"[124] Contingent existence is an imperfection in that it involves the element of accidental precariousness, a

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Proslogion, only the first of which is rendered invalid by traditional criticism. While attention to these two forms has been drawn only rather recently (Norman Malcolm, "Anselm's Ontological Arguments," *op. cit.*, pp. 41-62; Charles Hartshorne, *The Logic of Perfection*, *passim*; "What Anselm Discovered," *op. cit.*, pp. 213ff. [140]; "Rationale of the Ontological Proof," *op. cit.*, pp. 279ff. [151].), it is interesting to note Hartshorne's passing reference regarding this distinction in a footnote as early as 1944: "Incidently, Anselm has already put the argument out of the reach of this criticism of Kant's [that existence is a predicate] by holding not only that what exists is more than what does not but that 'what cannot be conceived not to exist' is more than what *can* be conceived not to exist. The first contention treats simple existence as a predicate, and is objectionable; the second treats necessity, logical type, of existence as a predicate, and this . . . is correct." ("The Formal Validity and the Real Significance of the Ontological Argument," *op. cit.*, p. 234 [40].) In light of this early insight and the abundance of subsequent writing on the ontological argument, it is highly unfortunate, in the opinion of this writer, that more attention has been given to Malcolm's recent article (cited above) than to the many articles and books of Hartshorne's in which the supposedly original insights of Malcolm had been articulated for some twenty-five years. One can only hope that this negligence on the part of the philosophical world will be overcome in the near future.

[123] *Saint Anselm, Basic Writings,* p. 1 of the introduction, [137].

[124] *The Logic of Perfection*, p. 61.

kind of radical "iffyness."[125]

Hence the argument in its second form has nothing to do with whether or not existence (in the ordinary, factual sense) is a predicate. "How much longer," Hartshorne impatiently queries, "will ink--and students' time in a thousand colleges--be worse than wasted upon the supposition that it does?"[126] Kant's strictures at this point are rendered null and void; dollars (or islands, for that matter) may always be conceived as not-existing. The deficiency inherent in contingency is part of the very nature of a dollar.[127] Therefore, there is no implication that existing dollars are greater than non-existing dollars.

> This whole line of criticism has nothing to do with the case. I beg indulgency for my severity; I am trying to call the attention of those deafened by thousands of shouts (echoing previous shouts) to a manifest mistake which no one seems to want to notice. This king really is naked. The king is not Anselm's argument. . . . it is Kant's chief criticism of it.[128]

So far our discussion has been primarily concerned with the distinctly modal form of Hartshorne's reformulated ontological argument. We have tried to show that the logic of

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[125] Ibid.

[126] Ibid., p. 58.

[127] Ibid., pp. 58f.; cf. Man's Vision of God, p. 303.

[128] The Logic of Perfection, p. 59.

Hartshorne's reasoning has led him to reject categorically any predication of the modality of contingency of the divine perfection. This leaves him with the disjunction, necessity or impossibility of existence.

That the conception of God's necessary existence is not an impossible idea is to this writer the least supported and most vulnerable assumption in Hartshorne's treatment of the argument in The Logic of Perfection. He himself is not unaware of this liability and says that this postulate (step 7 in the formalization on p. 51), which for him is "intuitively convincing," is nevertheless the hardest to justify.[129] To be sure, there will always be those who hold that "perfection" is cognitively meaningless or exhibits contradictions;[130] nevertheless, Hartshorne has made a persistent effort in virtually all of his writings to develop a coherent and cognitively significant idea of divine perfection. His basic contention is that an idea is "coherently conceivable" (and therefore not an impossibility) if it is neither nonsensical nor self-contradictory.[131]

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[129] *Ibid.*, pp. 51, 52.

[130] "Hume's Metaphysics and Its Present-Day Influence," *op. cit.*, p. 170 [127]; "Absolute Objects and Relative Subjects: A Reply," *op. cit.*, pp. 185f. [134]; "Can There Be Proofs for the Existence of God?" p. 18 [165]. For this reason Hartshorne admits that the argument cannot be positively conclusive. However, it is *negatively* conclusive, against the attempt to dismiss theism on the basis of empirical evidence. (*Ibid.*; cf. Readers' Responses: "Further Fascination of the Ontological Argument," *op. cit.*, p. 245 [148].) Other arguments may be used in mutual support, employing the strengths of one at the point where another, such as the ontological, may be weakest. ("The Formal Validity and the Real Significance of the Ontological Argument," *op. cit.*, p. 229 [40]; *The Logic of Perfection*, p. 52; "Can There Be Proofs for the Existence of God?" p. 19 [165].)

Now, admittedly, the traditional notions of perfection have in fact entailed some rather flagrant contradictions, if not downright nonsense, as we have already indicated in chapters IV and V. But by contrast, if one judges Hartshorne's doctrine of God in terms of its internal consistency, its logical coherency and its freedom from paradox, then one may pronounce this aspect of his philosophical endeavor as eminently successful. In short, if conceptual coherency is the criterion of the logical possibility of an idea, then surely Hartshorne's doctrine of perfection rigorously meets this standard.

At this point we confront one of the fundamental presuppositions of Hartshorne's philosophical thought: There can be no ultimate disjunction between logical and real possibility.[132] When this basic assumption is fortified by the use of modal logic and "Becker's Postulate," we then have

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[131] "The Formal Validity and the Real Significance of the Ontological Argument," op. cit., p. 225 [40]; "Real Possibility," op. cit., p. 593 [154].

[132] "Real Possibility," op. cit., pp. 593, 597, 598 [154]; cf. "Rationale of the Ontological Argument," op. cit., p. 279 [151]; The Logic of Perfection, pp. 95f.

Hartshorne's essential ingredients for what he contends is a valid ontological inference. We shall examine each of these principles in turn.

Hartshorne affirms as a doctrinal premise of the ontological argument that "meanings are logically possible only because referents are ontologically possible or actual."[133] Only a nonsensical idea, such as "roundsquare," can be without real terms in the actual world.[134] Every meaningful idea must have a relatum, something that is meant. ". . . meaning as such is a relation between sign and thing signified, and therefore . . . if there is nothing which is in the relation of being signified, then there is no meaning."[135] Given self-consistent meaning, there must be something that is meant. A thought cannot refer merely to its own self-consistency;[136] it always has meaning by virtue of some kind of experience.[137] Since all language is extensional for Hartshorne, that is, since some realm of objects, actual or possible, must serve as referents,[138] there can be no absolute disjunction between thought and reality.[139]

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[133] "The Formal Validity and the Real Significance of the Ontological Argument," op. cit., p. 226, italics mine [40]; cf. Discussion: "'On Hartshorne's Formulation of the Ontological Argument: A Rejoinder'," The Philosophical Review, Vol. LIV, No. 1 (January, 1946), p. 63.

[134] Man's Vision of God, p. 300; "The Formal Validity and the Real Significance of the Ontological Argument," op. cit., p. 226 [40].

[135] Discussion: "'Professor Hartshorne's Syllogism: A Rejoinder'," The Philosophical Review, Vol LIV, No. 5 (September, 1945), p. 507.

[136] "Real Possibility," op. cit., p. 597 [154]; Man's Vision of God, p. 300.

> . . . the meanings whose consistency is granted must mean something, and this referent of the meanings is not the consistency but the presupposition of their being any meanings, consistent or otherwise. If a consistent meaning means something, but something not even possible, then it means something very odd indeed. If it means only its own consistency, then it is really meaningless.[140]

Hence a coherent idea always stands in relation to an actuality or a real possibility.[141]

Now in the case of the ontological argument, to say that the referent in question, God, is at least possible, that is, that the idea of God is a coherent conception, is to affirm in this unique instance the indistinguishability of the possible and actual.[142] For the idea of God cannot be a mere possibility; it must either have the status of a pseudo- or impossible idea, or else it must be actual, "with no alternative of non-actual possibility at all."[143] If the term "God" did not have a referent, then there would be a logical flaw in the conception.

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[137] Man's Vision of God, p. 311.

[138] "Metaphysics and the Modality of Existential Judgments," op. cit., p. 119 [126].

[139] Man's Vision of God, p. 311; "Real Possibility," op. cit., p. 598 [154]; The Logic of Perfection, p. 90.

[140] Man's Vision of God, p. 304.

[141] "The Formal Validity and the Real Significance of the Ontological Argument," op. cit., pp. 226f. [40].

[142] Man's Vision of God, p. 300.

> For this name, unlike all others, by its barest connotation, requires a denotation, so that he who denies the latter implies a logical defect in the former. If, however, there be such defect, then God cannot exist; if there be none, then he cannot fail to exist.[144]

Hartshorne reinforces this line of reasoning by use of modal logic and "Becker's Postulate," which asserts that if a proposition could be necessary, it is necessary.[145] $(\sim N \sim Np \rightarrow Np)$ Consequently, if a proposition which asserts the exemplification of perfection could be necessary, then it is necessary.[146] "Could God exist is the same as, does

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[143] *Ibid.*, p. 309; "Metaphysics and the Modality of Existential Judgments," *op. cit.*, p. 118 [126].

[144] "God's Existence: A Conceptual Problem," in Hook, ed., *op. cit.*, p. 213 [130].

[145] *The Logic of Perfection*, pp. 53, 55, 56; cf. "Rationale of the Ontological Proof," *op. cit.*, p. 279 [151]. The negative of this would also hold: what is not necessary could not be necessary. (Np N Np)

[146] "Metaphysics and the Modality of Existential Judgments," *op. cit.*, p. 119 [126].

God exist?"[147] Necessity of existence logically includes existence on the assumption that the necessarily true is true. (Np→p)[148] If perfection is necessary, it is contradictory to deny that it is exemplified; a predicate which applies to all objects must apply to some objects.[149] Just as the notion of a contingently existing perfect being was ruled out as contradictory, so in the same way the notion of a non-existing perfect being is dismissed. "Thou dost exist so truly," Anselm wrote, "that Thou canst not be conceived not to exist." (Proslogion 3) Perfection therefore has only one intelligible status, namely that of existence. It would be nonsense to say that what "cannot not exist" nevertheless "does not exist."[150]

Turning now from expository analysis to some critical reflection, we immediately encounter a number of difficulties with Hartshorne's reformulation of the ontological argument that appear to render his position somewhat less convincing than he intends it to be.

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[147] Readers' Responses: "Further Fascination of the Ontological Argument," op. cit., p. 244 [148]; cf. The Logic of Perfection, p. 103.

[148] The Logic of Perfection, p. 63; "Absolute Objects and Relative Subjects: A Reply," op. cit., p. 185 [134].

[149] The Logic of Perfection, p. 50; Man's Vision of God, p. 309.

[150] "The Formal Validity and the Real Significance of the Ontological Argument," op. cit., p. 233 [40].

Let us begin with an observation that may or may not prove to be a difficulty, depending on one's affinity for neoclassical metaphysics. If in his rehabilitation of the argument, Hartshorne has been successful in reducing the viable alternatives to theism or positivism (an assertion which he has frequently made and one which we are inclined to accept as valid); and if Hartshorne's analysis of the logical-type difficulty in the Anselmian form of the argument is correct, with the consequence that the only defensible form of the argument is one which allows the abstract-concrete, necessary-contingent distinctions to fall within the divine nature; then it seems to follow that the validity of the argument is dependent upon a prior acceptance of dipolar theism--unless, of course, one is willing to tolerate the antinomies of traditional, absolutistic theism. Commenting on the intolerable contradictions which riddled the classical conception of God and the arguments that were intended to defend that conception, Hartshorne comments with unequivocal frankness: " . . . the failure of the classical proofs, as they stand, is indeed good riddance. But only because they were proofs, not for God, but for an idolatrous absurdity!"[151]

However, even though it may be true that the validity of the argument entails, among other things, a surrelative, neoclassical definition of perfection, it is not necessarily the case that one who rejects the argument will thereby be inclined to reject Hartshorne's doctrine of God. Conversely, one who affirms Hartshorne's dipolar theism may not be equally committed to a defense of his version of the ontological argument. In other words, while the argument appears to be invalid apart from a distinction of logical levels which a dipolar theology allows, it does not follow that the tenability of dipolar theism is severely jeopardized by the liabilities associated with an ontological form of argumentation.

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[151] "Can There Be Proofs for the Existence of God?" p. 5 [165].

Whether or not Hartshorne would concur in this judgment, it is obvious that he feels he has successfully countered the difficulties which his critics have found in the argument. Let us see if this judgment can be sustained.[152]

Hartshorne's formalization of the argument in The Logic of Perfection (p. 51) has been criticized by John Hick on the grounds that there is an illicit change from "logical" to "factual" necessity in proposition 6.[153] Now I think that

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[152] For an excellent critical discussion of objections that Hartshorne has not dealt with specifically in The Logic of Perfection, see Cobb, "'Perfection Exists': A Critique of Charles Hartshorne," *op. cit.*, pp. 298-303.

[153] Review of The Logic of Perfection, Theology Today, Vol. XX, No. 2 (July, 1963), p. 296. Hartshorne usually speaks of "real" rather than "factual" necessity.

Hick is wrong in this contention and for the same reasons Hartshorne has given in rejecting this indictment of a formal fallacy in the argument.[154] Throughout the formal proof, "N" stands for the logical necessity of propositions only, and in accordance with current philosophical usage, propositional necessity is derivative from the meaning of the words used.[155] Thus the proposition, "God exists," when interpreted in terms of logical necessity, is a sentence which is analytically true by definition, by virtue of the meaning of the words employed. The proposition, therefore, is unconditionally true, that is, "necessary upon tautological conditions."[156] As for Hartshorne's formalization of the Proof, then, this much is clear: real necessity as such does not appear at any point *in the formal deduction*.[157]

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[154] "Rationale of the Ontological Proof," op. cit., pp. 279ff. [151]. Incidentally, I think Hick is also obviously incorrect in asserting that Hartshorne's initial premise is a reversion to the first form of the argument, since Hartshorne's treatment of the argument is thoroughly modal while Anselm's first form is not. The thrust of Hick's reasoning is that "logical" necessity is philosophically inadmissible, whereas "factual" necessity is not (whatever that may mean to an empiricist of Hick's persuasion). Hick contends that Hartshorne's initial premise becomes valid with this change. (p. 296). How Hick can make this substitution, upholding as he does proposition 6 as affirming a valid set of alternatives (that God either exists necessarily or necessarily fails to exist), and then go on to say, " . . . from this it will never follow that God does exist" (p. 297; italics his), seems to involve him once again in a recourse to merely logical necessity which he supposedly has just eliminated.

[155] The Logic of Perfection, p. 53.

[156] Ibid.

Now even though Hick has incorrectly inferred the precise place in the deduction at which a switchover is made from logical to real necessity and consequently has not been able to show any formal fallacy in the argument on that account, he has hinted, nevertheless, at what appears to be a fundamental vulnerability in the argument--the illicit coalescence of logical and real necessity.

If the idea of God is to be more than a mere conception of formal logic, there must at some point be the entailment of real as well as logical necessity. Since the formal aspect of the argument involves nothing but logical necessity, according to Hartshorne's own admission, then real necessity must be asserted at some point outside the formal deduction. This is precisely what Hartshorne does in his initial premise. "Anselm's Principle," *p* *Np*, is affirmed on the "intuitive grounds" that the idea of real necessity is inherent in the very nature of divine perfection.[158] Now in a formal deduction one must always be mindful of the fact that no more may be found in the conclusion than originally obtained in the premises. Therefore, even though the formalization as such only makes use of logical necessity, it follows that Hartshorne must presuppose all along that there can really be no ultimate distinction between logical and real necessity if the logical conclusion is to stand for an actual referent in the real world. Even if one were to grant the ultimate inseparability of logical and real necessity (which I am not prepared to do), it still appears that Hartshorne assumes from the very beginning what cannot be demonstrated by strict logical procedure and hence what cannot be arrived at in the conclusion of a deductive argument--namely, the proposition, "There is a perfect being who has real existence in the actual world."

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[157] "Rationale of the Ontological Proof," *op. cit.*, p. 281 [151].

[158] *Ibid*.

In a similar fashion John Cobb likewise has resisted the argument at this point. While he fully agrees that if God exists at all, he must exist necessarily, it nevertheless does not follow, according to Cobb, that " . . . the absence of a logical basis for denying his existence excludes the possibility that he factually does not exist."[159]

Now let us see how Hartshorne defends his position in light of the above considerations. He would undoubtedly accuse his critics of failing to grasp Anselm's basic insight regarding the status of the idea of God, that is, whether it be exemplified or unexemplified. We are told that Anselm held that "the only exemplification which would not contradict the meaning of the idea must be necessary exemplification, without conceivable alternative of non-exemplification."[160] Now the crucial point concerns what Hartshorne means by "necessary exemplification." He fully agrees with the standard objection that logical necessity cannot relate concepts to particular existing things.[161]

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[159] "'Perfection Exists': A Critique of Charles Hartshorne," op. cit., p. 296. It is not altogether clear whether Cobb himself later concedes this difficulty, or is just affirming what Hartshorne's reaction would be, when he says, " . . . the distinction must be irrelevant as an objection to the ontological argument." (p. 297)

The phrase, "necessarily exemplified property," however, is obviously not a particular existing thing but a concept. Therefore, Hartshorne contends, "Necessity can perfectly well relate the concept 'perfection' to the concept 'necessarily exemplified property.' And this is exactly Anselm's Principle!"[162] But then Hartshorne neatly misses the forcefulness of his own remark by shifting the discussion from the admittedly illegitimate question as to how logical necessity in thought can be related to existence in rerum natura to one concerning the universality rather than the particularity of God's individuality.[163] He tells us that God is not a particular individual, for as such he could never be relevant to all other individuals. Rather, in his bare existence God is the non-particular individual, that is to say, he is "so completely abstract as to be wholly non-particular, and yet uniquely individual."[164] Moreover, what is correlative to every possible particular can no more be particular than particularity itself.[165] Does not the upshot of the argument, then, amount to something like this: While logical necessity cannot relate concepts to particular existing things, it can relate concepts to a universally existing abstraction? The particular actuality of God cannot be deduced from our idea of him, but his abstract necessity can be so deduced. But since God is the union (not the identity) of universal and particular (_that_ he exists being non-particular or universal but how he exists being exclusive or particular), have we still not _indirectly_ related logical necessity to particularity? And even if this be admissible, allowing for the distinction of logical types involved, where has Hartshorne transcended mere logical necessity and demonstrated that factuality may be deduced from ideality?

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[160] "Metaphysics and the Modality of Existential Judgments," op. cit., p. 118 [126].

[161] The Logic of Perfection. p. 92.

[162] Ibid., italics mine.

[163] Ibid.

A similar way of developing this criticism is to make use of the distinction between intensional and extensional meaning.[166] To use the sentence, "God exists," tautologically, is only to assert that existence is a logical requirement of the meaning of "God." On the other hand, if one affirms the sentence, "God exists," in a non-tautological manner, then he is contending that the term "God" has extension and applies to some existent.[167] Now in Hartshorne's version of the argument necessary existence is taken in the sense of "upon tautological conditions."[168] Hence the only valid conclusion of the argument can be an intensional statement about the meaning of the concept of God. The conclusion, *a fortiori*, cannot have reference to anything which has an extensional status to which the concept applies.[169]

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[164] _Ibid._, p. 93.

[165] _Ibid._

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[166] See Jerome Shaffer, "Existence, Predication, and the Ontological Argument," *op. cit.*, pp. 322-325.

[167] *Ibid.*, p. 322.

[168] *The Logic of Perfection*, p. 53

[169] Shaffer, "Existence, Predication, and the Ontological Argument," *op. cit.*, p. 323.

CHAPTER VIII

THE DIVINE ACTUALITY

To talk about the divine actuality is *ipso facto* to talk about the interrelationship between God and the world. For the cosmic unity (not just the mere totality) of the world process is what Hartshorne means by the divine actuality. God is all reality as somehow one.[1] In fact, the answer to the question as to how the universe with its parts can add up to a single existent is what Hartshorne means by God.[2] At each moment the world-process comprises something unitary, an integral whole of things which is maximal and absolute, exceeding the unity of any of its parts.

> Cosmic individual unity, that is, organicity, is far other than local organicity, but other by being sublimely more, never less . . .[3]

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[1] "The Idea of God--Literal or Analogical?" *op. cit.*, p. 131 [102].

[2] "The Compound Individual," *op. cit.*, p. 218 [16]; "The Modern World and a Modern View of God," *op. cit.*, p. 80 [138].

[3] *Man's Vision of God*, p. 201, italics his; cf. p. 285.

There is thus an unbroken, all-pervasive cosmic integrity to the universe,[4] and the divine actuality is this synthetic unity of the world as consisting of a cosmic superlife, what Hartshorne has called "an Experience of all experiences."[5] As the self-identical individuality of the world, God is infinitely endowed with an exhaustive, creative ability to assimilate the multiplicity of all individuals into the unity of his cosmic fullness.

There is no such situation as God and something else, for there is nothing additional to the all-inclusive, all-comprehensive fullness of the divine actuality.[6] All truth is descriptive of God, and conversely, a full description of deity (were that possible) would exhaust truth.[7]

Now there is an inseparable relationship between theology and ontology in Hartshorne's thought, which is to say that panentheism and panpsychism are mutually implicative. As we noted at the end of chapter II, the cosmological ramifications of a panpsychic ontology culminate in a world-view in which the myriad societies comprising the universe are synthesized into an all-comprehensive hierarchy--the inclusive Society of all other societies. This is, of course, no novel conception (being as old as Plato), but it could not come into its own, Hartshorne contends, until such monopolar prejudices as God's immutability and independence (also inherited from the Greeks) were overcome--that is, until a dipolar theism such as panentheism became a viable option.[8] The wholly absolute deity of the classical tradition is replaced by one who is relative in a supremely eminent fashion, having relations to all actuality and possibility.[9] The whole of nature may thus be conceived as an organism of social significance.[10] God is the compound individual who at all times has embraced or will embrace the fullness of all other individuals within his actuality.[11]

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[4] The Logic of Perfection, p. 205; cf. "The New Metaphysics and Current Problems (II)," op cit., p. 11 [10].

[5] Man's Vision of God, p. 293; cf. "The Structure of Givenness, op. cit., p. 31 [129].

[6] The Divine Relativity, p. 79.

[7] "The Idea of God--Literal or Analogical?" op. cit., pp. 135f. [102]; The Divine Relativity, p. 109.

To be sure, there is more to God than the everchanging synthetic complexity of the natural world. God has a self-identical _individuality_, his necessary essence, which is independent of the world-totality that constitutes the accidental, concrete particularity of God as the cosmic _individual_. The same distinction may be made between God's personality, again referring to the defining characteristics of his eternal essence, and God as Person, which is the all-inclusive whole as supremely personal.[12] "God is the whole of things, but that whole is personal . . ."[13]

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[8] _Man's Vision of God_, p. 205.

[9] 9_The Divine Relativity_, p. 76.

[10] _Beyond Humanism_, p. 264; cf. p. 255.

[11] "The Compound Individual," _op. cit.,_ p. 218 [16].

Such, in barest outline, is Hartshorne's doctrine of panentheism, which represents a theological reconciliation of the motifs of ordinary pantheism, where God is simply the de facto totality of things, and the contrary extreme of classical theism, where God's actuality is wholly independent of the contingent aspects of the world.[14]

In the last chapter we noted that the generic character of God, his essence, can be known a priori. By contrast, however, the fullness of the divine actuality can be known only vaguely and fragmentarily, and even then, only by reacting to all our experiences and knowledge in such a way that words can never be adequate. Nevertheless, a certain amount of speculative generalization is possible; indeed, it is necessary if we are to conceptualize, in however inadequate fashion, the nature of the divine actuality.

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[12] The Divine Relativity, pp. 25, 83, 143, 144.

[13] "The New Pantheism--I," op. cit., p. 119 [17]; cf. "The New Pantheism--II," op. cit., p. 143 [18]. For an excellent brief summary of Hartshorne's view of God as personal, see Ferm, ed., An Encyclopedia of Religion, entry entitled "God as Personal," pp. 302 f. [45].

[14] Ferm, ed., An Encyclopedia of Religion, entry entitled "Panentheism," p. 557 [45].

Now Hartshorne holds that God's relation to the world must necessarily be conceived by analogy with human experience. As Kant showed, all of our meanings involve space and time. Hence if God were simply non-spatial and non-temporal, he would be, as such, unknowable by us, even by analogy.[15] Therefore, if God is to be depicted as "the superindividual unity of space-time,"[16] our inference must be based on analogical extrapolation from a situation which has illustrative foundation somewhere in our experience.[17] In short, what is needed is a situation in which a multiplicity of individuals is synthesized into a complex, unified individual, a situation which may then be extended analogically to describe God's relation to the world.[18]

Hartshorne finds this situation in the apperception of the directly felt unity of the conscious self, or the human personality. It is here that one finds the epistemological basis for all conceptions of unity elsewhere.[19] ". . . the unity of our experience is the unity in which everything is initially found, and only by abstraction from or analogy with this unity can we understand any concrete unity."[20] Again he writes: ". . . personality is the only principle of wholeness or integration on a complex level such as the universe must involve, of which we have any experience."[21] Thus, for example, a man cannot be regarded as merely a system of cells acting upon one another, for he is directly aware of "himself" as a single unit of experience. When he thinks or acts, it is not so much his bodily cells or organs that think or act but the whole man as an irreducible, synthetic experience.[22] While Hartshorne does not believe that the mind and body are separable (indeed, the body is ultimately a species of other-mind in panpsychism), he nevertheless feels that an important distinction remains between them. For the cells of a man's body are many, while his experience at a given moment is one.[23] The "body," in abstraction from the "mind," is the intersection of billions of cells, yet one's experience in a given instance is not simply reducible to this multitude (though it is certainly dependent on it).[24] The body is really a complex "world" of individual cells or organisms, and the mind is to the body "something like an indwelling God."[25] The mind is thus the dominant member in a society of individuals that together comprise the complex unity of a man's body.[26]

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[15] Ferm, ed., An Encyclopedia of Religion, entry entitled "Analogy," p. 19 [45]. Even revelation presumably could not be imparted without recourse to the basic structures that make knowledge possible.

[16] "A Critique of Peirce's Idea of God," op. cit., p. 521 [30]; cf. Man's Vision of God, pp.273f.

[17] "Leibniz's Greatest Discovery," op. cit., p. 414 [53].

[18] Ibid.

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[19] Ibid., p. 415; "The Compound Individual," op. cit., p. 213 [16]; "The Structure of Givenness," op. cit., p. 22 [129]; "Metaphysics for Positivists," op. cit., p. 294 [14].

[20] "Whitehead's Philosophy of Reality as Socially-Structured Process," op. cit., p. 68; italics his [87]; cf. Man's Vision of God, pp.174f.; "The Structure of Givenness," op. cit., p. 22 [129]. Hartshorne follows Leibniz in rejecting visual and tactual perception as adequate data for conceptions of unity because they are usually limited to the reporting of macroscopic experiences of masses or aggregates of individuals and hence cannot illustrate individuality as such. ("Leibniz's Greatest Discovery," op. cit., p. 414 [53]; "Present Prospects for Metaphysics," op. cit., p. 199 [145]; "Mind as Memory and Creative Love," in Jordan M. Scher, ed., Theories of the Mind (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 458.)

[21] "The New Pantheism--II," op. cit., p. 143 [18].

[22] Reality as Social Process, p. 57; "Philosophy and Orthodoxy," op. cit., p. 297 [43]; "The Philosophy of Creative Synthesis," op. cit., p. 945 [115].

Given this integral mind-body synthesis, it is then possible to extend this relation analogically in such a manner that a super-mind both possesses the members of its body more immediately and intimately than in the human case, while at the same time exercising incomparably more power over them.[27]

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[23] "The Logical Structure of Givenness," op. cit., p. 315 [114]; The Logic of Perfection, p. 200.

[24] "The Logical Structure of Givenness," op. cit., p. 315 [114]; cf. "Leibniz's Greatest Discovery," op. cit., p. 416 [53]; Beyond Humanism, p. 147.

[25] Man's Vision of God, p. 175.

[26] The Logic of Perfection, pp. 200f.

What does a man have immediate knowledge of and direct control over? If the answer to this can be found in our experience, then we have an important clue for conceptualizing the God-world relation.

> . . . if we have any knowledge and power that is immediate, then--since nothing can be more immediate than immediate--the only dimension left for God's superiority is that of scope and completeness with respect to all objects in the universe.[28]

Now if control is defined as the ability to carry out some purpose, then the immediate effect of a human purpose or volition is some change in the body.[29] A man has control over the nerve cells of his body (we are, of course, only speaking of voluntary behavior) which carry out the intended activity. "Here and here alone," Hartshorne affirms, "we are Godlike in directness of power over individuals [body cells] other than our own ego."[30]

Again, Hartshorne asks, what does one immediately know? The evidence suggests that a man's awareness includes his own thoughts and feelings along with certain changes going on in his body. Nothing outside the body is apprehended with equal vividness.[31]

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[27] "Philosophy and Orthodoxy," op. cit., p. 297 [43].

[28] Man's Vision of God, p. 178.

[29] Ibid., p. 179.

[30] Ibid.

> . . . the body is merely the primary environment of the mind, and what is usually called 'the environment' is (in relation to the self) the environment of the environment, the second envelope, so to speak of correlated activities, correlated at one remove.[32]

Now if we take the relation between the activity in the cerebral cortex and a man's thoughts (assuming that the two are not identical), we have the basis for an analogy. A brain cell acts as both a "*nerve*-muscle" and a "*muscle*-nerve" in that there is a reciprocal response between its inner activity and a man's thoughts.[33] In an analogical manner, God's omniscient knowledge is as though every object in the world were to him a "muscle-*nerve*," while his power and volition are related to the world as though every item were a "nerve-*muscle*."[34] "If there is a theological analogy," Hartshorne affirms, "here is its locus."[35]

However, if the mind-body or mind-brain cell analogy is at once organically immediate, there is a great deal of mystery surrounding this complex interrelationship. There is need to reinforce the immediacy of the organic relation between mind and body with another relation in which the sympathetic interaction among individuals is more apparent.[36] Hartshorne finds this more obvious sympathetic interaction in the social relations between individual selves.[37] In this situation the reciprocal sharing of feeling is transparent enough, but the analogy here is defective for the reason that communication of feeling is always mediated through factors in the environment, such as the vibrations of air particles between the individuals. Moreover, except for the possibility of extrasensory perception, the transmission of feeling through intermediate factors is ultimately dependent on the mind-body relation--the body being that more immediate environment of the mind through which the surrounding world is apprehended.

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[31] *Ibid.*, p. 185.

[32] "Leibniz's Greatest Discovery," *op. cit.*, p 416 [53].

[33] *Man's Vision of God*, p. 185.

[34] *Ibid.* Cf. *The Logic of Perfection*, p. 197.

[35] *Man's Vision of God,* p. 185.

Thus we have two analogies, one organic and one social, each having strengths where the other is weak. Now Hartshorne combines the merits of both analogies on the assumption that if the brain and body cells are possessed with humble forms of feeling, then the mind-body relationship is _immediately social_.[38] Thus on the basis of a panpsychic interpretation of the mind-body relation, a forceful analogy may be elaborated by which to interpret the organic integrity of the God-world correlation. Hartshorne concludes:

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[36] The paralytic, for example, may feel perfectly normal until he attempts to execute a movement. Man's Vision of God, p. 186.

[37] Ibid., pp. 186f.

> Is this not the principle, and the only principle with any analogy in our experience, by which divine love . . . could know and sway the world?[39]

Hartshorne's elaboration of the mind-body relation as the theological analogy _par excellence_ is not to be equated with the _via analogia_ of Thomism, where a third way is sought between equivocal and univocal predication. Hartshorne fully intends to predicate a body of God in a quite literal fashion.[40] It is at this point that traditional theology once again has evidenced a monopolar prejudice, for it was willing to predicate consciousness of God analogous to man's consciousness, or will and understanding analogous to these qualities in us. But there was an intransigent inflexibility regarding any predication of a body analogous with our human bodies.[41] Hartshorne makes it quite plain that to speak of nature as the body of God is not meant as "a mere metaphor."[42] We have no other analogy by which we could conceive God as cosmic mind or supreme person "unless we impute to him a body adequate to his cosmic functions. What but the cosmos itself could be such a body?"[43] If a body be understood as the organization of one's immediate servants, then all things are the immediate servants of God. Therefore all of nature is literally his body.[44] Again, " . . . God is that mind which enjoys the fullest intimacy with all things, and therefore in an undiluted sense has all the world for his body."[45] But whereas the human body is never fully possessed by our minds, being a localized fragment of reality surrounded by a vast external environment, God's body is fully possessed and absolutely internal to the divine mind.[46] Since there is no external environment to the cosmos, there need be no cosmic analogue of a brain or central nervous system. The whole of reality is fully immediate to the cosmic mind. No part of the whole serves the function of a world-brain, because God's co-extensive omniscience with actuality is such that the whole world acts as a higher equivalent of a brain.[47]

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[38] _Ibid._, p. 187.

[39] _Ibid._, p. 188.

[40] "Whitehead's Idea of God, _op. cit._, p. 549 [27]; Ferm, ed., _An Encyclopedia of Religion_, entry entitled "Analogy," p. 20 [45].

[41] _Philosophers Speak of God_, p. 11

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[42] "The Compound Individual," op. cit., p. 213 [16].

[43] Ferm, ed., An Encyclopedia of Religion, entry entitled "God, as Personal," p. 303 [45].

[44] "The New Pantheism--II," op. cit., p. 142 [18].

[45] Man's Vision of God, p. 200.

[46] Ferm, ed., An Encyclopedia of Religion, entry entitled "Analogy," p. 20 [45]; "Husserl and the Social Structure of Immediacy," op. cit., p. 224 [24]; Reality as Social Process, pp. 141f.; "The Social Structure of Experience," op. cit., p. 109 [128].

> . . . just as between a brain cell and the human mind there is no further mechanism, so between every individual in existence and the world-mind there is no chain of intermediaries.[48]

The importance of the doctrine of relations to the logical structure of panentheism was pointed out in chapter VI. In particular we noted that only in a dipolar theology such as Hartshorne's, where the absolute essence of God is an externally related, abstract term in the all-inclusive relativity of the divine actuality, can the difficulties inherent in two time-honored positions be avoided--the difficulty, on the one hand, of equating the whole of reality with the absolute, with the attendant problems generated by exclusively internal relations; and, on the other hand, the difficulty of affirming sheer absoluteness of God, while at the same time trying to get him genuinely related to a contingent world. In short, Hartshorne's doctrine of the independent, wholly absolute essence of God could be articulated in a logically consistent manner only by making use of external relations.

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[47] The Logic of Perfection, p. 198.

[48] Ibid.

As we seek to develop Hartshorne's doctrine of the divine actuality, we find once again that the doctrine of relations provides the basic logical structure by means of which God and the world, the whole of reality and its constituent parts, are integrated.

There are three possible ways in which a whole may be related to its parts, only one of which gives panentheism. Let us examine the two positions which Hartshorne rejects in order to gain a clearer perspective of his own view.

The first position is a simple reductionism in which the whole is just all the related parts. Here there is nothing over and above the mere totality of the parts. The whole is thus not something distinct from all of the parts but is actually constituted by them. The rationale of this position is that the theory which posits the whole as something distinct from its parts gives rise to an infinite regress. For example, if all the parts, A, B, C, when they are present give rise to a new entity, W, which includes all of them but is distinct from them, then why do not these entities, A, B, C, W, when they are present give rise to yet a new entity, W', which is distinct from and yet includes all of them?[49]

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[49] This was the view taken by John Wild in his thorough but strongly unsympathetic review of The Divine Relativity. (The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. II, No. 6 (1948), pp. 65-77.)

Hartshorne's response to this position is as follows. He holds, in the first place, that there is no need in the above situation for a new whole, W', to contain W and the constituent parts, A, B, and C, for W is already related as a whole to every one of its parts, thus providing the inclusive unity that is needed.[50] However, there is a sense in which Hartshorne does admit that there is an infinite regress of inclusion, but he denies that this is "vicious" in the manner intended by the proponents of reductionism. For each moment in the temporal succession involves a new synthesis of old syntheses. The only way in which such endless succession could be viewed as futile would be if some goal were presupposed. But Hartshorne maintains this is a misunderstanding of the function of goals.

> Life is for the living, not for an end result. Essentially neither God nor man is trying to "get somewhere," there to rest in peace, but all are (in their perfect or imperfect manner respectively) at each moment striving to actualize as great a value as the past actualizations furnish material for, in such fashion that opportunity for further creation of value in the future will be maximized . . .[51]

In the second place, Hartshorne rejects the reductionist view as being incommensurate with an adequate theory of value. Is the part for the sake of the whole, or the whole merely for the sake of the part? Hartshorne's response is quite clear: "To me it seems wonderfully irrational to suppose that the enduring universe exists merely for its transient parts. But if the parts exist for the whole, then the whole must contain the values of the parts."[52] From this Hartshorne concludes that since it is unintelligible to hold that values could exist apart from a being capable of valuing them, the cosmos itself must be capable of valuing and enjoying all that falls within it.[53]

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[50] "The Divine Relativity and Absoluteness: A Reply," _op. cit._, p. 53 [69].

[51] _Ibid._, p. 54.

Another view regarding the part-whole relationship which Hartshorne rejects regards the whole as something completely organic, working on its constituent parts to integrate them into a determinate entity.[54] If, in the first view, the whole depends entirely on the parts, or better, merely is the sum of its parts, the second view holds that the parts depend entirely upon the whole.[55] But such a doctrine of an absolutely organic whole empties all the parts of any clear meaning. "For unless the parts have some sort of independence, they all involve the whole and hence each other, and that merely means that everything is the whole. But then nothing in any distinctive sense is the whole."[56] This would make any analysis of the whole impossible, for all the members presuppose the whole.[57] Only if each part is something in abstraction from the whole can the whole be analyzed into the constituent parts which compose it.[58] The only alternative would be a kind of mystical intuition of the whole in which true analysis would be impossible. And yet, while Hartshorne upholds the importance of analysis, he nevertheless feels that there can be no substitute for intuition of wholes. Analysis can never reach "full equivalence with a direct unitary intuition of the total actuality."[59]

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[52] "The Modern World and a Modern View of God," _op. cit._, p. 80 [138].

[53] _Ibid._

[54] _Philosophers Speak of God_, p. 19.

[55] "The Divine Relativity and Absoluteness: A Reply," _op. cit._, p. 52 [69].

In fact, as Bergson pointed out, in order for one to know when he has analyzed all the parts of a whole, he must have, over against the successive counting of units by which he is making a mental synthesis, a simultaneous apprehension of the whole, if only to know where to stop his counting.

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[56] "The Relativity of Nonrelativity: Some Reflections on Firstness," op. cit., p. 222 [74].

[57] The Logic of Perfection, p. 199.

[58] Ibid.

[59] "The Divine Relativity and Absoluteness: A Reply," op. cit., p. 53 [69].

Hence while we must count successively we must perceive simultaneously. In time we can perceive only succession but not an addition which culminates in a sum.[60]

Hartshorne's own view of the whole-part relation is that the whole, or inclusive reality, is not just the parts, but is something inclusive of the parts, one while they are many, yet not working on the parts--in fact, not entering into their being at all. "The single concept from which the cosmic ideas follow is that of 'the self-changing whole which includes all other beings as its (more or less) self-changing parts.'"[62] The whole comes into being as a free act of synthesis in which the parts are used as data.[63] But the response of the whole is temporally distinct from the responses of the individual parts.[64] "Only by neglecting the time structure of the situation, as philosophers of being may be expected to do . . . have 'holistic' philosophies fallen into the confusion of a whole determining its individual parts."[65] If the actions of the parts had no freedom, however slight, with respect to the whole into which they enter, there would then be no distinction between whole and parts and the very idea of whole would be divested of its meaning.[66] "Being part," then, is an external relation, and therefore a part need not have relation to its whole.[67] Only the whole is really related to the parts.[68] Wholes may thus be built up out of parts which are independent of those particular wholes.[69] To take an example, XY is not itself without X; but X could still have been X without entering into XY.[70]

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[60] Time and Free Will, p. 79; taken from A. D. Lindsay, The Philosophy of Bergson (New York: Hodder and Stoughton, 1911), p. 122.

[61] "The Divine Relativity and Absoluteness: A Reply," op. cit., p. 52 [69].

[62] Man's Vision of God, p. 349.

[63] Ibid.

[64] The Logic of Perfection, p. 200; The Divine Relativity, p. 69.

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[65] The Logic of Perfection, p. 200. While Hartshorne in this context makes the assertion that a whole must be temporally distinct from the responses of the parts in order to avoid the holistic fallacy of the whole determining its parts, it is an assertion which is essentially incompatible with his long-defended view regarding cosmic simultaneity and prehensive relations among contemporaries. As we shall show below and in the concluding chapter, Hartshorne's recent rejection of his earlier view on contemporary relations does indeed entail precisely this temporal distinction between the response of the whole and its parts. However, at the time this assertion was made (1942), Hartshorne held (and apparently still holds) to an idealistic view of reality that precluded there being a temporally distinct world over against God. (See below, pp. 243ff.)

[66] The Logic of Perfection, p. 202.

[67] The Divine Relativity, p. 69; cf. p. 93.

[68] "The Divine Relativity and Absoluteness: A Reply," op. cit., p. 52 [69]; "Absolute Objects and Relative Subjects," op. cit., p. 175 [134].

[69] "Whitehead, the Anglo-American Philosopher-Scientist," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, The Catholic University of America, 1961, p. 176.

We turn now to a discussion of the relationship between the ontological implications of Hartshorne's idealistic theory of knowledge and his doctrine of the all-inclusiveness of the divine actuality. It is Hartshorne's view that the world can only be constituted as a single organic reality by virtue of its being the content of God's unitary intuition in a unique, simultaneous, cosmic present.[71] Expressed dialectically, Hartshorne's doctrine of the inclusiveness of the world in the divine actuality is grounded in his view of the omniscience of God; while his doctrine of the inclusiveness of the world is derivative (with some important qualifications) from what appears to be a return to the absolute simultaneity of the Newtonian present moment.[72] We turn now to an extended discussion of these two interrelated topics.

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[70] The Divine Relativity, p. 69.

[71] Man's Vision of God, pp. 195, 287f.; The Divine Relativity, p. 77.

[72] A fundamental distinction from the Newtonian view is Hartshorne's affirmation of an indeterministic, open future, for example. It is interesting to note that William Reese, co-author of Philosophers Speak of God, made a similar comment in a letter to Hartshorne regarding the Newtonian aspect of the latter's philosophy. Hartshorne quoted Reese's misgivings about his position in a footnote of an article intended to answer some of the criticisms of Francis H. Parker's review of Philosophers Speak of God. I find no indication that Hartshorne has "corrected" Reese or altered his position at this point since the publication of his reply to Parker in 1961. ("Absolute Objects and Relative Subjects: A Reply," op. cit., pp. 182f. [134].)

Hartshorne's view that perfect knowledge is the measure of reality is for the most part a reiteration of Royce's position, with the important qualification[73] that Hartshorne does not fall into Royce's "fatal error" of equating ideal knowledge with that which is immutable and complete in every detail.[74] Such knowledge "from the standpoint of eternity," commits the fallacy of believing in the antecedent reality of factual truths.[75] Nevertheless, Royce did make a significant discovery which has achieved axiomatic status in Hartshorne's philosophy. The discovery is this: reality is to be defined as that which the perfect form of knowledge would or does know. One must start with experience or knowledge and in terms of it define reality.[76] Hartshorne's argument is as follows. Our imperfect form of knowledge seems to imply a non-coincidence of things as they are known and things as they are. We human beings recognize that there are many things which we do not know, that "reality" is far more extensive than our knowledge.[77] Therefore, we cannot regard human knowledge as an adequate measure of reality, for our beliefs are infected with uncertainty, doubt and inconsistency.[78] But it is just this awareness of the distinction between what we know and "reality" that leads us to surmise the possibility of knowledge more perfect than ours. We infer that what we know is not adequately known by us, which is to say that things as real and things as known to us are not identical.[79] There is a sharp contrast between the content of our half-beliefs and what that content would be as ideally known. Since our human knowing only partially fulfills such internal characteristics of knowledge as consistency, clarity and certainty, we are led to posit an ideal form of knowledge that entirely fulfills these criteria.[80] But this amounts to defining reality as that which is adequately known.[81] In short, reality is "what the internally perfect knowledge would have, or does have, as its presented content."[82] But we cannot say "would have," for that would be to turn reality as actual into something merely potential, and this is contradictory.[83] Hence, "things as they are" is merely a verbal alternative for "contents of the ideal knowledge."[84] Hartshorne asserts that "it is this ideal belief or knowledge which defines 'reality,' and herein, I think, is a great discovery of 'idealistic' philosophy. The imperfections of human knowledge can be stated without comparing the known with the 'real'; but not without comparing at least implicitly, defective with perfect knowledge."[85]

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[73] Hartshorne actually spells out five non sequiturs in the traditional idealistic theory of knowledge which are not necessarily entailed in a more careful restatement of what he considers to be "the great discovery" of idealistic philosophy. For a discussion of Hartshorne's polemic against Berkeley, Royce and other idealists, see "Ideal Knowledge Defines Reality: What Was True in 'Idealism,'" The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XLIII, No. 21 (October 10, 1946), pp. 573-582.

[74] "Ideal Knowledge Defines Reality: What Was True in 'Idealism'," op. cit., p. 575 [54].

[75] "Royce's Mistake--and Achievement," op. cit., p. 123 [99].

[76] "Metaphysical Statements as Nonrestrictive and Existential," op. cit., p. 45 [113].

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[77] "Ideal Knowledge Defines Reality: What Was True in 'Idealism,'" op. cit., p. 573 [54]; Philosophers Speak of God, p. 197; "Royce's Mistake--and Achievement," op. cit., p. 125 [99].

[78] "Royce's Mistake--and Achievement," op. cit., pp. 125, 127, 128 [99].

[79] Philosophers Speak of God, p. 198.

[80] "Royce's Mistake--and Achievement," op. cit., p. 128 [99].

Now it follows that if the real is within knowledge and consists in its relation to the adequate knower,[86] then to be is to be known by God.[87] His knowledge is essential to things in the following way. Any event must not only be or become known, but it must be adequately known. The class of "adequate knowings of E" cannot remain empty. Yet any actual knowing of E that God has is not essential either to God or E. God could have known E by a different yet equally adequate state of knowing.[88] Hence any particular event in the universe will have as its correlate an adequate particular state in the divine knower.[89]

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[81] Philosophers Speak of God, p. 198.

[82] Ibid., p. 197; cf. "Ideal Knowledge Defines Reality: What Was True in 'Idealism'," op. cit., p. 573 [54].

[83] Philosophers Speak of God, p. 197.

[84] "Ideal Knowledge Defines Reality: What Was True in 'Idealism'," op. cit., p. 574 [54]; cf. Royce's Mistake--and Achievement," op. cit., p. 128 [99].

[85] "Ideal Knowledge Defines Reality: What Was True in 'Idealism'," op. cit., p. 574, italics his [54].

[86] Philosophers Speak of God, p. 198.

According to Hartshorne, then, God's omniscience is the measure of all reality and value.[90] Not only must everything be adequately known by God, but all things share in the enjoyment of their contribution to the divine awareness--a postulate which Hartshorne says may be "the innermost secret of existence."[91]

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[87] *The Logic of Perfection*, p. 296; "Absolute Objects and Relative Subjects: A Reply," *op. cit.*, p. 179 [134]; "Ideal Knowledge Defines Reality: What Was True in 'Idealism'," *op. cit.*, pp. 577, 579, 580 [54].

[88] "Absolute Objects and Relative Subjects: A Reply," *op. cit.*, p. 180 [134].

[89] "The Structure of Metaphysics: A Criticism of Lazerowitz's Theory," *op. cit.*, p. 231 [116].

[90] "The Kinds of Theism: A Reply," *op. cit.*, p. 131 [85]; *The Divine Relativity*, p. 146; Ferm, ed., *An Encyclopedia of Religion*, entry entitled "Aristotle," p. 37; entry entitled "Omnipotence," p. 545 [45].

> We are what the ideal knower knows us to be, our value is that which we have for the ideal valuation, and if we were not thus adequately known and valued, we should have no determinate, objective, public being and value.[92]

Furthermore, Hartshorne holds that God's knowledge is not only the measure of reality; it literally includes all reality. Perfect knowledge, which must be coextensive with all existence includes its objects.[93] Complete knowledge is complete possession.[94] To know all is to include all.[95] The entire system of the actual universe is "wholly internal and immediate to the cosmic mind."[96]

Now suppose, Hartshorne asks, that God's knowing were a self-inclosed reality, with the known objects outside of it.[97] We would then have a total reality, God-and-the-world, which would be more inclusive than either God or the world, taken alone. God would be one constituent of the totality, the world another. "If it is held an impiety that God have constituents, what about the more obvious impiety that he should *be* a mere constituent?"[98]

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[91] The Divine Relativity, p. 124.

[92] Ibid., p. 141.

[93] The Logic of Perfection, p. 120.

[94] Ibid., p. 205.

[95] The Divine Relativity, p. 76; The Logic of Perfection, p. 119.

[96] The Logic of Perfection, p. 198.

[97] Philosophers Speak of God, p. 19.

So far we have been discussing God's omniscience as the basis on which Hartshorne develops his doctrine of the all-inclusiveness of the divine actuality. We turn now to the correlative notion, the nature of the world that is thus included in God's knowledge. We suggested earlier that in order for the world to be constituted as a single organic unity it must be the object of God's intuition in a unique, cosmic, present moment.

Now it is at this point that Hartshorne's temporalistic theism runs counter to two fundamental tenets of contemporary physics, the principle of the relativity of simultaneity and its corollary, the causal independence of contemporary events.[99] For many years Hartshorne stoutly defended precisely what present-day physics has rejected: an absolute simultaneity for all events within a cosmic present moment and prehensive relations among contemporary events.

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[98] *Ibid.* We shall take issue with this in the next chapter.

[99] For an excellent comparative study of the differences between Newtonian and Einsteinian physics see Milеč Čapek, *The Philosophical Impact of Contemporary Physics* (Princeton: Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1961). The following comments on the relativity of simultaneity are taken from an article by Capek, in which the essential content of his book is given a summary treatment. ("Relativity and the Status of Space," *Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. IX, December, 1955, pp. 169-199.) One of the fallacious notions of classical physics was the illegitimate extrapolation of my local "here-now" into a distant "there-now" and eventually into an "everywhere-now." But the whole conceptualization is illegitimate, in fact, contradictory. For it amounts to one

In many of his writings Hartshorne has readily admitted this seeming incompatibility between the cosmology of panentheism and the principles of contemporary physics.[100] He speaks of the need for finding an adequate philosophical solution to the difficulties involved as "one of the most important philosophical tasks of our time."[101]

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observer's being in many places at once, or in calling two events one event. Events which appear simultaneous in one inertial system may not be so in another. It is possible, in fact, that the order of events may be reversed. Hence there is no privileged system of reference. The "elsewhere" does not have instantaneous association with the "here-now." Indeed, there is no such thing as an instantaneous present. Simultaneity does not exist. It is not possible to speak about the "here-now" being related to the "there-now" but only the "there-then." The only relations in the universe are successive temporal relations, spatial relations being merely disguised temporal relations. This is what Whitehead meant when he said that "spatial relations must stretch across time." (*An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge*, Cambridge, 1919, p. 16.) Spatial distance is thus measured by the duration of causal links of the interval of causal independence. This interval of "co-presence," as it is often called, is always double the duration of the corresponding causal links.

[100] *The Logic of Perfection*, xi, p. 205, fn. 6; *Philosophers Speak of God,* p. 11; "Whitehead's Philosophy of Reality as Socially-Structured Process," *op. cit.*, p. 68 [87]; *The Divine Relativity*, p. 99; "Present Prospects for Metaphysics," *op. cit.*, p. 205 [145]; "The Divine Relativity and Absoluteness: A Reply," *op. cit.*, pp. 58ff. [69].

[101] *Philosophers Speak of God*, p. 11.

Since it is hardly possible to posit an absolute simultaneity without also advocating an interdependence of contemporary events that constitutes the given totality or wholeness of the world in a particular cosmic moment, we shall begin by discussing Hartshorne's doctrine of contemporary relations. However, our discussion must be immediately qualified by one important observation.

Recently Hartshorne seems to have given up the position that there is a mutual immanence or causal relatedness among contemporary events. Nevertheless, the affirmation of this heterodox view seems to have been a basic tenet in the development of panentheism. It becomes important, therefore, to find out what repercussions his subsequent relinquishing of this position have for his doctrine of God. Our procedure will be to document Hartshorne's earlier position regarding contemporary relations and an absolute simultaneity for God, and then to ascertain in the next chapter how the changes he has made affect the correlation between God and the world as envisioned by panentheism.

Present-day physics admits only two fundamental relations in the universe, causal succession and contemporary independence.[102] Contemporaneity is thus the absence of causal influence or relation. Two events are contemporary if neither is internal to the other. Internality is therefore an affair of the past. Contemporaries are externally related and hence mutually independent. As Whitehead has expressed it:

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[102] Čapek, "Relativity and the Status of Space," *op. cit.*, p. 190; cf. Čapek, *Philosophical Impact of Contemporary Physics*, pp. 214-222.

> It is the definition of contemporary events that they happen in causal independence of each other. Thus two contemporary occasions are such that neither belongs to the past of the other. The two occasions are not in any direct relation of efficient causation. The vast causal independence of contemporary occasions is the preservative of the elbow-room within the Universe . . . . Our claim for freedom is rooted in our relationship to our contemporary environment. Nature does provide a field for independent activities. The understanding of the Universe requires that we conceive in their proper relations to each other the various roles, of efficient causation, of teleological self-creation, and of contemporary independence.[103]

Against this position and in spite of the difficulties involved, Hartshorne affirmed consistently that an "unqualified inclusiveness of prehension" (with the exception of earlier in relation to later events in time) is actually required by Whitehead's philosophy.[104]

This is true, Hartshorne maintained, for at least two reasons. First, the alleged externality of contemporary relations violates Whitehead's ontological principle.

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[103] Adventures of Ideas, p. 251; cf. Process and Reality, p. 345.

[104] "On Some Criticisms of Whitehead's Philosophy," op. cit., p. 334 [15].

Second, absence of relation among contemporaries would lead to a vicious regress. Let us now examine each of Hartshorne's contentions in some detail.

First of all, to say that contemporary occasions are external to one another, that they do not involve each other as individuals, seems to violate Whitehead's "ontological principle," according to which everything, in order to be at all, must be in some actual unit of experience.[105] But if the relations between contemporaries are external to all actual entities, then such relations would seem to be nowhere at all and hence would lack the ontological requisite for being factors within experience.[106]

In the second place, such externality or absence of relation among contemporaries would lead, according to Hartshorne, to a form of vicious regress emphasized by

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[105] "Whitehead's Theory of Knowledge," op. cit., p. 375 [34].

[106] Ibid. However, it may be argued in defense of Whitehead's position that Hartshorne's criticism is invalid, for contemporary occasions are not really "suspended," as it were, without any grounding in actuality. A contemporary occasion is related to its own causal antecedents, and it may also be related to the past causal links which form the heritage of a present event with which it is now contemporary. Hartshorne would seem, in effect, to be trying to give ontological status to a relation which is really no relation at all. His subsequent affirmation of the causal independence of contemporaries seems compatible with Whitehead's ontological principle, if the foregoing observations are taken into consideration.

Bradley against which there is no defense.[107]

> For if entities are mutually external and are both concrete, then their relations can belong to neither of them nor to anything more concrete which embraces them; and we can only say that the terms have to the relations the relation of being actually related by them, and this obviously involves an endless regress of the kind which is vicious because it must end if the terms are to be related.[108]

There seem to be two ways in which regress may be avoided. On the one hand, one might assert that if there is no real relation among contemporaries as such, they are nevertheless together and hence are related in the consequent nature of God. This would seem to cancel out the asserted externality, for the consequent nature of God is in turn prehended by the contemporaries, which in turn prehend the contents of the consequent nature. Therefore each prehends the other without any lapse of time.[109] In short, if all occasions are immanent in God, and he in turn is immanent in them, are they not, then, immanent in each other?[110] "For, since God is not spatially separated from things, it seems no definite lapse of time can occur either between his prehension of them or theirs of him."[111]

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[107] Man's Vision of God, p. 287.

[108] Ibid., pp. 287f.

[109] "Whitehead's Theory of Knowledge," op. cit., p. 375 [34]; cf. "Is Whitehead's God the God of Religion?" op. cit., p. 222 [35].

[110] "Whitehead's Idea of God," op. cit., p. 545 [27]. That this is the outcome of Whitehead's position is sustained by John Wilcox in a recent article where he writes that Whitehead's God "has an objectification of a cosmic present and leaves the world still receiving an objectification of the divine present for which there is no scientific evidence."

In The Divine Relativity Hartshorne continued to defend the need for a mutual immanence among contemporary events, although one is more cognizant now of the growing difficulty Hartshorne has of reconciling contemporary relations with his virtually axiomatic insistence that time has an asymmetrical structure.

> The particular, succeeding subject prehends the more general, preceding object; and this relation relativizes the particular prehender to the prehended, the successor to the predecessor, the particular to the general, but not conversely.[112]

Nevertheless, Hartshorne cleverly proposed as an exception to the above principle and as an alternative to the view of present-day physics the notion that contemporary events may

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("A Question from Physics for Certain Theists," (The Journal of Religion, Vol. XLI, No. 4 (October, 1961), p. 297.)

[111] "Whitehead's Idea of God," op. cit., p. 545 [27]; cf. "On Some Criticisms of Whitehead's Philosophy," op. cit., p. 334 [15]. To adopt this position, however, would seem to involve embarrassing consequences for Hartshorne in another vein. If God is contemporaneously related to events in their very act of becoming, then it would seem that his knowledge of a given event, which by definition is omniscient to the minutest detail, would preclude any internal freedom on the part of the event. As we shall see below, Hartshorne attempts to circumvent this difficulty by holding that two contemporary occasions may be mutually determining and hence each may be partly free in relation to the other. (The Divine Relativity, pp. 98f.)

[112] The Divine Relativity, p. 98, italics his.

be mutually interdependent.[113] If there is no interaction between present events and those of the past or future, then it seems that contemporaries must either have no action upon one another, or there must be action both ways.[114] Hartshorne is able to make this proposal from the standpoint of his pansubjective ontology. Suppose a subject S knows a contemporary C. According to Hartshorne's realistic epistemology,[115] it is the subject that is relative to the object, the knower to the known, thus preserving the independence of the object. Hence this would not mean, of itself, any relativity of C to S. But Hartshorne suggests the possibility of a reverse relation of C to S other than the "non-genuine one" of C's merely being known by S. If C is another knowing subject, S^2, then there may be a mutual awareness between S^1 and S^2.

> Each would enter into the other, not merely as knower but as known-knower. Everything known, even a knower of oneself as known, is constitutive of the knower by

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[113] Ibid., p. 98.

[114] Ibid., p. 99; "The Compound Individual," op. cit., p. 209 [16]; cf. "The Interpretation of Whitehead (Reply to John W. Blyth)," op. cit., pp. 422f. [22]; "The Divine Relativity and Absoluteness: A Reply," op. cit., p. 59 [69].

[115] See above, Chapter II, p. 48; also Reality as Social Process, pp. 69ff.

which it is known.[116]

As plausible as this alternative seems to have been, given the acceptability of panpsychism, Hartshorne evidently was not fully satisfied with the proposal. For immediately after the last sentence quoted he writes: "The topic of contemporary relations bristles with difficulties, and I shall only say that _if_ I could find a consistent analysis of it, I should be able to die content, so far as philosophical achievements are concerned. At present the topic seems the most vulnerable point in the surrelativist doctrine."[117]

In Hartshorne's reply to John Wild's lengthy review of _The Divine Relativity_ he is still unable to affirm the notion that contemporary events are unrelated.

> For they seem to have the relation of co-existence, or rather, of co-occurrence. If this is not a real relation in them, it must be a relation in some mind considering them, above all, God's. But then there is a problem of God as, in a certain phase, contemporary with us in a certain phase.

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[116] _The Divine Relativity_, p. 99; a similar discussion is given in _Reality as Social Process_, pp. 76f. While this may be a plausible solution among non-omniscient contemporaries, it seems inadmissible where an omniscient individual is concerned. For it is difficult to see how there could be any genuine _mutuality_ where the degree of determination (if the extent of _knowledge_ be the index of determination) is categorically supreme in the case of the divine individual.

[117] _The Divine Relativity_, p. 99, italics his.

> So I suspect (not too happily) that one must admit real relations between contemporary happenings.[118]

We turn now to Hartshorne's doctrine of cosmic simultaneity. He is of course not unaware of the tremendous difficulty of reconciling the "creative advance" of the world with the denial of an absolute simultaneity by relativity physics.[119] He recognizes the implications of the finite velocity of light for our physical theories of the universe.[120] He admits that relativity physics does not allow for instantaneous activity on a pervasive cosmic scale, and he acknowledges this to be "a serious complication, though not, I believe, an insuperable difficulty for our thesis."[121] In another place he speaks of the problem of correlating the divine time of cosmic becoming with worldly time as understood by contemporary physical theory as "a neglected and apparently extremely formidable task."[122]

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[118] "The Divine Relativity and Absoluteness: A Reply," op. cit., p. 59 [69]. He adds the following comment at the close of the discussion: " . . . I am greatly troubled about the problem of contemporaries, which leads straight into questions about physical relativity where I always seem to become confused".

[119] The Logic of Perfection, p. xi.

[120] Ibid., p. 204.

[121] Ibid., p. 205, footnote 6.

[122] "Present Prospects for Metaphysics," op. cit., p. 205 [145].

One can find at least two reasons why Hartshorne rejects the supposition that the contemporaneity recognized by Einstein is the only contemporaneity that there can be.[123]

In the first place, the unity of the universe lies deeper than the considerations of our physical theories can make clear. All groups short of the universe may break up in various ways and degrees, but there is and can be no secession from the cosmic community.[124] If anything exists in time and space, Hartshorne affirms, then "God exists as the eternal and omnipresent unity of space-time, without which that unity is not positively conceivable."[125] In Newton's phrase, space-time is the "sensorium of God," the unity of his all-sympathetic mind.[126] The concrete character of God and the concrete unity of the universe are the same.[127] The actuality of God is the "total actual being of a given moment, with all achieved determinations."[128] The concrete state of God at a given moment, God-now, constitutes the togetherness of the world-now, which is a single, momentary whole in space.[129]

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[123] In an article on "The Contemporary World," Review of Metaphysics, Vol. VI, No. 4 (June, 1953), pp. 525-538, Paul Weiss speaks of six kinds of contemporaneity that may be contrasted with the Einsteinian conception.

[124] The Logic of Perfection, p. 204.

[125] Man's Vision of God, pp. 273f.

[126] Ibid., p. 279.

[127] "Santayana's Doctrine of Essence," in Schilpp, ed., op. cit., p. 180 [25].

[128] The Divine Relativity, p. 88.

A second reason why Hartshorne upholds the need for an absolute, cosmic simultaneity is that this is apparently the only way in which a real division may be effected between the actual and the potential, the determinate past and the indeterminate future.[130] The alternative view, which is the simplest way to interpret the Minkowski manifold of events in space-time, is to hold that all reality constitutes an Eleatic totality which never becomes and never receives any additions but simply is.[131] However, Hartshorne rejects this position as having no meaning, for the idea of an eternally fixed total content of "all time" is a contradiction in terms.[132] Hartshorne shares with Peirce the view that time is "objective modality."

> It unites determinate, actual, past reality with indeterminate, potential, future reality. This union is perpetually enriched by new actualities, and there can, by the very meaning of time

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[129] Man's Vision of God, p. 211.

[130] "Outlines of a Philosophy of Nature," Part II, op. cit., p. 382 [111]; Man's Vision of God, p. 140.

[131] "Outlines of a Philosophy of Nature," Part II, op. cit., p. 382 [111]; Philosophers Speak of God, p. 11.

[132] Philosophers Speak of God, p. 11.

> or process, be no ultimate totality of actualities for anyone to know.[133]

Hartshorne thus comes to the conclusion that given the two alternatives: (1) God has an absolute simultaneity but it is not in principle communicable to us; and (2) There is no absolute simultaneity for God; the first is more acceptable. "I incline, with fear and trembling, to prefer the first alternative, that God knows an absolute simultaneity which is systematically concealed from us, this concealment being part of the basic order of the world."[134] Such a conception can be of no interest to physics because, on the one hand, human observation is local and not cosmic,[135] and, on the other hand, if God were to communicate his simultaneity to us, he would have to do it at an infinite velocity, which would utterly confute our physical theories.[136]

In summary, we have seen that Hartshorne's doctrine of the divine actuality involves two principles--contemporary relations and absolute simultaneity--that are at variance with the accepted tenets of relativity physics. We have noted Hartshorne's concern with this vulnerable point in his doctrine of God, but we have also seen his persistent defense of panentheism in spite of the difficulties involved. We turn now in the concluding chapter to a consideration of Hartshorne's changed point of view regarding contemporary relations and its implications for his whole theological program.

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[133] Ibid.

[134] "Outlines of a Philosophy of Nature," Part II, op. cit., p. 382 [111].

[135] Man's Vision of God, p. 140; "Whitehead's Idea of God," in Schilpp, ed., op. cit., pp. 545f. [27]; Philosophers Speak of God, p. 11.

[136] "Outlines of a Philosophy of Nature," Part II, op. cit., p. 382 [111].

CHAPTER IX

A CRITIQUE OF PANENTHEISM

In the last chapter it was pointed out that Hartshorne has evidently given up his earlier position regarding the mutual immanence of contemporary occasions. Our purpose in this chapter will be to examine the implications of this shift for Hartshorne's doctrine of God. Since the philosophy of panentheism was developed with a consistent rejection of contemporary independence, we should expect that Hartshorne's theological position would not remain uneffected by this change of position.

We have previously noted that Hartshorne regards the doctrine of temporal asymmetry as "the absolute principle."[1] In a close paraphrase of a letter Hartshorne wrote to William Christian, dated March 1, 1959, John Wilcox writes:

> Now Hartshorne did not defend for long, either as an interpretation of Whitehead or as true, the view of mutual sharing between contemporaries, and in the years since he raised our question [the problem of reconciling a temporalistic theism

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[1] "Present Prospects For Metaphysics," op. cit., p. 203 [145]; cf. "The Structure of Givenness," op. cit., p. 25 [129].

> with relativity physics], the temporal asymmetry of prehensive relations has become almost axiomatic for him.[2]

Nevertheless, it must be pointed out parenthetically that even if temporal asymmetry be given a kind of axiomatic status in Hartshorne's thought, this would not, as such, necessarily preclude his also affirming contemporary relations at the same time. In fact, Hartshorne has consistently affirmed both together for many years,[3] and this tends, it would seem, to mitigate the intended forcefulness of the above comment by Wilcox. Temporal asymmetry is concerned with the irreversible, one-way directionality of the structure of time, from the determinate past to an unsettled, indeterminate future. But since contemporaneity concerns relationship neither to the past nor to the future (except in the oblique sense in which contemporary events may experience pasts and/or futures which partially coincide), it is not intrinsically incompatible with a doctrine of asymmetrical temporality.

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[2] "A Question from Physics for Certain Theists," *op. cit.*, p. 297. It seems that the "long" referred to above is somewhat longer than Wilcox (or perhaps Hartshorne) is willing to admit. The 1964 edition to *The Divine Relativity* makes no change or editorial comment that would lead the reader to feel that Hartshorne has changed his position. The same may be said for the almost cavalier manner in which he brushes aside the problem in the preface to *The Logic of Perfection* (1962, p. xl).

[3] Cf. "The Compound Individual," *op. cit.*, pp. 207f. [16] and *The Divine Relativity*, p. 98. It is for this reason that there is some difficulty in documenting a precise point at which Hartshorne gives up his controversial stand on contemporary relations. There appears to have been a fundamental ambiguity in his thought on this issue. While his subsequent rejection of prehension among contemporaries has cleared up the ambiguity in this regard, it does raise, as we shall see, some difficulties for the doctrine of panentheism.

Let us now turn to Hartshorne's new position regarding contemporary relations. The shifting of views seems to have grown out of reflection on the logical structure of experience. Experience, Hartshorne holds, is always _of_ something, the objective givenness of which is distinguishable from the experience in which it is given.[4] Moreover, there is no present self-contained event which is given as such, for "givenness is itself a causal and temporal arrow pointing backwards and outwards in space-time, and indeed it is an actual grasp of events whose beginning was independent of the present event."[5] In short, the subject-object structure is fundamentally the present-past structure. Al direct awareness is memory of the past.[6] Only past events, which are fully determined, are ready to be experienced.[7] In direct response to a question put to him by William A. Christian,

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[4] "The Logical Structure of Givenness," _op. cit._, p. 308 [114]. See chapter II above, pp. 45ff.

[5] "The Structure of Givenness," _op. cit._, pp. 37f, italics mine [129].

[6] _Ibid._, p. 37.

[7] "Hume's Metaphysics and Its Present-Day Influence," _op. cit._, p. 162 [127].

Hartshorne clearly indicates his changed attitude: "Since an event can, on my view, be intrinsically related to another only by having it as datum, and it scarcely seems that two events can each be datum for the other, it appears that contemporaries (events not past or future relative to one another) cannot have intrinsic relatedness."[8]

Furthermore, space, or symmetry, is defined through time, or nonsymmetry.[9] In terms of momentary experiences all action is temporal or one-way. But where enduring individuals are involved, that is, where there are two streams of genetically related individuals, there may be a partial interdependence or two-way action. But note, this partial interdependence is _never_ between contemporary events in the parallel series of experiences. Contemporaries do not have experience of one another _qua_ contemporaries; they are mutually independent.[10] "But both experience pasts or causes which in part coincide, and both will have future effects which will partially coincide, and this partial coincidence of causes and effects just is the spatial order."[11] Space is thus the multiplicity of partially interdependent temporal series. Events inherit from their own pasts as well as the pasts of events with which they are contemporary.[12]

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[8] Sydney and Beatrice Rome, eds., _Philosophical Interrogations_ (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964), p. 324.

[9] "The Structure of Givenness," _op. cit._, p. 29 [129].

[10] _Ibid._, p. 30. In _The Divine Relativity_ Hartshorne had said contemporaries are "mutually interdependent." (p. 98)

So much, then, seems clear: Hartshorne has made a definite break from his earlier position regarding contemporary relations. We must now ask what implications this change has for his doctrine of God.

There can be no doubt that the problem of contemporary relations has troubled Hartshorne for many years. Even though he has long been aware of his variance with Whitehead and present-day physics in this matter, he has consistently resisted altering his position for reasons we have considered in the last chapter.

Now if Hartshorne has subsequently come to accept as axiomatic the causal independence of contemporary events--and the above documentation, along with comments Hartshorne has made in conversation with the author, leave no doubt in the matter--then it appears to be evident that he has not sufficiently reflected on the implications of this shift for his doctrine of God.

It is our contention that if the notion of a contemporary world with which God is in unison of becoming is not intrinsically incompatible with panentheism in general (as we shall indicate later in this chapter), it does seem to be incongruent with Hartshorne's particular version of the doctrine. Indeed, we shall presently argue that this change in Hartshorne's position regarding contemporary relations actually introduces a fundamental inconsistency in his thought that implicates his theism in precisely the kind of incoherency that has always been the locus of his own vigorous polemic against traditional theisms.

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[11] "The Structure of Givenness," _op. cit._, pp. 29 f. [129].

[12] _Ibid._, p. 29.

There are several ways in which the above inconsistency might be eliminated. In the first place, Hartshorne could conceivably exempt God from the causal independence that he now accepts as qualifying at least the relations between all non-divine contemporary events.

However, this alternative would amount to making God the categorical exception to a general metaphysical principle. That is to say, while the principle of causal independence entails a mutual exclusiveness or non-immanence of the subjectivity of coexisting occasions which are contemporary with one another, God presumably could share in the immediacy of every becoming occasion. For reasons we have already considered, this notion would seem to threaten the autonomous individuality that characterizes all becoming actualities. We maintain that the creative self-determination of every occasion must be an objectively given datum even for God; otherwise God's knowledge would preempt the subjectively unique individuality and freedom of each becoming occasion. To argue that of course God does not know beforehand the precise way in which an occasion will be actualized but that he only knows the details of actualization as they occur (in distinction from after they have occurred) does not mitigate the problem. We are still left with the question of the status of the word "as" in the preceding sentence. Granted that God may not predetermine how an occasion shall be actualized, I still do not see how Hartshorne can escape the fact that God nevertheless determines or at least co-determines the definite individuality of every becoming occasion. But if the subjective immediacy of all becoming actuality is contemporaneously shared by God, then to that extent the unique, *sui generis* individuality in becoming occasions is lost in God's inclusive subjectivity, where all privacy is forfeit to be shared publicity of the many that have become integrated into the unity of the divine experience. I can see no way out of the problems generated by this first alternative--except to admit that the immediacy of the presently becoming world which is contemporary with God is excluded from his experience.

In the second place, Hartshorne might maintain that the whole notion of a contemporary world that is independent of

God's subjectivity is inadmissible. In fact, Hartshorne once gave me the impression in conversation that this was his position. However, since he has not indicated his views in this regard in writing as yet, I shall only consider this as a plausible alternative and offer my own criticism of its deficiency.

This view really amounts to the denial of any ontological status to the mode of becoming; there is only the determinate world of definite actuality and the determinable but indefinite realm of possibility. Given these assumptions, however, it seems that one would be driven to account for the arrival of novelty in the world by either one of two equally inadequate ways. Either (1) the creative advance of the world would have to be derived solely from God,since fully actualized events only have the status of objects and not subjects and hence would not possess any element of indeterminate individuality by which one could account for the presence of novelty in the world; or (2) creativity would have to be explained in terms of possibility. Here again the alternative appears to be untenable, however. For freedom of self-determination must have a more definite foothold in reality than mere possibility. The realm of potentiality is deficient of any agency whereby the pure possibility of novelty may become actualized into some definite instance of creative individuality. It seems, therefore, that we must give some status to the world of indefinite actuality, in which becoming occasions creatively integrate the manifold possibilities of past actuality into the subjective immediacy of their own experience and in turn bequeath their own fully achieved definiteness to the ongoing world process.

Since neither of the above alternatives appears to be defensible, it would seem that the shift in Hartshorne's position regarding contemporary relations must be understood as having unqualified relevance and applicability to the whole of his philosophy, and hence, a fortiori, to his doctrine of God. We turn, then, to a third possibility in which internal consistency is achieved only at the expense of revising some of the basic tenets in Hartshorne's concept of God.

Our argument may be formulated in the following thesis statements: (1) By relinquishing his earlier position concerning the mutual immanence of contemporary occasions, and by adopting the view that contemporaries are causally unrelated to one another, Hartshorne has undermined the fundamental idealistic axiom upon which the whole edifice of his philosophical theology is built: namely, the assumption that to be is to be known by God, and that God's knowledge is not only the measure of reality but that it literally includes all reality. (2) When this basic idealistic assumption is called in question by a view of relations that allows for a contemporary world which is experientially and hence cognitively independent of the divine actuality, then several aspects of Hartshorne's doctrine of God (which were originally formulated so as to require for their intelligibility a cosmic contemporaneity) no longer appear to be defensible: (A) The description of the divine essence as the all-pervasive factor of reality becomes inconsistent with the affirmation of a contemporary world vis-a-vis the divine actuality. (B) Insofar as Hartshorne's formulation of the ontological argument is dependent upon the acceptance of the divine essence as coextensive with all reality, it too becomes forfeit to an unacceptable inconsistency. (C) To the extent that the panentheistic principle of the inclusiveness of the divine actuality rests on Hartshorne's view of the omniscience of God, this must be amended to allow for a more clear-cut distinction between God and the world.

We turn now to a detailed examination of the first thesis statement above, after which we shall show the implications of denying that omniscience is the measure of reality for those aspects of Hartshorne's doctrine of God that are enumerated in statement two above.

In the last chapter we mentioned Hartshorne's affinities with the idealistic epistemology of Berkeley and Royce. We may now summarize his position in the following propositions:

(1) Reality is to be defined in terms of experience or knowledge.

(2) Because of the uncertainty, doubt and inconsistency that render all human knowing imperfect, there is a non-coincidence of things as they are known by us and things as they are in themselves.

(3) Human knowledge, therefore, cannot be regarded as an adequate measure of reality.

(4) This awareness of the distinction between what we know and reality leads us to surmise the possibility of knowledge more perfect than ours.

(5) Since our human knowing only partially fulfills such internal characteristics of knowledge as consistency, clarity and certainty, we are led to posit an ideal form of knowledge that entirely meets these criteria.

(6) Reality must therefore be what the internally perfect knowledge has as its presented content.

(7) If the real consists in its relation to the adequate knower, then to be is to be known by God.

My concern at this point is not to criticize the above propositions by offering an alternative set of assumptions, such as those that a realist might put forth. Rather I would like to point out the internal incompatibility of the cumulative argument in the above propositions with the shift in Hartshorne's thought regarding contemporary relations. This may be done by analyzing several of Hartshorne's basic assumptions and then showing the inconsistency that obtains between them.

(1) Knowledge is a relation between the knower and the known, such that (A) the object term is externally related to the knower (that is, could have been what it is apart from that particular relation), while (B) the knower or subject term is genuinely (rather than nominally) related to the object term (that is, is constituted or made what it presently is by having relation to the object term).

(2) Reality or the real is to be defined in terms of its relation to the adequate knower.

(3) Since the causal independence of contemporary events implies the absence of relation between them, God does not prehend the presently becoming world which is contemporary with him.

Now it follows that if the real is what is related to God [by assumptions (1) and (2)], then either (A) there can be no contemporary, i.e., causally unrelated, world vis-a-vis the divine actuality [contrary to assumption (3)]; or (B) it is not the case that to be is to be known by God [contrary to (2)]. In short, we are left with two alternative disjunctions, one of which (A) is incompatible with Hartshorne's present views on contemporaneity, the other (B) with the essential idealistic foundation of his theism. Since it is our contention that Hartshorne's recent endorsement of contemporary independence is a long overdue concession to present-day physics, we maintain that consistency cannot be achieved at the expense of affirming the first disjunct. Hence we conclude that the second alternative is Hartshorne's only viable option, namely, that part of the real world, that which is in unison of becoming with God, is not known by God and that omniscience cannot, without qualification, be said to be the measure of reality.

Now if the above line of reasoning can be sustained, then our conclusion has some significant implications for particular aspects of Hartshorne's doctrine of God. We turn to an examination of our second thesis statement that was mentioned above on page 266.

In chapter VI we pointed out that Hartshorne really has two distinct though not incompatible views of the divine essence. We now further contend that the second of these positions, namely the view that the divine essence is immanently pervasive of the given actual world, can be sustained only on the basis of the rejected assumption that omniscience is the measure of reality. That is to say, to affirm, as Hartshorne does, that the divine essence is the universally immanent and abstract constituent of all things is rendered intelligible only on the epistemological analogy of an infallible knower who prehends the presently becoming world which is contemporaneous with Him.

However, if the denial of contemporary relations entails a fundamental distinction between God and the world, such that God and the presently becoming world are mutually independent of one another, then Hartshorne's doctrine of the divine essence collapses along with the Berkeleyan foundation which was its raison d'être.

This may be illustrated by the following difficulty which arises, given Hartshorne's original view. If the divine essence is held to be coextensive with the world, then, on the assumption that contemporary events are causally unrelated, Hartshorne would in effect be making the embarrassing assertion that that which is not God, that is, the presently becoming world which is contemporaneously independent of the divine actuality, is nevertheless qualified by what is supposedly the defining characteristic of God's actuality: the divine essence itself! The only way in which Hartshorne can retain the view of the divine essence as coextensive with the actual world seems to be at the expense of once again affirming his recently rejected position regarding contemporary relations. In short, only two alternatives would appear to be open to Hartshorne if his doctrine of God is to remain internally coherent. Either (1) he must deny that God's essence is the absolutely pervasive factor of reality, or (2) he must surrender the notion of contemporary independence which makes it possible for there to be a world which is experientially distinct from the divine fullness. Since the second alternative would undermine significant gains resulting from his shift in position, his only option seems to be a rejection of the view that God's essence is coextensive with the actual world.

Furthermore, since Hartshorne's doctrine of the divine essence is the distinctive element in the neoclassical reformulation of the ontological argument, it now becomes possible to take issue with the argument on an entirely different basis than the one used by most of Hartshorne's critics.[13]

In chapter VII we showed that only a dipolar theism such as Hartshorne's is able to overcome the logical type difficulty (the Findlay paradox) which turns the traditional Anselmian form of the ontological argument into a disproof.[14] By making a distinction between the contingent actuality and the necessary essence of deity, Hartshorne is able to counter the objection that from an abstract definition of God His concrete existence is illegitimately inferred. Since on

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[13] The author's own critique at the end of chapter VII is an example of another line of attack, which, incidently, Hartshorne claims to have resisted successfully in The Logic of Perfection. Perhaps the different approach taken in this chapter will be less vulnerable to his rebuttal.

[14] See above, pp. 188ff.

Hartshorne's view the divine existence does not refer to God's concrete particularity but only to his abstract essence, it follows that the kind of "existence" which his form of the argument seeks to demonstrate has no reference to the concrete actuality of the divine individual but only to the a priori necessity that the divine essence always be given some particular embodiment or other. Hence it can now be seen that the defensibility of the argument ultimately rests upon Hartshorne's doctrine of the divine essence.

Now if the argument is concerned with the existential status of the divine essence rather than the divine actuality, it is obvious that such status must be unqualifiedly necessary, for the point of the argument is to demonstrate the incompatibility between contingency and perfection. What, however, is Hartshorne's criterion of necessity? It is precisely that which we have contended cannot be legitimately affirmed if we take his recent view on relations seriously--namely, the coextensiveness of the divine essence with all actuality, which notion, we have seen, is dependent upon the idealistic premise of an omniscient mind in terms of whose contents reality is to be defined. Having rejected the basic epistemological foundation of Hartshorne's thought as being axiomatically irreconcilable with the mutual exclusiveness of contemporary occasions, we therefore conclude that neither his doctrine of the divine essence nor the reformulation of the ontological argument which is systematically dependent on it can be sustained.

Moreover, Hartshorne's doctrine of the divine actuality must be reworked so as to eliminate any tendency to speak of it as all-inclusive without qualification or to identify it simpliciter with all actuality as such. (That Hartshorne clearly does this may be cited from The Logic of Perfection, p. 38, where he says: " . . . the divine actuality is all-actuality," and again: "His actuality . . . is all-inclusive.")

The reason that Hartshorne makes this kind of affirmation is because the idealistic structure of his theism inclines him to conceive of perfection in terms of wholeness or all-inclusiveness. There can be nothing in addition to God, taken as the all-inclusive whole of reality. If that were not the case, Hartshorne argues, then God would be only a part of reality, albeit the supreme constituent. But, the religious consciousness would be offended by the impiety of a totality, God-and-the-world, which would be greater than God alone. In sum, if God is not all-inclusive, then the concept of perfection would be nullified by that than which something greater could be conceived, namely the togetherness of God and whatever else there may be. Nevertheless, this is precisely what does happen to Hartshorne's conception of perfection when the all-inclusiveness of God is amended in favor of a view which allows for an ontological distinction between God and the world. However, this does not in any way imply the consequent imperfection of deity, for Hartshorne's categories still enable him to speak of God as "the all-surpassing surpasser of all"--a conception which clearly conveys the notion of perfection (AR) without the connotation of all-inclusive, metaphysical wholeness.

So far in this chapter we have shown those aspects of Hartshorne's panentheism which are incongruent with the notion of a contemporary world with which God is in unison of becoming. Yet while it is clear that Hartshorne developed his panentheistic conception of God in terms of a mutual immanence of contemporary events, it seems quite possible that with some modifications his doctrine of God may be readily amenable to his subsequent acceptance of the principle of causal independence among contemporaries. It now remains for us to show what changes would have to be made in Hartshorne's theism in such a way that we might reconcile the inclusivist principle of panentheism with the doctrine of the mutual, non-prehensive exclusiveness of contemporary occasions.

Contrary to what might be expected, the distinctive panentheistic principle that God literally contains or includes the world need not be jettisoned if one accepts the non-prehension of contemporary occasions. We shall show how this is possible by affirming panentheism against one of Hartshorne's most astute critics, William A. Christian, who vigorously rejects it, while at the same time siding with Christian in his insistence that the notion of contemporary independence is categorically required in a Whiteheadian ontology.

Christian has staunchly insisted that God cannot include the de facto totality of events in the world, not only because the non-immanence of contemporary events in one another or in God precludes this possibility, but also because his particular interpretation of the non-overlapping of the regions of actual occasions (to use his Whiteheadian language) invalidates the whole-part analogy of panentheism. We shall briefly examine Christian's position to see whether his contentions are really able to undermine the inclusiveness principle of panentheism.

In the first place, Christian rejects the panentheistic notion that God literally includes the world because he holds that the extensive relations between regions of actual occasions are always external, which is to say that no two regions ever overlap or have parts in common.[15] Christian asserts: " . . . the region of an actual occasion is exclusive of the region of any other occasion. No two actual occasions have any spatial-temporal parts in common."[16] Moreover, because God is interpreted by Christian to be an actual entity (in distinction from the Hartshornian conception of God as the inclusive, ordered society of all other societies), he is consequently able to say that "God does not have any region or extensive standpoint which might include finite and externally connected regions."[17]

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[15] An Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), pp. 93ff.

Christian's second reason for rejecting panentheism is based on his contention that causal independence among contemporaries precludes the possibility of there literally being an all-inclusive reality. If contemporary events are in unison of becoming and hence are mutually exclusive, then God as contemporary with the presently becoming world cannot contain the contemporary world within his experience. Christian maintains that this mutual independence among contemporaries is not affirmed simply because of the fact that light travels at a finite velocity and therefore spatially distant events cannot interact simultaneously. Rather the categorical reason for mutual independence of contemporary occasions is, to use Christian's words,

> that otherwise there could be no unified satisfaction and hence no completion of the concrescence. There must be a duration when the concrescence is closed to

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[16] Ibid., p. 104.

[17] Ibid., p. 394.

> further physical data, so that the multiplicity of physical data in its initial phase may be inwardly absorbed into a unity of feeling.[18]

Now we maintain that it is possible to agree fully with Christian in this latter contention regarding the autonomy of each becoming occasion without accepting his former position that the regions of actual occasions must be mutually exclusive. Expressed otherwise, the causal independence of contemporary occasions does not necessarily entail a mutual externality between God and the presently becoming world. Christian's insistence that independence and externality presuppose one another may be more the result of his attempt to make Whitehead's concept of God conform to the traditional theological distinction between God and the world than it is the result of a legitimate implication or faithful rendering of Whitehead's categories. However, whether or not Christian has correctly interpreted Whitehead is not so much the point at issue as the question of the possibility of reconciling the causal independence of contemporary events with the all-inclusiveness of God.

This may be done in the following manner. God may be thought of as literally containing the world in the sense that nothing is outside of, or external to, the all-inclusive unity of reality taken as a whole. That is to say, God as the unitary whole is spatially-temporally inclusive of the individual entities in the world. This means, contrary to Christian's position, that God's region is inclusive of all other regions, or what is the same thing expressed somewhat differently, God is not limited to any particular, finite perspective as defined by some region that might be only partially inclusive of other regions and hence, by implication, exclusive of still others.

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[18] _Ibid._, p. 331.

Nevertheless, while God's region is inclusive of all others in the sense that there is nothing additional to the all-embracing, synthetic whole of reality--as if a part (per impossible) might somehow be outside of the whole of which it is a constituent--it does not necessarily follow that the individual parts of this whole all need to be related to one another or to the inclusive whole at any given moment. Indeed, to assume this latter position would be to commit the fallacy of regarding the parts as determined by the integrative activity of the whole taken as "organic." Or it would amount to the denial of causal independence among parts which are contemporary with one another, or, similarly, the denial of contemporary independence between certain of the parts and the whole, if the whole be understood as a complex, synthetic unity having a distinct individuality of its own over and above the multiplicity of the parts.

We contend, therefore, that it is logically possible to say that God is spatially-temporally inclusive of the world while at the same time denying that God must be experientially coextensive with all aspects of it. At no time is there a single, all-comprehensive experience which literally includes all other experiences. Inclusiveness is compatible with independence, though not with externality. God and the presently becoming world coexist in a "unison of becoming" during which neither shares the immediate subjectivity of the other. The world that God does prehend, therefore, is always the past actual world--that multiplicity of events which has already become and hence is objectively available as a given datum to be prehended.

The denial of prehensive relations among contemporary events that are spatially distant from one another gives rise to what we referred to in the preceding chapter as the relativity of simultaneity. The absence of any physical evidence for an absolute, cosmic simultaneity is preservative of what Whitehead called the "elbowroom" in the universe. There seems to be no intelligible meaning to the notion of an instantaneous cross-section of all reality in a given moment of time. This is the fallacy of trying to spatialize time, of thinking in terms of events that are "there-now" rather than "there-then." Instead of an absolute simultaneity at a given moment, there is a "simultaneity of fluxes," a situation similar to polyphonic harmony in music, where a note of music is nothing at an instant but requires a whole period of time to manifest itself.[19]

However, the rejection of a cosmic simultaneity does not necessarily entail the abandonment of an absolute simultaneity for God, because in this instance the question of simultaneity is not at all a function of the transmission of causal influences at a finite velocity. Since God is not spatially localized in such a fashion that there would be a durational lapse of time between any occurrence and his prehension of it, it follows that God immediately intuits every event after it has become fully actualized. Hence the content of God's unitary experience is always the determinate past, never the world which is contemporary with him. But, once again, it must be emphasized that the contemporary world vis-a-vis the divine present moment is not spatially external to, but only independent of, God's experience.

We turn now to a difficult problem that invariably arises in a temporalistic theism such as Hartshorne's when the attempt is made to reconcile omniscience and the relativity of simultaneity. We have argued that the principle of causal independence among contemporary events must be sustained even in the case of God's relation to the world, with the consequence that only the past actual world is experientially prehended by God. However, while God does not prehend events which are contemporary with him, virtually all of these events in his past actual world are themselves contemporary with one another in varying degrees of durational independence. This gives rise to a twofold problem. First, does it not follow that events in the world which are contemporary with one another, hence causally unrelated, are really related after all by being terms in God's all-inclusive experience? And second, if God already experiences as related events which are as yet still in one another's future by virtue of the durational factor which constitutes their mutual exclusiveness, does it not follow that the future is already known by God and that therefore the freedom of individual events is negated by God's determinate foreknowledge?

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[19] Čapek, "Relativity and the Status of Space," op. cit., pp. 197ff.

Now I believe that satisfactory answers can be given to these questions without forfeiting the inclusiveness principle of panentheism, on the one hand, or a temporalistic omniscience that fully allows for individual freedom, on the other hand.

In the first instance, it does not necessarily follow that constituent parts which are embraced within an inclusive whole must in every instance be related to one another. Since it is the whole which contains the parts, the relation of inclusion or containment is internal to the whole. A given whole is what it is by virtue of just those very parts which constitute it as a whole. Change any one of the parts and there will be a different whole. However, a part need not have relation to the whole; the status of being a part may be an external relation. Thus, for example, AB would not be the actual whole it is without A, but A may well be itself without entering into the particular configuration of AB. Now if external relations may obtain between parts and the wholes of which they are constituents, then it seems equally justifiable to assume that parts within a given whole need not be internally related to one another. There must be an internal relation somewhere, or else no whole could be constituted, but this relation obtains between the whole and its parts, not between the parts and the whole or the parts with one another.

In the second instance, the difficulty is more apparent than real. To be sure, it does follow from the inclusion of the past actual world in God that events which are still in my future, that is, events with which I am contemporary and hence have not yet interacted with causally, are already known by God. But it is one thing to say that events in my future are known by God and quite another to say that God knows the precise way in which I shall interact with these events. To know which variables are possible determin*ables* for my future is not the same thing as knowing which of these possibilities will actually become determinate. Every event possesses an irreducible element of spontaneous self-determination which preempts what would otherwise be a tyrannical, deterministic omniscience.

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